Immortality

Use in the book

At 981e–982a2 the Athenian says that the stellar kind should receive, in opinion, one of two portions. Either each being is indestructible, immortal, and altogether divine by every necessity, or each has a life of long ages sufficient for it, such that it would never need more. The second possibility is not an alternative of ordinary human mortality. It secures an exceptionally durable and sufficient life without making indestructibility the sole available account.

Both sides of the disjunction support the privileged stellar condition. The point is not to resolve, by a newly supplied proof, every question about the duration of a generated god. The opening “we must, very nearly, give them in opinion” also signals the manner of assent. Doxa here is the proposed assessment of their condition, not merely the public reputation of a mortal claimant to wisdom. A summary that says only “the stars are proved immortal” suppresses both the alternative and its stated epistemic framing.

The passage later tightens its language. At 984b the two visible living kinds are contrasted as immortal and wholly mortal, with the earthly kind as the latter. That recapitulation uses the first side of the earlier alternative without separately demonstrating why the other has now been excluded. The lexicon should show this rather than repair the movement by inserting an argument. The earlier sufficiency condition remains part of the work even when the later classification becomes categorical.

Mortality concerns the earthly living kind, the compound defined from body and soul. The final promise for the wise after death is a different claim, made with its own qualification at 992b. The present contrast does not prove that an individual human compound survives forever, and the ending should not be used to convert human bodily life into the stellar constitution. Conversely, saying that the earthly kind is mortal does not by itself refute the text's hope for a soul's transformed condition. The objects and qualifications differ.

The terminology joins duration to happiness without identifying them. At 981e the stars have the happiest and best soul; the following alternatives concern the life adequate to that condition. The phrase “would never need any more” shifts attention from sheer quantity of years to fulfilled life. That is why the long-lived alternative cannot be paraphrased simply as a grudging retreat to “eventually they die.” It presents sufficiency as a positive status.

Places to read

1. 981eδυοῖν … μοιρῶν τὴν ἑτέραν — One of two portions must be assigned
2. 981e–982a2ἀνώλεθρόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον — The first alternative is indestructibility and immortality
3. 982aμακραίωνα βίον — The other is a life of long ages
4. 982aοὐδέν τι πλείονος ἂν προσδεῖσθαί ποτε — Sufficiency means never needing more
5. 984bἀθάνατον, τὸ δὲ γήινον ἅπαν θνητὸν — The later contrast uses immortal and wholly mortal

Translation in this edition

“Life of long ages” preserves the force of makraiōn without turning it into “eternal.” At 984b Burnet prints ἀθάνατον without τὸ μέν, “the one,” which a later hand supplies; the English supplies “one” to make the contrast intelligible. That supplied English is not evidence that τὸ μέν belongs to the Greek reading text.

Mortal visible kind — γήινος (gēinos)

γήινος (gēinos)

Mortal visible kind. The visible earthly class is described as wholly mortal in contrast with the immortal celestial kind. This concerns living compounds, not a complete denial of every posthumous hope. Attested: γήινον (984b). Mortality indestructibility and life long enough.

An expressly alternative status — ἀθάνατος (athanatos)

ἀθάνατος (athanatos)

An expressly alternative status. Immortality is first one of two possible assessments of the stars, alongside life long enough never to require more. Attested: ἀθάνατον (981e). Mortality indestructibility and life long enough.

Categorical later contrast — ἀθάνατος (athanatos)

ἀθάνατος (athanatos)

Categorical later contrast. The recapitulation calls the celestial visible kind immortal while the earthly kind is mortal. It does not separately explain why the earlier longevity alternative has fallen out of the summary. Attested: ἀθάνατον (984b). Mortality indestructibility and life long enough.

First duration alternative — ἀνώλεθρος (anōlethros)

ἀνώλεθρος (anōlethros)

First duration alternative. Indestructibility joins immortality and complete divinity on one side of the stellar-life disjunction. It is not the only possibility initially allowed. Attested: ἀνώλεθρόν (981e). Mortality indestructibility and life long enough.

Long enough life — βίος (bios)

βίος (bios)

Long enough life. The life-course of long ages is said to be adequate for each stellar being. The value is sufficiency rather than indefinite accumulation of years. Attested: βίον (982a). Mortality indestructibility and life long enough.

Life of which one needs no more — ζωή (zōē)

ζωή (zōē)

Life of which one needs no more. The noun gives the life whose quantity is sufficient in the long-lived alternative. The following relative clause emphasizes freedom from need for more. Attested: ζωῆς (982a). Mortality indestructibility and life long enough.

Life over long ages — μακραίων (makraiōn)

μακραίων (makraiōn)

Life over long ages. The adjective offers an enduring and sufficient life as an alternative to indestructible immortality. It does not lexically mean everlasting. Attested: μακραίωνα (982a). Mortality indestructibility and life long enough.

Earthly compound’s condition — θνητός (thnētos)

θνητός (thnētos)

Earthly compound’s condition. The earthly living kind is wholly mortal. The statement concerns the bodily animated class and must be read separately from the final conditional hope for the wise after death. Attested: θνητὸν (984b). Mortality indestructibility and life long enough.

Qualified assignment of stellar duration — δόξα (doxa)

δόξα (doxa)

Qualified assignment of stellar duration. Opinion is the mode in which one of the two stellar portions is assigned. It should not be silently promoted to a separately supplied demonstration. Attested: δόξῃ (981e). Mortality indestructibility and life long enough.

Two possible stellar conditions — μοῖρα (moira)

μοῖρα (moira)

Two possible stellar conditions. The two portions are immortality and a life of sufficiently long ages. The wording marks a genuine alternative in the speaker’s assessment. Attested: μοιρῶν (981e). Mortality indestructibility and life long enough.

Life sufficient for a star — ἱκανός (hikanos)

ἱκανός (hikanos)

Life sufficient for a star. A life of long ages is sufficient for each stellar being and would require no more. Adequacy concerns a fulfilled condition, not merely a large duration. Attested: ἱκανὸν (982a). Mortality indestructibility and life long enough.

Qualified stellar assessment — σχεδόν (schedon)

σχεδόν (schedon)

Qualified stellar assessment. Very nearly qualifies the assignment in opinion of one of two stellar portions. It reinforces the need to preserve the alternative rather than report an unqualified proof of immortality. Attested: σχεδόν (981e). Mortality indestructibility and life long enough.

Two portions for stellar duration (contextual phrase)

δυοῖν δὲ αὐτοῖς μοιρῶν τὴν ἑτέραν χρὴ δόξῃ μεταδιδόναι σχεδόν (981e)

One of two portions must, very nearly, be assigned to the stars in opinion. The dual and the following either/or structure establish a real choice between indestructible immortality and sufficiently long life. The later categorical use of immortal cannot erase this earlier formulation. Mortality indestructibility and life long enough.

A life needing nothing longer (contextual phrase)

ἧς οὐδέν τι πλείονος ἂν προσδεῖσθαί ποτε (982a)

The relative clause refers to the life of which each stellar being has enough. The language stresses sufficiency, never needing any more, rather than simply conceding that a long life must end. It is the positive condition of the second side of the duration alternative. Mortality indestructibility and life long enough.

Use in the book

The Phaedo explicitly introduces that further condition: if the immortal is also indestructible, soul cannot perish when death approaches. Its comparisons with odd number and fire clarify the refusal of a contrary, but the passage does not silently identify this refusal with indestructibility. A Hermetic formula calls the heavenly god an immortal human being, placing mortality and immortality within a comparison between human and cosmic life.

Places to read

1. I.49.16.4The argument adds indestructibility to deathlessness.
2. I.47.8.7The earthly human and heavenly god exchange descriptive terms.

Translation in this edition

“Immortal” is distinguished from “indestructible.” The Hermetic formula is presented as a daring comparison in its source, not a biological definition.

Use in the book

The soul’s immortality is called a necessary opinion both for consolation and for teaching justice. A second note pairs foreknowledge of death with a presentiment of immortality, then leaves its comparison with animals unfinished. Finally Joubert declares that removing immortality removes the beauty of life, and adds “That is enough.” The brevity is itself an argumentative choice: the claim of sufficiency should not be expanded into a demonstration he did not write.

Places to read

1. I, p. 309, entry 6, ¶1The opinion matters for consolation and for teaching justice.
2. II, p. 567, entry 11, ¶1Death is foreseen; immortality is felt in advance.
3. II, p. 835, entry 8, ¶1Immortality is treated as necessary to life’s beauty.

Translation in this edition

The English translation distinguishes foreseeing death from having a presentiment of immortality. It keeps “opinion,” the incomplete conditional and the final two-sentence assertion. A lexicon should not raise these terms to the stronger status of established knowledge.

Use in the book

The word belongs both to Christian hope and to the remembered child’s vision. In the first Century, life without end is humanity’s intended fellowship with God; the fall and the Cross form the setting in which that destination is recovered. In III.3 the wheat and the people appear immortal because the child has not learned sowing, reaping, birth, and death. The experience is genuinely revelatory for Traherne without functioning as agricultural or biological description.

The mature prayer of I.95 locates the fountain of immortality in the Father and joins lasting life to the Spirit’s present work of awakening perception. Endless duration without knowledge and love would not express the desired fullness.

Places to read

1. I.75Humanity’s intended endless life is recalled in a prayer before the Cross.
2. I.95The Father is the fountain of immortality within Trinitarian communion.
3. III.3Corn and human beings appear immortal to the child’s unmeasured vision.

In this edition

Distinguish the doctrinal noun from the phenomenological immortal in the childhood narrative; the latter reports an apprehension rather than denying ordinary change.

Use in the book

The work's title and opening identify the immortality of souls as the major problem. Book I first frames it through human misery: Ficino argues that a being capable of worshipping God should not be the most unfortunate mortal and therefore must have a prospect of blessedness beyond bodily death. The subsequent metaphysical ascent seeks a more structural foundation. The rational soul is not divided into material parts, does not vanish when deprived of a material subject, and is not mixed with a contrary form capable of corrupting it. As the middle bond of nature, it is also announced as indissoluble. Together these considerations constitute Ficino's opening case for the thesis. Immortality does not mean immobility in every respect. The next chapter expressly distinguishes stable soul-substance from changing operations, preventing the claim of indestructibility from being mistaken for a denial that souls think, will, or act successively.

Book III extends the account through the divine gift of unity and stability. Some beings that would be dissoluble considered in themselves are preserved by the divine knot; their indissolubility does not make them self-sufficient first principles. Soul enters mortal things whole and withdraws whole, rather than being distributed into bodily pieces. These arguments belong to the opening development of the work's thesis, not a claim that this first volume contains every later specialized proof.

Further passage references. Proem.7; I.1.1–I.1.7234567; I.3.33; I.4.1–I.4.52345; III.1.5; III.2.22.

Places to read

1. I.3.33No dissoluble parts, removable material support, or corrupting contrary grounds the stated immortality
2. I.4.1The question of changing operation follows and qualifies any inference from immortality to total immobility
3. III.2.22Soul enters mortal things whole and withdraws whole without becoming mortal

Translation in this edition

The description of soul as true and immortal in I.3.33 is explicitly assigned to the Platonists. Its freedom from bodily dissolution does not remove all changing operation: I.42345 immediately asks about mobility. The volume supplies an opening argument rather than every demonstration promised by the complete work.

indissolubilis / dissolvo

indissolubilis / dissolvo. Printed forms: dissolvi; indissolubile.

Indissoluble, and to be dissolved. Soul’s binding office and lack of parts are used in arguments for its indissolubility; the adjective does not replace every other argument for continued existence. References: I.1.7, I.3.33. See Immortality.

inserere / retrahere

inserere / retrahere. Printed forms: inserit; retrahit.

Insert or enter / withdraw. Soul enters mortal things whole and withdraws whole, supporting the claim that animation does not make its substance mortal. References: III.2.22. See Immortality.

mortalis / immortalis

mortalis / immortalis. Printed forms: immortalis; immortalitatem; mortalia.

Mortal and immortal; immortality as the inquiry’s object. The opening promises to make immortality visible to mind; the third essence is later judged immortal through independence from dissoluble parts and material support. References: I.1.3, I.3.33. See Immortality.

superesse / discedere

superesse / discedere. Printed forms: discedentibus; superesse.

To remain over or survive; to depart. The remaining light for souls departing bodily imprisonment is the conclusion Ficino says seems necessary; it is not yet the whole promised demonstration of immortality. References: I.1.1. See Immortality.

Use in the book

Book VIII assembles different routes rather than simply repeating “incorporeal, therefore immortal.” Truth nourishes mind with an incorruptible object; indivisible virtues indicate an indivisible subject and source; simple intellectual forms imply a simple knower; receptive understanding is not corrupted by the contraries it understands; reflexive life preserves its own formal integrity; and divinely enlarged intellectual power supports unbounded living.

The steps differ in force. VIII.10.2 says that nothing prevents mind from being perpetual after arguing that it exceeds spatial and temporal confinement. VIII.9.1 explicitly preserves two alternatives: always having existed and always existing hereafter, or at least always existing hereafter. VIII.15.2 contrasts natural succession with intellectual generation retained in the individual knower. VIII.16.4 ends with a received power of living, rather than self-originating divine existence.

It is consequently misleading to make the result either mere survival of the human species or an unqualified claim that every human soul is coeternal with God. Ficino seeks the enduring individual mind, while his qualifications limit what each local argument establishes. Likewise, the statement that mind is not disturbed by bodily contraries concerns its intellectual mode and metaphysical nature; the text elsewhere acknowledges distraction and impediments in embodied exercise.

The lexicon's references preserve these differences so that the reader can reconstruct the cumulative proof and evaluate its premises rather than encounter a single flattened slogan.

Places to read

1. VIII.2.8Immortal nourishment and natural desire supply one route.
2. VIII.4.13Simplicity and the priority of life supply another.
3. VIII.9.1Future permanence is retained without requiring past eternity.
4. VIII.10.2The conclusion is phrased as absence of an obstacle to perpetuity.
5. VIII.15.2, VIII.16.4Inward generation and divinely given vital power support individual endurance.

Translation in this edition

The several temporal and causal qualifications belong to the content, not merely to editorial caution. No single English word should obscure the difference between enduring forever in the future, existing without beginning, being formally self-sustaining and being efficiently uncaused.

actus rectus / reflexus

actus rectus / reflexus. Printed forms: actum rectum; actum reflexum.

The direct act is life; the reflexive act is cognition. Since mind apprehends its enduring species by knowing, Ficino argues that its prior living act has a corresponding enduring capacity. References: VIII.9.1. See Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion.

aeternus / aeternitas

aeternus / aeternitas. Printed forms: aeternitas; aeternus.

Eternal or eternity, here inferred from independence of nourishment or stable contemplative being. The no-food alternative is brief and conditional; the repose argument derives eternity from the mode of perfection. Neither cancels the elsewhere explicit future-only alternative. References: VIII.2.2, VIII.11.1. See Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion.

argumentatio / demonstratio

argumentatio / demonstratio. Printed forms: argumentatio; argumentatione; argumentationem; demonstratio.

An articulated argument or demonstration, distinct from the immediate act whose nature it explains. The proof of the universal Idea need not precede every apprehension of a universal; later chapters offer cumulative but nonidentical routes to immortality. References: VIII.1.4, VIII.2.8, VIII.3.1, VIII.5.2, VIII.15.2. See Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion.

concedere / donare

concedere / donare. Printed forms: concessa; concessa sibi; donatus.

Granting or bestowing, the vocabulary governing the soul's enlarged dignity. The final limitless power of living is inferred from powers of understanding and willing already granted, not claimed as efficient self-creation. References: VIII.16.4. See Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion.

immortalis / immortalitas

immortalis / immortalitas. Printed forms: immortalem; immortales; immortali; immortalis; Immortalis; immortalitas; immortalitatem; immortalitatis.

Immortalis means immortal or deathless; immortalitas means immortality, the conclusion sought for rational souls and a recurrent attribute of higher principles. The life argument must explain why nonreception of death entails survival, rather than relying solely on the word. References: V.1.1, V.2.1, V.4.1, V.4.10, V.14.1, V.14.5. See Contraries, death and imperishability.

Not subject to death, or the corresponding enduring condition. The immortality of truth, species and an individual mind are connected but remain distinct subjects; intellectual generation is contrasted with biological succession. References: VIII.2.8, VIII.9.1, VIII.15.2. See Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion.

indissolubilis

indissolubilis. Printed forms: indissolubile; indissolubilem; indissolubilis.

Not liable to dissolution, inferred from simplicity rather than merely asserted from the name soul. Ficino relates simplicity in knowing to stable living through the priority of life over its reflective operation. References: VIII.4.13. See Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion.

mortalis / corruptibilis

mortalis / corruptibilis. Printed forms: corruptibile; corruptibilem; corruptibilia; corruptibilis; mortalem; mortalibus; mortalis.

Subject to death or corruption, in contrast with the intellect's alleged proper nature. The predicates describe bodies and also a rejected view of mind; the completed immortality inference must be distinguished from the hypothesis it refutes. References: VIII.1.5, VIII.2.8, VIII.3.8, VIII.12.1, VIII.13.2, VIII.14.1. See Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion.

perpetuus / sempiternus

perpetuus / sempiternus. Printed forms: perpetua; perpetuam; perpetuo; sempiternae; sempiternus.

Perpetual or everlasting, without thereby settling whether existence began. The future-only alternative of VIII.9.1 and the granted power of life at VIII.16.4 limit what can be inferred about pre-existence. References: VIII.1.3, VIII.2.5, VIII.2.6, VIII.10.2, VIII.11.1, VIII.14.1, VIII.16.1, VIII.16.2. See Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion.

saltem futura sit semper

saltem futura sit semper. Printed forms: saltem futura sit semper.

At least it will always exist hereafter, preserving a weaker temporal conclusion. The alternative prevents an inference that the passage unconditionally proves every mind's beginningless existence. References: VIII.9.1. See Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion.

videri / apparere / patere / constare

videri / apparere / patere / constare. Printed forms: Apparet; apparet; Constat; constat; patet; videantur; videatur; videtur.

Seeming, appearing, being evident and being established, distinct strengths of presentation. Ficino moves among illustrative appearances, explicit demonstrations and provisional formulations; a sentence's marker should not be silently upgraded to certainty. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.1.2, VIII.1.5, VIII.2.1, VIII.2.3, VIII.2.5, VIII.2.7, VIII.2.8, VIII.4.2, VIII.4.4, VIII.4.8, VIII.4.9, VIII.4.10, VIII.4.11, VIII.4.13, VIII.5.1, VIII.5.2, VIII.7.1, VIII.11.1, VIII.13.1, VIII.13.2, VIII.15.2, VIII.16.1, VIII.16.2, VIII.16.3. See Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion.

vita / vivere

vita / vivere. Printed forms: Vita; vita; vitae; vitam; vivendi; vivendo; viventia; vivere; vivet; vivificare; Vivit; vivit.

Life or living activity; inward operation is called life's act, prior to reflective intelligence. The proof moves from intellectual self-operation to life and being, then to a received limitless power of continued living. References: VIII.2.8, VIII.4.13, VIII.14.1, VIII.15.2, VIII.15.3, VIII.16.4. See Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion.