From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordTo help, to do good to, to benefit, with the person benefited in the accusative; the opposite of βλάπτειν, “harm”.
- In the CharmidesFive times: Socrates’ question whether such a knowledge “would benefit us or not” (169b); “the knowledge whose work is to benefit us” (174d); Critias’ reply, “Why couldn’t it benefit us?” and “it would benefit us” (174d–e); and Socrates’ grief that temperance “is to be of no benefit to you in life” (175e).
- In this edition“Benefit”.
- A place to read174d–175a and 175d–176a.
- English renderings
- ὠφελοῖ, ōpheloi, “would benefit”; ὠφελεῖν, ōphelein, “to benefit”; ὠφελήσει, ōphelēsei, “is to be of … benefit”
Meaning
To benefit someone is to make him better off: to help him in need, to cure him, to profit him. The verb takes the person benefited as its object, and the question it raises is whom a thing benefits and how. In the Charmides the object is “us” three times, understood a fourth time in Critias’ “Why couldn’t it benefit us?” (174d8, where the English supplies it), and “you”, the boy, once.
Use in the book
The verb first frames Socrates’ condition for accepting Critias’ definition: he will not grant that knowledge of knowledge is temperance until he has looked into whether a thing of that kind “would benefit us or not” (169b; see ὠφέλιμος). At 174d it names the work of the knowledge of good and bad, “the knowledge whose work is to benefit us” (see ἔργον τὸ ὠφελεῖν), and so takes the benefit away from temperance.
Critias answers with his last claim for his definition, “Why couldn’t it benefit us?”: temperance, if it presides over the other kinds of knowledge, would rule over the knowledge of the good as well, and so “it would benefit us” (174d–e; see ἄρχω; ἐπιστατέω). His temperance benefits as a ruler benefits, by commanding the knowledge that does the work. Socrates’ reply shows the cost: then temperance would also make us healthy, and not medicine, and do each craft’s work, though they had agreed long ago that it was knowledge only of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge, and of nothing else (174e; see τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον). A ruler that knows only knowledge has nothing of its own to give, and the reply leaves Critias’ claim with no ground. The political dream of temperance presiding over the city’s knowledge (171d–172a, 173a–d) is here compressed into one sentence, and the sentence fails.
The last use turns from “us” to the boy. “But on your account, Charmides … I am very aggrieved”, Socrates says, if temperance “is to be of no benefit to you in life by being present in you” (175d–e; see ἀγανακτέω; βίος; ὀνίνημι; σωφροσύνη παροῦσα). The question of benefit is now a question about one life, and Socrates will not accept the answer the argument has given. He blames himself as a poor inquirer (175e; see φαῦλος; ὠφέλιμος).
Places to read
Every passage in which the verb occurs.
- 169bSocrates will not grant the definition until he has looked into whether such a knowledge would benefit us.
- 174dThe knowledge whose work is to benefit us is the knowledge of good and bad, not temperance.
- 174d–e2Critias: temperance, ruling over the knowledge of the good, would benefit us.
- 175eSocrates is aggrieved that temperance is to be of no benefit to the boy in life.
Translation in this edition
“Benefit” renders the verb at 169b3, 174d4, 174d8 and 174e2. At 175e2 μηδέ τί σ’ ὠφελήσει, literally “and will not benefit you at all”, is “it is to be of no benefit to you”, keeping the family’s word beside ὀνήσῃ, “get no profit”, just before it.
Other ancient sources
Xenophon opens the fourth book of his memoirs of Socrates with the family’s words, the adjective twice and then the verb. Socrates, he says, was so beneficial in every matter and in every way that anyone who considered it, even with modest discernment, could see that nothing was more beneficial than to be with Socrates and spend time with him, anywhere and on any matter; even the memory of him, when he was not there, benefited not a little those who used to be with him and accepted him.1 The Charmides ends with temperance shown, by the argument, to be of no benefit, and with the boy resolved to be charmed by Socrates every day (176b; see ὅσαι ἡμέραι). Xenophon’s sentence can be read as saying what the boy’s resolve implies.
Source note
1. Xenophon, Memorabilia 4.1.1.