From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordἈνωφελής is “unprofitable”, “of no use”, the negative of the family of ὄφελος, “use”, and ὠφελεῖν, “to benefit”.
- In the CharmidesTwice, in Socrates’ verdict. What is agreed to be the finest of all things “would not have turned out to be of no use to us, if I were of any use at inquiring well” (175a–b); and the inquiry has shown what they agreed on and laid down as temperance “to be of no benefit” (175d).
- In this edition“Of no use” at 175b, where it plays on “use”; “of no benefit” at 175d.
- A place to read175a–176a.
- English renderings
- ἀνωφελές, anōpheles, “of no use”, “of no benefit”
Meaning
Ἀνωφελής (anōphelēs) is formed from ἀ-, “not”, and the stem of ὄφελος, “use, help”, and ὠφελεῖν, “to help, to benefit”: what brings no profit or help. It is the negative of ὠφέλιμος, “beneficial”, the word on which the dialogue’s second question turns: whether temperance, if it were knowledge of knowledge, would benefit us (167b, 169b; see ὠφέλιμος).
Use in the book
The verdict falls on temperance as they have defined it, and Socrates lays the blame once on the inquirer and once on the definition; the virtue itself he still calls “a great good” (175e). At 175a Socrates has shown that temperance, as defined, would be “the craftsman of no benefit” (see οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός), and he turns at once on himself, saying that he was right to blame himself (175a; see αἰτιάομαι): “For surely what is agreed to be the finest of all things would not have turned out to be of no use to us, if I were of any use at inquiring well” (175a–b; see ὄφελος). The play on ὄφελος in ἀνωφελές puts the failure where Socrates puts it, in his inquiring.
The second use comes after the list of concessions (175b–c; see ἄλογος). The inquiry, personified, has mocked the truth and shown what they had made up between them and laid down as temperance “with the utmost insolence, to be of no benefit” (175d; see ἀλήθεια; ὑβριστικῶς). What is of no benefit here is their own construction, the thing they modelled and set up, not the virtue it was meant to describe.
Socrates then says so in so many words. He would be aggrieved if he had taken great pains to learn a charm “for a thing worth nothing”, but he does not think it so: he is “a poor inquirer”, and temperance “a great good” (175e; see ἀγανακτέω; ζητητής). The dialogue that set out to ask whether temperance benefits us ends by finding the account of it of no benefit and the inquirer of no use, while temperance itself is declared a great good. The verdict moves the question from the virtue to those who try to define it.
Places to read
Both passages in which the word occurs.
Translation in this edition
The Key Words say that at 175b “Socrates plays on ophelos in anōphelēs, ‘of no use to us, if I were of any use at inquiring well’, and the English keeps the play”; the Glossary records “of no use” at 175b and “of no benefit” at 175d. “Use” and “useful” are otherwise kept for ὄφελος, χρηστός and χρήσιμος, and “benefit” for ὠφέλιμος and its family, so that the second verdict answers Socrates’ question about benefit in its own terms.
Elsewhere in Plato
In the Republic the word names the philosopher’s fate in a bad city. Socrates tells Adeimantus, Plato’s other brother, that the few who have tasted philosophy and seen the madness of the many know that no one acts soundly in politics, and that a man who went to the aid of justice would be like a man fallen among wild beasts, unwilling to join in their wrongs and unable alone to hold out against them all, and would perish before he could help his city or his friends, “of no use to himself or to anyone else”. So he keeps quiet and does his own business, like a man sheltering behind a wall from a storm of dust and wind (496c–d). Quietness and doing one’s own business, two of the definitions the Charmides rejects (159b, 161b), can be read as returning there as the refuge of the man who would otherwise be useless.
In the Lysis the word measures friendship. Socrates tells the boy Lysis that in matters where we are of no use, no one will love us, not even our father or mother; if he becomes wise, all will be his friends, since he will be useful and good (210c–d). Beside the Lysis, the end of the Charmides can be read as a paradox: the boy asks to be charmed by Socrates every day (176b), though Socrates’ inquiry has been, by his own account, of no use.