Principle

Use in the book

Chapter 10 pairs principles with elements of the universe. The report on Anaximander makes the unlimited the principle of existing things. In the arithmetic passages, the monad is the beginning of number. Each use asks the reader to identify what depends upon the proposed origin.

Places to read

1. I.10.headingPrinciples and elements are placed together for comparison.
2. I.10.12.2The unlimited is reported as Anaximander’s principle.
3. Arith.6The monad is called the beginning of number.

Translation in this edition

“Principle” serves explanatory contexts; “beginning” preserves a less technical or explicitly generative relation. The chosen English word should not remove a connection the Greek leaves open.

Use in the book

Respect is given both a principle and an underlying cause: an opinion of excellence and an idea of perfection. The paired terms make the grounding relation explicit without requiring two wholly separate mechanisms. Another fragment distinguishes the principles of moral literature from rules that have not yet been made. In a mathematical report, a center can be called the principle of the whole. Such uses share explanatory priority, but do not amount to a single definition of first principles.

Places to read

1. I, p. 471, entry 6, ¶1An estimate of excellence grounds the sentiment of respect.
2. II, p. 505, entry 7, ¶4Principles can be invoked before particular rules exist.
3. II, p. 747, entry 9, ¶1The center is reported as a principle of the whole.

Translation in this edition

The English translation keeps “principle” distinct from “underlying cause.” The mathematical language is part of a reported comparison with a reference to Ficino, not an unattributed proposition proved by Joubert.

Use in the book

The fourth Century rejects principles left buried in books. They must be brought into the understanding, then continually revived by exercise. Speaking rightly and acting rightly are not interchangeable, and living beside one’s principles is as miserable as having none.

IV.49 calls self-love and gratitude infused principles through which immense ends become possible. The word here describes an operative source rather than a sentence learned by rote. Yet the account of the friend repeatedly distinguishes principles from achieved practice. IV.30 explicitly admits shortfall and repentance. Readers should therefore use the fourth Century as an exposition of commitments and methods, without converting every statement into evidence of flawless personal attainment.

Places to read

1. IV.2Principles must pass from books into understanding and sustained exercise.
2. IV.30The friend’s glorious principles are distinguished from imperfect practice.
3. IV.49Self-love and gratitude are principles through which the creature becomes capable of expansive enjoyment.

In this edition

The difference between native principle and formulated rule is contextual. IV.30 expressly limits what the account claims about actual practice.

Use in the book

At A28 Simplicius calls Love and Strife the principles “properly” so called because they move the elements. He nevertheless concludes that the principles number six. This double use both distinguishes mover from material and brings them under a common explanatory heading. His following criticism reports difficulty in assigning Love and Strife active power in one place and equal standing with the four in another.

Aristotle’s A37 emphasizes a different achievement: Empedocles divides the source of motion into opposed causes. A39 then considers good and evil as principles, but only by reconstructing what Empedocles’ meaning ought to have been. Hippolytus at A31 adds an assimilative account of the universe’s principle beside the monad’s fire. These passages show that “principle” is a privileged site of later system-building. A reader should ask in each case what is being made primary: a constituent, a mover, an ethical explanation or an original cosmic condition.

Places to read

1. A 28 (testimony)Simplicius, Physics 25,21, from Theophrastus. Distinguishes the two proper moving principles while arriving at six principles overall.
2. A 33 (testimony)2Aëtius I 3,20. Describes Love and Strife as two original powers, one unifying and the other dividing.
3. A 39 (polemical)Aristotle, Metaphysics A 4, 984b32. Considers whether good and evil may properly be called Empedoclean principles.

Translation in this edition

The edition correctly warns that no quoted fragment here counts six principles. Retain the explanatory usefulness of the classification without presenting it as an explicit line of the poem.

Use in the book

The first principle is the underived source of things, not merely the earliest member of a temporal sequence or an abstract proposition. Ficino identifies it with supreme unity, truth, and goodness. There cannot be two independent equal first principles, since their common and differentiating features would entail composition or a higher source. Nor can principles rise without end, since an order entirely received from elsewhere would lack an originating and stabilizing source. This priority supports preservation as well as initial production. In II.3.10 Ficino combines philosophical and theological names, describing unity as principle, truth as the principle's reason, and goodness as the love of the rational principle. He attributes the theology to the apostle John and mentions the Platonist Amelius's reception of it. The alignment brings these named authorities into Ficino's own theological synthesis. Fons makes the causal meaning vivid: finite things have a source of essence rather than being their own inexhaustible springs.

III.1.26 distinguishes soul as fountain because it has motion from itself and as principle because it pours motion into others. The Apelles example then calls the meadow the beginning and end, while soul is the fountain accounting for the activity’s gradual mode. These local distinctions prevent “source” from erasing the difference between object, final cause, external incitement, and inward temporal operation.

Further passage references. II.1.2–723456; II.2.1–82345678; II.3.1–102345678910; II.7.16

Selected annotated passages.

III.1.26. Fountain and principle receive explicit, different glosses.

III.1.30. Beginning and end belong to the meadow; the fountain of succession belongs to soul.

Places to read

1. II.1.2–723456Received unities point toward a first unifying source.
2. II.2.1–82345678Competing equal first principles are rejected through dependence and composition.
3. II.3.10Unity, truth, and goodness are joined in the theological account of one source.
4. II.7.16Completion and origination are connected in causal explanation.

Translation in this edition

The English’s “principle,” “fountain,” and “source” overlap without being dispensable synonyms. II.3.10 attributes a theological alignment of principle, reason, and love to John as received by Amelius; this is Ficino’s report. III.1.26 explicitly differentiates fountain from principle.

The English’s several source-words should be kept visible. Calling soul a fountain of motion does not make it the first cause of its own being.

corruo / renascor

corruo / renascor. Printed forms: corruunt; renasci.

To collapse and to arise again. If the first principle were extinguished, all things would collapse and no new beginning would be available; the scenario is counterfactual. References: I.3.32. See Principle.

fons / principium

fons / principium. Printed forms: fontem; fontem et principium motionis; principium.

Fountain / originating principle. Ficino explicitly explains fountain as having motion from itself, principle as communicating it to others. References: III.1.26. See Principle.

primum / summum / ultimum

primum / summum / ultimum. Printed forms: primo; primum; primumque; summa; summam; Ultimum; ultimus.

First / highest / last or final. Priority, rank, and finality can coincide in the divine first principle but are not identical lexical notions. References: II.11.35, II.12.12, III.1.23. See Principle.

primum / ultimum

primum / ultimum. Printed forms: primum; ultimum.

First and last in a causal or ontological order. God’s universal action and matter’s universal passivity are opposed as first and last; the ordering is not merely chronological. References: I.2.6. See Principle.

principium / origo

principium / origo. Printed forms: origo; principium.

Source or principle, and origin of being or action. The first principle also serves as the final end; a proximate producer is not therefore the first origin of its own efficacy. References: II.1.2, II.3.9, II.7.25. See Principle.

Begetter beginning and end (Greek quotation)

παντογένεθλ’, ἀρχὴ πάντων, πάντων τε τελευτή

Ficino glosses the Orphic address to Jupiter as begetter, beginning and end of all. It supports the claim that the first principle moves things for its own sake, while the life of the world provides under that higher direction. Beginning and end are causal and final relations here, not simply the earliest and latest moments of a temporal sequence.

Place. II.13.21. See Principle.

Amelius (authorities and cited works)

Amelius. The Platonist whom Ficino associates with the reception of John's theology in the alignment of unity, truth, and goodness with principle, reason, and love. II.3.10. See Principle; Unity and multiplicity.

John the Apostle (authorities and cited works)

John the Apostle. Ficino attributes to his theology the principle–reason–love interpretation of unity, truth, and goodness, with Amelius named as a recipient. II.3.10. See Principle.