Β Beta

use force

βιάζομαι

The force that ends the dialogue, where persuasion and argument give out · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordΒιάζεσθαι, to use force, βία, on someone; to overpower, to compel against his will. Its opposite is πείθειν, to persuade.
  • In the CharmidesThree times, all in the last lines. “So you’ll use force,” Socrates asks, “and won’t even give me a preliminary hearing?” “Count on force,” the boy answers; and Socrates: “When you set about doing anything, and use force, no man alive will be able to oppose you” (176c–d).
  • In this edition“Use force”; “Count on force” for the future participle with ὡς.
  • A place to read176a–d.
English renderings
βιάσῃ, biasēi, “you’ll use force”; ὡς βιασομένου, hōs biasomenou, “Count on force”; βιαζομένῳ, biazomenōi, “use force”

Meaning

Βία is bodily strength, and then violence: the force that takes what it is not given. The middle verb is to do violence, to constrain, to carry a point by main strength. Its natural opposite is persuasion, πειθώ, and Plato returns to the pair more than once when he asks how a city should be ruled.

Use in the book

The ending passes from persuasion to command to force. The edition’s note at 176b traces a “play on persuading and obeying begun at 156a and 157b–c”, which “closes here, just as persuasion gives way to force”. The boy, who does not know whether he has temperance, is not altogether persuaded by Socrates’ suggestion that he may have it and need no charm, and asks for the charm (176a–b; see δέομαι; πείθω). Critias makes the charm a test of the boy’s temperance, and the boy will obey his guardian, since it would be “something terrible” not to (176b–c; see δεινός; ἐπίτροπος; κελεύω). Then Socrates asks the pair what they are plotting, and the boy answers that the plotting is done (176c; see βουλεύομαι).

The force follows. Socrates asks, “So you’ll use force … and won’t even give me a preliminary hearing?” (176c; see ἀνάκρισις). “Count on force,” the boy answers, “since this man here gives the orders. You, for your part, take counsel what you’ll do about it” (176c; see ἐπιτάττω). Socrates answers that there is no counsel left, and that once the boy sets about anything and uses force no man alive will be able to oppose him; the dialogue closes on his promise not to oppose him either (176d; see βουλή; ἐναντιόομαι). On the surface it is a joke between friends: the force is the boy’s resolve to be charmed every day, and Socrates yields to it gladly. The Greek marks the joke: “Count on force” is ὡς βιασομένου, the construction of the boy’s promise a few lines earlier, ὡς ἀκολουθήσοντος, “Count on it” (176b; see ἀκολουθέω).

The joke has a second edge, and the edition names it. The note at 176c recalls that “some twenty-five years later these two ruled Athens by force in the oligarchy of 404–403 BC, Critias among the Thirty and Charmides among the Ten set over the Piraeus”, and that both died fighting the democrats at Munychia, the hill above the harbour; “many readers hear the exchange as the dialogue’s last and darkest irony.” The Note on this Edition is exact about the history: the Thirty “were voted in, under Spartan pressure, and then ruled by force”. Read with that in mind, the last exchange compresses the dialogue’s failure into a scene. The inquiry into temperance ends without a definition (175b); the decision is then made by an order, without a hearing, by the guardian who had claimed temperance was knowing oneself and the ward who does not know whether he has it (176a–b; see οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ’ εἰ ἔχω οὔτ’ εἰ μὴ ἔχω). Earlier Socrates had promised the boy an inquiry in which he would not be forced to say what he did not want to (158e; see ἀναγκάζω). At the end the force is applied to Socrates. “No man alive will be able to oppose you” can be read as the dialogue’s prophecy, and “Then I won’t oppose you” as the line Plato’s readers knew Socrates had not kept.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

  1. 176cSocrates: so you will use force, and not even give me a preliminary hearing? The boy: count on force, since Critias gives the orders.
  2. 176dSocrates: there is no counsel left; when you set about anything and use force, no one will be able to oppose you.

Translation in this edition

Βιάσῃ (176c7) is the second person of the future middle, “So you’ll use force”; B and T write the same form as βιάσει, and a later hand in T has the active βιάσεις (apparatus, c7). Ὡς βιασομένου (176c8), a future participle with ὡς and its subject understood, is “Count on force”, matching “Count on it” at 176b9. Βιαζομένῳ (176d2) is “use force”. The English uses “forced” for ἀναγκάζεσθαι at 157c, 158e and 169c, and “use force” for βιάζεσθαι here (see ἀναγκάζω); the Glossary lists the verb under “force”.

Elsewhere in Plato

Under the Thirty, Socrates tells his jury in the Apology, he was summoned with four others to the Round House, the Tholos in the Agora, and ordered to fetch Leon from Salamis, the island off the Athenian coast, to be put to death. Strong as that regime was, it could not scare him into an unjust act: the other four went off to Salamis and fetched Leon, and Socrates went home, a refusal that might have cost him his life had the regime not been brought down soon after (32c–d). That refusal can be read as the opposition the end of the Charmides jokingly forswears.

The Republic opens with friendly force. Polemarchus stops Socrates on his way back from the Piraeus: “Then either show yourselves stronger than this crowd, or stay put.” Socrates offers a third way, to persuade them to let him go; “And could you persuade people who will not listen?” (327c). There the joke leads to a night of conversation, as the boy’s resolve in the Charmides leads to daily charming. In the Crito the Laws of Athens tell Socrates that a man must persuade his country or do what it bids, and that force is unholy against mother or father, and much more against one’s country (51c). In the Statesman the visitor from Elea asks what to call it when a man who has the art compels people to the better without persuading them: a doctor who forces a patient to a better treatment against the written rules has committed no error of medicine (296b–c). The picture of 171d–172a, a household and a city run by temperance, can be read as raising that question, and the ending as answering it with force and no knowledge.

Other ancient sources

Xenophon’s defence of Socrates meets the charge of violence head on. Socrates’ accuser said that his mockery of choosing magistrates by lot made the young men violent (see ἁμαρτία); Xenophon answers that those who cultivate good sense are the least violent of men, since force brings enmity and danger, while persuasion brings about the same things without danger and in friendship: those who are forced hate, those who are persuaded love.1 The accuser’s next charge used the same word of Critias, the most violent, βιαιότατος, of all the oligarchs, and Xenophon does not defend what he did.2

Source note

1. Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.2.9–11.

2. Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.2.12–13.