Care for oneself

Use in the book

The demand develops before its definition. At 119a Socrates asks whether Alcibiades will leave himself as he is or undertake some care. Alcibiades accepts the criticism of the politicians but draws the wrong practical conclusion: their incompetence makes his own preparation unnecessary. Socrates redirects his competitive ambition toward stronger rivals. Care becomes the resource that can compensate for disadvantages of upbringing and resources, linked first with wisdom at 123d and then with craft at 124b. This is a motivational approach to self-care, not its final account.

At 124b–d2 Alcibiades finally asks what care he should undertake. Socrates deliberately includes himself: both men need care, and all human beings need it. The form of the conversation changes from an apparently self-sufficient young man being inspected by a superior to an inquiry they must conduct together. Socrates' exceptional divine guardian does not turn this into a claim that he himself needs no education. Care remains a task for the speaking partners.

The decisive question is delayed until the failure to define civic excellence and concord. At 127e–128a2 Socrates warns that one may think one is caring for oneself while actually looking after something else. The warning repeats the earlier structure of epistemic conceit: conviction that one is doing the right thing may conceal the absence of the required knowledge. Shoes and feet supply the controlled example. Improving shoes is not identical with improving feet; the first belongs to shoemaking, the second to bodily training. The difference extends from a thing and its belongings to oneself and one's belongings.

This separation establishes why self-knowledge must precede intelligent care. One cannot identify the craft that improves a shoe without knowing what a shoe is; likewise one cannot identify the care of oneself while ignorant of what one is. The argument then identifies the human being, provisionally, with the soul that uses and rules the body. At 132b–c the practical consequence is made explicit: care is to be directed to the soul, while care of bodies and money may be entrusted to others. The latter tasks do not vanish; they cease to define the primary work of becoming good.

The eye analogy gives a direction for such care rather than a detailed curriculum. The soul must attend to soul, especially the region of knowing and intelligence. The ensuing identification of self-knowledge with temperance connects this activity to discovering one's own goods and acting well. Self-care is consequently neither private withdrawal nor permission to privilege one's wishes over other people's needs. At 134c the person who will care for a city must first possess the virtue to be shared with its citizens. Personal and political care are ordered by the same requirement of knowledgeable goodness.

The last promise is especially important: Alcibiades says he will begin caring for justice, not merely thinking about his own identity. That promise translates the inquiry into an ethical direction without certifying its completion. Socrates wishes him perseverance and fears the city's power. The dialogue thus ends with care begun, vulnerable, and still needing to continue.

Places to read

1. 119a–120d23Neglected preparation becomes the need to take care of oneself
2. 123d–124d2Care is paired with wisdom and craft; Socrates includes himself in its need
3. 127e–129a234Right care improves its object; care of oneself is distinguished from care of possessions
4. 132b–133c23Care is directed to soul and its knowing excellence
5. 134c–135e234Care for the city presupposes personal virtue; Alcibiades promises care for justice

Translation in this edition

The edition consistently uses “care for,” keeping ἐπιμελεῖσθαι distinct from therapeutic tending and from ordinary wishing. At 127e–128a2 its parenthesis is a warning that “we may perhaps fail to notice,” not a factual assertion that this happens often. The qualification matters: the inquiry must guard against misidentifying care's object.

ἀδύνατος

Attested: ἀδύνατον (adynaton; 129a). At 129a: Impossible to identify the craft improving self while ignorant of what one is, the negative side of the care requirement. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀδύνατος. See Care for oneself.

ἐξηγέομαι

Attested: ἐξηγήσασθαι (exēgēsasthai; 124b). To explain or set out; Alcibiades now asks Socrates to explain what kind of care is needed. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐξηγέομαι. See Care for oneself.

ἐπιμέλεια

Attested: ἐπιμέλειαν (epimeleian; 128b). At 128b: Right care is attention that makes its actual object better, not simply time or effort expended on something associated with it. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπιμέλεια. See Care for oneself.

ἐπιμελέομαι

Attested: τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι (to heautou epimeleisthai; 127e); ψυχῆς ἐπιμελητέον (psychēs epimelēteon; 132c). At 127e: To attend to oneself as the object needing improvement; the subsequent inquiry tests whether this is confused with attending to belongings. At 132c: The verbal adjective states that soul must receive care, after soul has been provisionally identified as the person. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπιμελέομαι. See Care for oneself.

τάχα

Attested: τάχ’ (tach’; 129a). At 129a: Possibly know proper self-care after knowing oneself; the positive result is cautiously proposed, unlike the negative impossibility. Lexical identification: lemma: τάχα. See Care for oneself.