From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordTwo adverbs of place: οὐδαμοῦ, “nowhere”, and ὀλιγαχοῦ, “in few places”, here qualified by πάνυ που, “very few, I suppose”, πάνυ strengthening and που softening.
- In the CharmidesOnce: “quiet actions in life have appeared finer to us than quick and strong ones either nowhere or in very few places” (160b–c).
- In this edition“Either nowhere or in very few places”.
- A place to read159b–160d.
- English renderings
- ἢ οὐδαμοῦ … ἢ πάνυ που ὀλιγαχοῦ, ē oudamou … ē panu pou oligachou, “either nowhere or in very few places”
Meaning
Ὀλιγαχοῦ, from ὀλίγος, “few”, is a rare word: “in few places”, “in few cases”. Set beside οὐδαμοῦ it makes a statement about a count: the cases have been surveyed, and the exceptions are none or almost none. It is the language of an argument from instances, not of a proof.
Use in the book
The phrase sums up the survey that refutes the boy’s first definition. Socrates has run through writing, reading, the lyre, wrestling, boxing, running and jumping, learning, teaching, remembering, understanding and deliberating, and in each the quick and vigorous has seemed finer than the quiet (159c–160b; see ὀξέως; ὀξύτης; ταχύς). The phrase is his count: quiet actions have appeared finer “either nowhere or in very few places” (160b–c). The dilemma it opens and the concession that follows are told elsewhere (160b–d; see δυοῖν τὰ ἕτερα; ὅτι μάλιστα).
What belongs to the phrase is its modesty. Socrates does not claim that quiet actions are never finer; the hedge πάνυ που, “very few, I suppose”, admits that a case may have been missed, and the concession that follows grants even that the quiet may be as often finer as the quick (160c). The argument does not need the count to be exact, since either horn of the dilemma leaves quietness short of temperance (160c–d; see δυοῖν τὰ ἕτερα). The same adverb returns in the refutation’s last clause, where temperance would not be quietness “whether in walking or in talking or anywhere else” (160c), and later in the argument with Critias, when “no knowledge of this kind has turned up anywhere” (172a). The phrase can be read as the dialogue’s first use of a habit it keeps: a definition is tested by looking for its cases, and found wanting where none, or too few, turn up.
Places to read
The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the concession that follows.
Translation in this edition
“Either nowhere or in very few places” renders ἢ οὐδαμοῦ … ἢ πάνυ που ὀλιγαχοῦ (160b9–c1), with “very” for πάνυ and the tentative που left unexpressed. At 160c6 “whether in walking or in talking” follows Priscian (see λέξις).
Other ancient sources
Aristotle’s judgement that Socrates was owed two things, arguments that lead up from particular cases and the defining of what is common, is told elsewhere (Metaphysics 13.4, 1078b27–30; see εἶδος).