DiotimosReading Desk

Argument, distinctions and uncertainty

Generality and qualification

ἔστιν ὧν (estin hōn); ἔστιν οἷς (estin hois); ἔχουσί πως (echousi pōs); εἴπερ (eiper); ὀλιγάκις (oligakis); τὰ πλείω (ta pleiō)

This heading gathers the ordinary expressions that restrict the dialogue’s claims: of some things, for some people, in a certain condition, if indeed, seldom and for the most part.

From the book

Alcibiades II

Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordThis heading gathers the ordinary expressions that restrict the dialogue’s claims: of some things, for some people, in a certain condition, if indeed, seldom and for the most part.
  • In Alcibiades IIThe central correction comes at 143c.
  • In this editionThe translation deliberately retains the repeated phrases and hesitant formulations.
  • A place to readThe blanket verdict on ignorance is qualified by object, agent and state.

Meaning

This heading gathers the ordinary expressions that restrict the dialogue’s claims: of some things, for some people, in a certain condition, if indeed, seldom and for the most part. They are not a specialised Greek terminology for quantification. Their importance is that the argument’s most startling conclusions change substantially when their restrictions are omitted.

Use in the book

The central correction comes at 143c. Alcibiades has blamed ignorance broadly; Socrates demands an object, a person and a condition. The conclusion at 144c repeats the restrictions after the Pericles and Orestes cases. A local good effect does not establish that ignorance is good universally, just as the universal condemnation did not survive a counterexample.

The next claim is qualified differently. Possession of other knowledge without the best “looks as though” it seldom benefits and mostly harms at 144d. The assertion concerns the usual consequences under a specified absence, not the impossibility of any beneficial result. At 146d the paradox about not knowing additionally depends on the conditional that knowledge or supposed knowledge makes people readier to act to their harm. The practical mechanism is part of the claim, not dispensable decoration.

The argument nevertheless sometimes generalises beyond what its examples independently show. At 143e ignorance of the best is called bad for everyone after the Orestes exchange. The numerical and frequency claims about the many are not established by measured evidence. A close reader can acknowledge the intended generality while distinguishing it from what has been demonstrated. Preserving qualifications does not require pretending that every inference has thereby become conclusive.

Places to read

  1. 143cThe blanket verdict on ignorance is qualified by object, agent and state.
  2. 143eIgnorance of the best receives a contrasting universal condemnation.
  3. 144cThe restricted positive conclusion is repeated.
  4. 144d; 146eThe central thesis includes an absence condition and frequency qualifiers.
  5. 146dThe practical conclusion depends on a stated condition about eagerness and harm.

Translation in this edition

The translation deliberately retains the repeated phrases and hesitant formulations. They should not be abbreviated into slogans such as “knowledge is harmful” or “ignorance is good”. Conversely, its full force at 143e should not be softened into a merely occasional disadvantage.