From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordActive, to benefit, to help; middle, to have profit, to get good from something.
- In the CharmidesThree times: whether each craftsman must know “when he is going to profit from the work he is doing” (164b); whether temperance, if it is of that kind, “will benefit us at all” (172d); and the boy is “to get no profit from this temperance” (175e).
- In this edition“Profit”, “benefit”.
- A place to read172c–d.
- English renderings
- ὀνήσεσθαι, onēsesthai, “profit”; ὀνήσει, onēsei, “will benefit”; ὀνήσῃ, onēsēi, “get … profit”
Meaning
Ὀνίνημι is an old verb, frequent in epic, of help and its enjoyment; in Attic prose it stands beside ὠφελέω, the dialogue’s ordinary word for benefit, and has a plainer, more personal ring: what does a man get out of it?
Use in the book
The three uses mark the three points at which the dialogue asks what temperance is good for. At 164b the middle voice asks about the craftsman’s own profit. The doctor who heals a patient makes something beneficial for himself and for the patient; but must he know when his treatment is beneficial, and must each craftsman know “when he is going to profit from the work he is doing, and when he is not?” “Perhaps not” (164b; see δημιουργός; ὠφελίμως). If not, a man could act temperately without knowing it, and Critias, rather than concede that, turns to self-knowledge (164c–d; see γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν).
At 172d the active asks the question of the whole second half. Having granted that temperance is knowing what one knows and does not know, Socrates proposes to “look still better at whether, if it is of that kind, it will benefit us at all” (172d; see δίδωμι), and the answer, through the dream, is that it will not, since the knowledge that benefits is of good and bad (174d–175a; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ). At 175e the middle returns, and the profit is the boy’s: Socrates tells the boy that he is very aggrieved on his account, “if you, being such as you are in your looks and, besides, most temperate in soul, are to get no profit from this temperance, and it is to be of no benefit to you in life by being present in you” (175d–e; see ἀγανακτέω). The two verbs stand side by side there, ὀνήσῃ and ὠφελήσει, as if Socrates needed both to say how little the argument had left.
Places to read
Every passage in which the verb occurs.
Translation in this edition
“Profit” renders the middle at 164b9, ὀνήσεσθαι, and 175e1, ὀνήσῃ, “get no profit”; “benefit” renders the active ὀνήσει at 172d2, the one place where “benefit” does not render ὠφελέω and its family, as the Glossary notes under “beneficial”.
Elsewhere in Plato
In the Euthydemus Socrates and the young Clinias, having agreed that one must love wisdom, ask which knowledge they should rightly acquire, and answer simply: the one that will benefit us. Would it benefit us to know how to go about the earth and find where the most gold is buried? Not even the power to turn stones into gold would be worth anything without knowing how to use the gold; nor is there any use in money-making or medicine or any other knowledge that knows how to make a thing and not how to use what it makes, nor even in a knowledge that could make men immortal without knowing how to use immortality. So they need a knowledge in which making and knowing how to use what is made coincide (288d–289b). The Charmides asks at 172d, with the same verb, ὀνήσει, whether temperance will benefit us at all, the question the Euthydemus takes as its first step; its answer at 174b–d, that only the knowledge of good and bad benefits, can be read as where the Euthydemus’ search for a knowledge that both makes and uses is heading.