Living creature

Use in the book

At 981a the Athenian asks whether what is most truly called a living being by nature is what results when one combination of soul and body comes together and brings forth one shape. Clinias answers “Rightly.” The Athenian then repeats the naming question and receives “Yes.” This unusually explicit exchange fixes the term used throughout the cosmology: earthly organisms and heavenly stars must both be judged against the same account of animation.

The two occurrences of “one” matter. A living being is a unity constituted from soul and body, not simply two things placed next to one another in a list. The sentence does not, however, specify that soul and body cease to be different kinds. At 983d their distinction is asserted strongly and the plurality of each is preserved. The definition makes composite unity intelligible within that distinction. It does not solve every later question about how an invisible soul relates spatially to a visible body.

The scope of zōion extends beyond ordinary examples of moving animals. The earthly kind at 981d includes human beings, many-footed and footless creatures, moving beings and those fixed by roots. The last group includes plants. The fiery kind includes the stars, endowed with body and soul. Ether, air, and water then provide three further kinds. Translating zōion throughout as “animal” in a narrow modern sense would prejudice the classification by making plants and celestial bodies sound like exceptions to an already restricted definition.

The phrase also distinguishes the living being from its predominant body. Fire is not itself called a star merely because fire is one of the five bodies. A celestial living being has a composite bodily constitution and soul. Similarly, an airy or ethereal being is not just an empty region of atmosphere. The bodies supply material conditions and distinctions; the soul–body combination makes the thing a living being.

The definition's bodily requirement is important when the account reaches beings that are transparent or normally unseen. Their failure to appear plainly does not make them bodiless. Soul alone has that status at 981b; the middle beings remain composites. At 983c the Athenian leaves a further alternative in the soul's relation to heavenly bodies, saying soul must have come to be “with each, or even in each.” That disjunction prevents treating the initial combination as an exact anatomical account of psychic location.

Places to read

1. 981aζῷόν γε ἀληθέστατα λέγεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν — The question concerns the truest natural application of “living being”
2. 981aμία συνελθοῦσα σύστασις ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος — A single combination joins soul and body
3. 981aἀποτέκῃ μίαν μορφήν — The combination brings forth one shape
4. 981dὅσα μόνιμα, διειλημμένα ῥίζαις — Rooted beings belong to the earthly class
5. 983cψυχῆς πρὸς ἑκάστῳ γενομένης ἢ καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις — Soul's relation to each heavenly body is not reduced to one spatial formula
6. 984cπάντων μὲν μετόχων τοῦ ζῆν γεγονότων — All five bodily kinds can contribute to beings that share in life

Translation in this edition

Zōion is consistently “living being”; the participial ζῶσι at 982e is “living things.” Morphē is “shape,” kept apart from εἶδος, “form,” in the later curriculum. Systasis will recur in the “combination of harmony” at 991e; that recurrence invites comparison of ordered composition without making a harmonic combination a living being.

Generation of a living unity — ἀποτίκτειν (apotiktein)

ἀποτίκτειν (apotiktein)

Generation of a living unity. The subjunctive uses birth-language for the production of one shape by soul–body combination. It describes the general condition for a living being rather than only sexual reproduction. Attested: ἀποτέκῃ (981a). Living being combination and one shape.

Constitution of one being — σύστασις (systasis)

σύστασις (systasis)

Constitution of one being. The coming-together of soul and body produces a unified living shape. The combination is not an extra third substance named alongside the two kinds. Attested: σύστασις (981a). Living being combination and one shape.

Soul–body unity — ζῷον (zōion)

ζῷον (zōion)

Soul–body unity. A living being is what results when one combination of soul and body brings forth one shape. The term’s local scope includes organisms, stars, and middle kinds. Attested: ζῷόν (981a). Living being combination and one shape.

One living appearance — μορφή (morphē)

μορφή (morphē)

One living appearance. The one shape brought forth by a combination marks the unity of the living being. The edition keeps shape distinct from eidos, form, in the later curriculum. Attested: μορφήν (981a). Living being combination and one shape.

Constituent of a living unity — ψυχή (psychē)

ψυχή (psychē)

Constituent of a living unity. Soul combines with body to bring forth one shape. The living being’s unity does not erase the distinction between the two constituent kinds. Attested: ψυχῆς (981a). Living being combination and one shape.

One combination brings forth one shape (contextual phrase)

μία συνελθοῦσα σύστασις ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ἀποτέκῃ μίαν μορφήν (981a)

The repeated μία joins the unity of combination to the unity of resulting shape. Soul and body remain grammatically distinct constituents. The phrase defines the condition for calling something a living being, without reducing that being either to an isolated soul or to its predominant material alone. Living being combination and one shape.

Soul with each or in each (contextual phrase)

μὴ ψυχῆς πρὸς ἑκάστῳ γενομένης ἢ καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις (983c)

Without soul having come to be with each, or even in each, the exact celestial activity is denied. The alternative prepositions preserve latitude about soul’s relation to the body. They should not be reduced to a single anatomical location for a material driver. Living being combination and one shape.

Use in the book

One notice divides living creatures into terrestrial, aquatic, winged, and heavenly kinds, including the stars. Another assigns Plato and Thales the view that plants are ensouled living creatures. The following notice gives Aristotle a narrower classification: plants have soul but are not animals, since animals have impulse and perception. These are differences of classification, not a contradiction to be removed by translating every occurrence identically.

Places to read

1. I.43.1Heavenly creatures are included in a fourfold classification.
2. I.45.1Plants count as ensouled living creatures.
3. I.45.2Animals are distinguished by impulse and perception.

Translation in this edition

“Living creature” keeps the broader range visible; “animal” is used where the passage expressly contrasts animals with plants.