From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordἈναμάρτητος is “unerring”, “without error”, the adjective of ἁμαρτάνειν, “to miss”, with the negative prefix: one who does not miss.
- In the CharmidesOnce, in the picture of what temperance would give if it were knowing what one knows and what one does not: “we would live our lives without error, both we ourselves who had temperance and all the others who were ruled by us” (171d–e).
- In this edition“Without error”.
- A place to read171c–172a, from the failure to tell a doctor from a pretender to the promise of happiness.
- English renderings
- ἀναμάρτητοι, anamartētoi, “without error”
Meaning
Ἀναμάρτητος (anamartētos) is formed from ἀ-, “not”, and the root of ἁμαρτάνειν, “to miss the mark” (see ἁμαρτία). Said of a person, it means one who makes no mistakes; said of conduct, blameless. Applied to a whole life, as here, it claims more than skill in any one thing: a life in which no act misses.
Use in the book
The adjective stands in a sentence built on conditions contrary to fact. “For if, as we supposed at the start, the temperate man knew what he knew and what he did not know … then, we say, it would be of enormous benefit to us to be temperate. For we would live our lives without error” (171d). The Greek verbs are past tenses with ἄν, the form for what is not the case, and Socrates has just shown that it is not: a temperance that is only knowledge of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge could tell neither a doctor from a pretender nor any other expert from a man without expertise, except one of the temperate man’s own craft (171c). The life without error is described at the moment it has been ruled out, as a picture of what was hoped for.
The error the adjective removes is not only the temperate man’s own. It reaches “all the others who were ruled by us”, because the temperate would undertake nothing they did not know, would find those who did know and hand things over to them, and would allow those they ruled only what they would do correctly (171d–e; see ἄρχω; παραδίδωμι). The life without error is a political order, a household and a city run by knowledge, and the chain runs on from it to rightness, doing well and happiness (171e–172a; see ἁμαρτία).
Socrates goes on to doubt even the counterfactual, withdrawing the premise that it would be a great good for men to do what they know and hand over what they do not know to those who do (172d), and the dream that follows ends in the knowledge of good and bad (172d–174c; see ἁμαρτία; ἐπιστημόνως). Freedom from error in each art is not yet knowing what is worth doing.
Places to read
The one passage in which the word occurs.
- 171d–eIf the temperate man knew what he knew and did not, and could examine others, we would live our lives without error, we who had temperance and all who were ruled by us.
Translation in this edition
Ἀναμάρτητοι γὰρ ἂν τὸν βίον διεζῶμεν (171d6–7) is “For we would live our lives without error”, the adjective standing in the predicate. In the next words, αὐτοί τε [καὶ] οἱ τὴν σωφροσύνην ἔχοντες, Burnet brackets καί, which Heindorf deleted (apparatus, d7): without it the sense is “both we ourselves who had temperance”, and the English follows the bracket, making the temperate and “we” the same people. On the reading διεζῶμεν, see ἁμαρτία.
Elsewhere in Plato
In the first book of the Republic the same adjective undoes Thrasymachus’ definition of justice as the advantage of the stronger. Socrates asks whether the rulers in each city are without error or such as to make mistakes; Thrasymachus grants that they can err, and so that they make some laws rightly and some wrongly, to their own disadvantage (339c). To save his definition he then invents the ruler “in the precise sense”, who as such never errs (340d–e; see ἁμαρτία). The Charmides and the Republic can be read as reaching the same question from opposite sides: whether anyone who rules can rule without error, and whether such rule would be good for the ruled.
Other ancient sources
The Stoics, the school founded at Athens by Zeno of Citium about 300 BC, made the adjective a mark of their wise man. Diogenes Laertius, the biographer of the philosophers, reports their doctrine that the wise alone are free, and kings as well, since kingship is a rule accountable to no one which can exist only among the wise; Chrysippus, the third head of the school, said that the ruler must have knowledge of goods and evils, and that none of the base has it; the wise alone are fit to rule, to judge and to speak, and they are without error, since they are not liable to fall into it.1 The Stoic sage can be read as uniting what the Charmides keeps apart: rule, freedom from error, and the knowledge of good and bad that Critias names at 174b.
Source note
1. Diogenes Laertius 7.121–122.