From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordΔιαφέρω, to carry apart; intransitively, to differ, and so to stand out, to excel; impersonally διαφέρει, “it makes a difference”. Its noun is διαφορά, “difference”.
- In the CharmidesSeven times. In the prologue it is the word for distinction, of the young (153d), of the boy (157d twice) and of his family (157e). Then it turns: Charmides asks “what difference does it make” who said the definition (161c), Critias says the god addresses those who enter “differently from men” (164e), and he tells Socrates that his search has brought him to “the very point in which temperance differs from all the other kinds of knowledge” (166b).
- In this edition“Outstanding”, “surpass”, “excel”, “what difference does it make”, “differently from”, “differs from”.
- A place to read165e–166c.
- English renderings
- διαφέροντες, diapherontes, “outstanding”; διαφέρειν, diapherein, “surpass”, “excel”; διαφέρουσα, diapherousa, “outstanding”; διαφέρει, diapherei, “what difference does it make”, “differs from”; διαφέρον, diapheron, “differently from”
Meaning
The verb joins φέρειν, “to carry”, with διά, “apart”: what is carried apart from the rest differs from it. With a dative of respect it means to excel in something, as the boy excels his contemporaries in looks; with the genitive, to differ from something; and in the third person, διαφέρει, it asks whether a thing matters. The noun gives the language of definition its word for what sets a thing apart from others of its kind.
Use in the book
The prologue uses the verb for rank. Socrates, back from Potidaea, asks “whether any of them had turned out to be outstanding in wisdom, or in beauty, or in both” (153d; see ἐγγίγνομαι; σοφία ἢ κάλλος). Critias answers for his ward that Charmides is thought “to surpass those his age” in looks and in temperance alike (157d; see δοκέω; ἰδέα). Socrates agrees that it is only right that the boy “should excel all the others in all these things” (157d–e; see δίκαιος), for his father’s house has come down celebrated by the poets for its outstanding beauty and virtue (157e; see ἐγκωμιάζω). In these four places to differ is to stand above, and the standing is a matter of birth and of what people say.
At 161c the verb is turned on the question of authority. Socrates guesses that the boy heard “doing one’s own business” from Critias, and Charmides asks, “But what difference does it make, Socrates … whom I heard it from?” Socrates answers, “None”: what matters is whether what is said is true (161c; see ἀληθής). At 164e Critias uses the participle of the god at Delphi, who addresses those who enter “differently from men” (see Γνῶθι σαυτόν).
The last use is the weightiest. Socrates has shown that every craft-knowledge is of something other than itself, calculation of the odd and even, weighing of the heavy and light, and asks what temperance is knowledge of. Critias replies: “There it is, Socrates … Your search has brought you to the very point in which temperance differs from all the other kinds of knowledge, and yet you are looking for some likeness between it and the others. It isn’t so” (166b–c; see ὁμοιότης).
Critias’ difference is a difference in kind: the other kinds of knowledge are of something else, his alone is of itself and of the others (166c). The claim is a strong one, since it removes temperance from the comparisons by which Socrates has been testing it, and the rest of the argument can be read as testing whether a knowledge that differs so much from the others is still a knowledge of anything. The dialogue’s first uses of the word praise a boy for standing out; its last makes a virtue stand out so far that, by 175b, no one can find what it is.
Places to read
Every passage in which the verb occurs.
- 153dSocrates asks whether any of the young have turned out outstanding in wisdom, or in beauty, or in both.
- 157dCharmides is thought to surpass his contemporaries in looks and in temperance.
- 157d–eIt is only right that he should excel the others; his father’s house has come down celebrated for its outstanding beauty and virtue.
- 161cWhat difference does it make whom he heard it from? None; the question is whether it is true.
- 164eThe god addresses those who enter his temple differently from men.
- 166b–cCritias: Socrates has come to the very point in which temperance differs from all the other kinds of knowledge.
Translation in this edition
Διαφέροντες (153d4) is “outstanding”, διαφέρειν “surpass” at 157d2 and “excel” at 157d9, διαφέρουσα “outstanding” (157e7). Τί διαφέρει (161c3) is “what difference does it make”, διαφέρον τι ἢ οἱ ἄνθρωποι (164e4) “differently from men”, and τὸ ᾧ διαφέρει πασῶν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν (166b8) “the very point in which temperance differs from all the other kinds of knowledge”. The reading rests on a conjecture. Burnet prints τὸ ᾧ, H. Richards’ correction, where B has ὅτῳ and T and W τῷ; and he prints T’s πασῶν, “all”, also a variant in W, where B and W have πλείω, “more” (apparatus, b8).
Elsewhere in Plato
In the Theaetetus the third account of λόγος that Socrates tries is the one most people would give: to be able to name some sign by which the thing asked about differs from all others, as the sun is the brightest of the bodies that move about the earth. Whoever adds to a correct opinion of a thing its difference from the rest, he says, will have become knowledgeable where before he only opined (208c–e). Then he finds the account empty: a correct opinion of a thing must already include how it differs from the others, so that the instruction to add the difference tells us to add what we have (209d–e). In the Meno knowledge differs from right opinion by the bond of reasoning that ties it down (98a; see δόξα), and the virtues, many as they are, do not differ in the one form they share (72c; see εἶδος).
Other ancient sources
Aristotle, in his book of distinctions, gives as the first sense of the term that things are called different which are other while being the same in something, not in number only but in species, in genus or by analogy.1 On that account Critias’ temperance, if it differs from the other kinds of knowledge, must still share something with them, and Socrates’ search for a likeness can be read as a search for that common ground.
Source note
1. Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.9, 1018a12–14.