From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Orientation
At a Glance
- The wordΔιαγιγνώσκω, to know apart, to distinguish, discern; to decide between. Its noun, διάγνωσις, is the source of English “diagnosis”.
- In the CharmidesOnce: “If the temperate man, or anyone else, is to tell the true doctor from the one who is not, won’t he proceed like this?” (170e).
- In this edition“Tell … from”.
- A place to read170d–171c.
- English renderings
- διαγνώσεσθαι, diagnōsesthai, “to tell … from”
Meaning
The prefix διά, “apart”, gives γιγνώσκειν, “to know”, the sense of knowing one thing from another: to tell apart, and so to judge between them. It is the knowing of the examiner, who must sort what is presented to him into the genuine and the false.
Use in the book
The verb names the test that the temperate man was promised he could pass. At 167a the temperate man was to be able to inspect others, to see what each knows and what he only thinks he knows (see ἐξετάζω; οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι). By 170d Socrates has shown that a knowledge of knowledge would know only that a man has some knowledge, not of what. He then sets out how the test would have to be done: “If the temperate man, or anyone else, is to tell the true doctor from the one who is not, won’t he proceed like this?” He will not discuss medicine with the doctor, who understands nothing but the healthy and the diseased (170e; see διαλέγομαι; ἐπαΐω). The examiner must look into the doctor “in so far as he is a doctor, in what is healthy and diseased” (171b; see ᾗ ἰατρικός), and no one can do that without medicine; the full argument is told under ἀληθινός.
The verb’s point is that telling apart is itself a knowledge of the thing. To distinguish the true doctor from the pretender one must know what a doctor knows, as a doctor distinguishes the healthy from the diseased. The temperate man, who has knowledge only of knowledge, cannot tell the pretender from the doctor (170e; see διακρίνω), and the dialogue concludes that only a “fellow craftsman” can (171c; see ὁμότεχνος). Socrates, who spends the dialogue telling the genuine from the pretended, can be read as the case the argument cannot account for; the edition’s note at 170d calls the result “perhaps the result that tells most against Critias’ definition”, since examining others is “exactly what Socrates does in the Apology”.
Places to read
The passage in which the verb occurs, with the argument it begins.
Translation in this edition
Τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἰατρὸν διαγνώσεσθαι καὶ τὸν μή (170e4–5) is “to tell the true doctor from the one who is not”. The future middle infinitive depends on εἰ μέλλει, “if he is to”. The English uses “distinguish … from” for διακρίνειν at 170e2 and “tell … from” for both διαγνώσεσθαι here and διακρῖναι at 171c5, so that one Greek verb has two renderings and two Greek verbs share one (see διακρίνω).
Elsewhere in Plato
The Gorgias stages the test before a bad judge: set before children, the cook would beat the doctor over which of them understands good and bad food (464d–e; see ἀληθινός). The Charmides’ examiner without medicine can be read as in the children’s place. In the myth of the Republic the one study worth having is the knowledge that can tell the good life from the bad (618c; see βίος).
Other ancient sources
Xenophon’s Socrates uses the verb of self-knowledge: those who know themselves know what suits them and distinguish what they can do from what they cannot (Memorabilia 4.2.26; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν). Aristotle uses it of the judgment for which men call in advisers: on great matters, distrusting ourselves, we take counsellors, as not able to discern the case alone (Nicomachean Ethics 3.3, 1112b10–11; see βουλεύομαι).