Use and profit

Use in the book

The leaf is of no use without its accompanying charm (155e). Use is conditional on the right treatment of the whole person. At 165a the Delphic dedicators are said to have set up useful advice; at 165c Socrates asks what use medicine is and answers by identifying its beneficial work. These different uses introduce the general demand that a proposed resource should contribute something.

The doctor and other craftsmen may not know whether they will derive benefit from their work (164b). “Profit” here opens an evaluative uncertainty, not necessarily a question about professional fees. The same verb asks whether the maximally granted knowledge would benefit us at all (172d), and whether Charmides would gain anything from possessing temperance (175e).

The negative judgment at 172c concerns the inquiry: perhaps they have sought to no useful purpose. Socrates repeats the thought at 175a and makes a wordplay at 175b between temperance's appearing of no use and his own being of any use at inquiry. This does not prove that temperance is useless; his self-criticism explicitly resists that outcome. The recurrence links the practical worth of the virtue with the adequacy of the way it has been investigated.

Places to read

1. 155eThe proposed treatment combines singing the charm with using the remedy.
2. 155eThe remedy has no use without the charm
3. 164bA craftsman may not know whether his work will profit him
4. 165a–d2Useful advice and the use of medicine provide distinct contexts
5. 172c–dThe inquiry’s utility and the hypothesised knowledge’s benefit are questioned
6. 175a–e2Socrates makes the use-wordplay and rejects the virtue’s apparent worthlessness
7. 173cThe dream assumes that people employ genuine craftsmen, without yet establishing happiness.

Translation in this edition

The edition normally reserves “benefit” for the ὠφελ- family and “use” for ὄφελος and χρηστ-/χρησιμ-. Exceptions are visible: ὀνήσει is “benefit” at 172d, while ἀνωφελές is “of no use” at 175b for the verbal play. “Profit” for ὀνίνημι should not be expanded into an unattested theory of financial gain.

ὄφελος

Attested: ὄφελος (ophelos). Use or advantage; the leaf without the charm and the allegedly useless temperance both prompt the question of practical benefit. References: 155e, 175b. Lexical identification: lemma: ὄφελος. See Use and profit.

χράομαι

Attested: χρῷτο / κεχρημένῳ / χρῆσθαι (chrōito / kechrēmenōi / chrēsthai). Use or make use of a remedy or genuine craftspeople; the Homeric perfect κεχρημένῳ instead means being in need and belongs to the verb’s want-or-need sense. References: 155e, 161a, 173c. Lexical identification: lemma: χράομαι. See Use and profit.

χρήσιμος

Attested: χρησίμους / χρησίμη (chrēsimous / chrēsimē). Useful or serviceable; qualifies Delphic advice and raises the question of what medicine contributes. References: 165a, 165c. Lexical identification: lemma: χρήσιμος. See Use and profit.

χρηστός

Attested: χρηστὸν (chrēston). Good, useful or serviceable; asks whether the inquiry has found anything practically worthwhile. References: 172c, 175a. Lexical identification: lemma: χρηστός. See Use and profit.

Use in the book

Socrates says Lysis gets no ὄφελος from his great wealth because others exercise control over it. The thought carries on to his fine body, which someone else tends. The noun names the advantage that possession ought to yield but here seems not to yield.

This practical use should be kept distinct from the adjective χρήσιμος and from the abstract noun ὠφελία. Its role is to expose a gap between owning something and being able to benefit from it, preparing the appeal to understanding as the condition of effective control.

Places to read

1. 208eοὐδὲν ὄφελος — no benefit.