Mind and moral practice

Good, bad and indifference

ἀγαθός; ἀδιαφορέω; ἀδιαφορία; ἀδιάφορος; αἰσχρός; κακία; κακός; καλός; μέσος; σπουδαῖος; φαῦλος

Death and life, fame, pain, pleasure and wealth befall good men and bad alike, and are "neither good nor bad" (2.11.4); nothing is good for a man "which does not make him just, self-controlled, courageous, free" (8.1).

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Meditations

Marcus Aurelius · Diotimos Editions · 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordἈγαθόν is the good and κακόν the bad; κακία is badness of soul, vice. The Stoics held that only virtue is good and only vice bad, and called everything else indifferent: τὰ ἀδιάφορα, "things that make no difference", or, in Marcus' other word, τὰ μέσα, "the middle things".
  • In the MeditationsDeath and life, fame, pain, pleasure and wealth befall good men and bad alike, and are "neither good nor bad" (2.11.4); nothing is good for a man "which does not make him just, self-controlled, courageous, free" (8.1). A man lives most honourably if he "treats as making no difference the things that make no difference" (11.16), yet among them he still seeks "what is according to worth" (3.11.3).
  • In this editionἈγαθόν and κακόν are "good" and "bad", never "evil"; κακία is "vice", καλόν "honourable" and αἰσχρόν "shameful"; τὰ μέσα is "things indifferent", kept apart from τὰ ἀδιάφορα, "things that make no difference".
  • A place to read2.11, where Marcus argues from the gods' care that what befalls good men and bad alike is neither good nor bad.

Meaning

Ἀγαθός (agathos) is "good" in every ordinary sense: good at something, brave, well born, useful. Κακός (kakos) is its opposite, bad, base or harmful, and κακία (kakia) is badness, in moral philosophy vice. Καλός (kalos) is beautiful and, of conduct, honourable; αἰσχρός (aischros) is ugly, and so shameful. The Stoics tied the two pairs together: only the honourable is good, and whatever neither benefits nor harms, such as life, health, wealth and fame, is ἀδιάφορον (adiaphoron), a thing that makes no difference to whether a man is happy.1

Marcus takes over the doctrine and its words: the good is honourable and the bad shameful (2.1), and for what lies "between virtue and vice" (7.31) he has both ἀδιάφορα and τὰ μέσα (ta mesa), "the middle things". He uses the words less to sort the world than to judge what happens to him and what others do.

Use in the book

Book II opens with the doctrine as something Marcus has seen: "I have observed the nature of the good, that it is honourable, and of the bad, that it is shameful" (2.1), and so no one he meets can harm him, "for no one will involve me in what is shameful". Ten chapters later he argues it. The gods "do exist, and they do care for human affairs; and they have put it wholly in man's power not to fall into what is truly bad. And if there were anything bad in the rest, they would have provided for this too … But how could what does not make a man worse make a man's life worse?" (2.11.2). The nature of the whole would not have let good and bad "befall good men and bad indiscriminately and alike" (2.11.3). "But death and life, fame and obscurity, pain and pleasure, wealth and poverty: all these befall good men and bad alike, being neither honourable nor shameful. So they are neither good nor bad" (2.11.4).

The measure of good is what a thing does to the man: by Marcus' principles "about good things and bad", nothing is good for him that does not make him just, self-controlled, courageous and free (8.1; see Virtue and excellence). At 5.12 he tests the many's goods with a line of the comic poet Menander:2 whoever has conceived of "truly goods, such as wisdom, self-control, justice, courage" could not listen to the phrase "from the goods", "for it will not fit"; said of wealth and luxury, the line is received "as aptly and wittily said", so that "even the many form an impression of the difference". Pleasure fails another test: no honourable and good man would regret having let a pleasure pass, "so pleasure is neither useful nor good" (8.10). The good and the bad lie "not in being acted upon but in activity" (9.16), and "Within is the spring of the good" (7.59).

The bad is vice, and each man's vice is his own. "It is ridiculous not to flee one's own vice, which is indeed possible, but to flee that of others, which is impossible" (7.71). Another's vice "does no harm to another" (8.55), "otherwise my neighbour's vice would be bad for me, which God did not decide" (8.56). His own vice is the one to fear: a more gracious man would have left life without a taste of lying, pretence, luxury and vanity, and to die having had one's fill of them "is the second voyage", the proverbial next-best course;3 and he asks whether he has "chosen to sit fast by vice" (9.2). Whoever counts things outside his choice good or bad must blame the gods and hate men; "But if we judge only what is in our power to be good and bad, no cause is left either to accuse God or to take an enemy's stand against a man" (6.41).

Everything else is indifferent. "To live through life most honourably: the faculty for this is in the soul, if one treats as making no difference the things that make no difference" (11.16). Even man, "in so far as some stand in the way of my proper works", becomes "one of the things that make no difference to me", though "in one respect" he is "the thing most proper to us" (5.20). The ground of it is piety. The common nature "uses equally" pain and pleasure, death and life, fame and obscurity, and whoever does not stand equally towards them "is clearly impious" (9.1.3); so is whoever pursues pleasures as good, for he must blame nature when "the base are often in pleasures … while the serious meet with pain" (9.1.2). Indifference here is not neglect. Of a kinsman ignorant of what is according to nature, Marcus says, "I treat him according to the natural law of fellowship, with goodwill and justice, while in things indifferent I try at the same time to hit on what is according to worth" (3.11.3). He is to help others "according to worth, even if they are losing in things indifferent" (5.36), and "what is just will not be kept" if we are at odds over things indifferent (11.10).

Good has a second measure, the whole. "To every part of nature that is good which the nature of the whole brings" (2.3; see Nature), and the ending of life "is for each not bad, because not shameful either, if indeed it is both outside choice and not unsocial; and good, if indeed it is opportune for the whole" (12.23; see Change). This can be read as agreeing with 2.11.4: measured by what it does to a man's character, death is neither good nor bad; measured by the whole, it is good when it is opportune. What the doctrine gives Marcus is not coldness but a single place where he can be harmed, his own choice, and so a world in which anger has no ground: anger goes when he reckons that what was done to him "is not shameful", "for if the shameful is not the only bad thing, you too must necessarily do much wrong" (11.18.3).

Places to read

The passages where good and bad, vice and the shameful are discussed or carry the argument, in the order of the book, with every place of τὰ μέσα and of ἀδιάφορος and its family; every place of each word is given in the sub-entries.

  1. 2.1GreekMarcus has observed that the nature of the good is honourable and of the bad shameful, so that no wrongdoer can harm him or involve him in what is shameful.
  2. 2.3GreekWhat the nature of the whole brings to each part of nature, and what preserves the whole, is good for that part.
  3. 2.11GreekThe gods have put it wholly in man's power not to fall into what is truly bad; death and life, fame and obscurity, pain and pleasure, wealth and poverty befall good men and bad alike, and so are neither good nor bad.
  4. 2.17.2GreekDeath is the dissolution of the elements, which is according to nature, and nothing according to nature is bad.
  5. 3.6.3GreekNothing of another kind, the praise of the many, office, wealth or pleasure, may be set up against the rational good.
  6. 3.11.3GreekMarcus treats a kinsman according to the law of fellowship, and in things indifferent tries to hit on what is according to worth.
  7. 4.39GreekWhat is bad for a man lies only where he forms opinions about bad things; what can happen equally to a bad man and a good is neither bad nor good.
  8. 5.12GreekEven the many sense the difference between true goods, such as wisdom, self-control, justice and courage, and their own, since the comic poet's jibe fits only wealth and luxury.
  9. 5.15GreekNothing that does not fall to a man as a man is his good, or the man who strips himself of such things would not be the better for it.
  10. 5.16GreekThe good of each thing lies where its end is, and the good of a rational living being is fellowship.
  11. 5.20GreekIn one respect man is most proper to us; in so far as he obstructs our work, he becomes one of the things that make no difference.
  12. 5.35GreekIf a thing is neither Marcus' vice nor an act of his vice, and the community is not harmed, he asks why he should be at odds over it.
  13. 5.36GreekMarcus is to help others according to worth even when their losses are in things indifferent, but not to form the impression that the loss is a harm.
  14. 6.32GreekTo the poor body all things make no difference; to the understanding, all that is not its own present act makes no difference.
  15. 6.33GreekPain is not contrary to nature for a man who does what belongs to a man, and so not bad for him.
  16. 6.41GreekWhoever counts things outside his choice good or bad must blame the gods and hate men; if only what is in our power counts as good and bad, no cause is left to accuse God or to take an enemy's stand against a man.
  17. 6.44.2GreekEven if the gods take counsel about nothing, Marcus can take counsel for himself: what is advantageous to each accords with his nature, and only what benefits his cities, Rome and the universe, is good for him.
  18. 6.45GreekWhatever happens to each is advantageous to the whole; "advantageous" is also taken in the commoner sense, of things indifferent.
  19. 6.51GreekThe lover of fame finds his good in another's activity, the lover of pleasure in being acted upon, the man with a mind in his own action.
  20. 7.26GreekWhen someone does wrong, Marcus is to consider with what opinion of good or bad he did it; seeing this, he will pity him.
  21. 7.31GreekMarcus is to make himself bright with simplicity, self-respect and indifference towards what lies between virtue and vice.
  22. 7.59GreekWithin is the spring of the good, which can always gush up if one digs.
  23. 7.64GreekPain is not shameful and does not make the understanding worse.
  24. 7.71GreekIt is ridiculous to flee others' vice, which is impossible, and not one's own, which is possible.
  25. 8.1GreekThe principles from which impulses and actions come are about good and bad: nothing is good that does not make a man just, self-controlled, courageous and free (see Virtue and excellence).
  26. 8.10GreekRegret is reproach for letting something useful pass; no honourable and good man regrets a pleasure let pass, so pleasure is neither useful nor good.
  27. 8.14GreekWhoever Marcus meets, he asks first what principles the man has about good and bad.
  28. 8.28GreekPain is bad either for the body, which can speak for itself, or for the soul, which need not judge it bad.
  29. 8.55GreekVice does no harm to the universe, and a man's vice harms only himself.
  30. 8.56GreekA neighbour's faculty of choice makes no difference to Marcus', or the neighbour's vice would be bad for him.
  31. 9.1.2–4GreekWhoever pursues pleasure as good and flees pain as bad is impious, for he must often blame nature for allotting pleasures to the base and pains to the serious; one must stand equally towards what nature uses equally.
  32. 9.2GreekIt would have been the part of a more gracious man to leave life without a taste of lying, pretence, luxury and vanity; to die having had one's fill of them is the second voyage; corruption of the understanding is a plague.
  33. 9.16GreekThe bad and the good of a rational civic living being, like its virtue and vice, lie in activity, not in being acted upon.
  34. 9.42.4GreekMan, beneficent by nature, has his own when he does something beneficent or co-operative in things indifferent.
  35. 10.33.4GreekOther things are made worse by what befalls them; man becomes better by using it rightly.
  36. 11.10GreekWhat is just will not be kept if we are at odds over things indifferent.
  37. 11.16GreekThe soul lives most honourably if it treats as making no difference the things that make no difference, remembering that it is we who write the judgements about them in ourselves.
  38. 11.18.3GreekAnger goes when one reckons that what was done is not shameful, for if the shameful is not the only bad thing, one must do much wrong oneself.
  39. 12.23GreekThe ending of life is not bad, because not shameful, if it is outside choice and not unsocial; and it is good if it is opportune for the whole.

Translation in this edition

Ἀγαθόν is "good", as adjective and as noun ("the good", "good things", "goods", "a good"), except at 5.15, where μᾶλλον ἀγαθός (mallon agathos) is "the better"; κακόν is "bad", never "evil", because the argument of 2.11 and much else turns on the single word, which is the same whether Marcus speaks of vice or of misfortune. The one other rendering of κακός is "worst" for the superlative in a saying of Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, "the worst ruin" (11.25). The adverb κακῶς (kakōs) is "ill" (1.15.2, 6.1, 6.2, 6.55, 7.36, 8.45, 8.49), "in a bad way" (8.40, 9.35), "badly" (at 9.35, a supplement of Johann Jacob Reiske, the eighteenth-century German scholar, adopted by J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints) and "in a bad condition" (12.23). Κακία is "vice" at every place. Καλόν is "honourable" where the sense is moral, and "beautiful" where it is beauty (4.20, 5.31, 6.36, 6.57, 7.48, 12.23); the adverb καλῶς (kalōs) is "honourably" (9.35, 9.41, 10.7.1, 11.5, 12.5), and elsewhere is rendered as the phrase requires: "doing well" (4.24), "Good:" (4.26), "make good use" (6.42), "took good counsel" (6.44.1), "speak well" (7.44), "use them well" (7.58), "as it should be" (10.13), "You have said it well" (12.36). Αἰσχρόν is "shameful" throughout. Τὰ μέσα is "things indifferent" (3.11.3, 5.36, 6.45, 9.42.4, 11.10), kept apart from τὰ ἀδιάφορα, "things that make no difference": "one of the things that make no difference" (5.20), "all things make no difference" (6.32), "makes no difference" (8.56), "the things that make no difference" (11.16). The verb ἀδιαφορεῖν is "treat as making no difference" (11.16), and the abstract noun ἀδιαφορία is "indifference" (7.31); the "indifference to pleasure" of 5.5 renders another word, τὸ ἀφιλήδονον (to aphilēdonon). "Make no difference" and its variants also render the impersonal διαφέρει (diapherei) and the imperative διαφέρου (2.14.2, 4.15, 6.2, 6.23, 10.13, 10.15, 12.35, 12.36; "what difference is there", 4.50), so that the English keeps the family Marcus plays on at 6.32, where the body "cannot tell a difference"; elsewhere the middle is "be at odds" (4.46, 5.35, 9.27, 9.40, 11.10, 11.39), and once "the things they are set on" (5.1.3). At 7.58 Leopold prints διάφορον (diaphoron), "makes a difference"; Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, proposed ἀδιάφορον, "makes no difference", and the note gives both.

Greek forms and English renderings

What makes a man better or worse · Meditations

ἀγαθόν, agathon, "good", "better"; κακόν, kakon, "bad", "worst"; κακία, kakia, "vice"; καλόν, kalon, "honourable", "beautiful"; αἰσχρόν, aischron, "shameful"; τὰ μέσα, ta mesa, "things indifferent"; τὰ ἀδιάφορα, ta adiaphora, "things that make no difference"; ἀδιαφορεῖν, adiaphorein, "treat as making no difference"; ἀδιαφορία, adiaphoria, "indifference"; σπουδαῖος, spoudaios, "serious"; φαῦλος, phaulos, "base"

Epictetus and the Stoics

Diogenes Laertius, the biographer of the philosophers, gives in his account of Stoic ethics the doctrine Marcus assumes, citing the Stoic Hecaton of Rhodes and Chrysippus, the third head of the Stoic school: of the things that are, some are good, some bad and some neither; good are the virtues, "wisdom, justice, courage, self-control and the rest", bad their opposites, and neither are "life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, fame, noble birth" and their opposites, "death, disease, pain, ugliness, weakness, poverty, obscurity, low birth".4 Diogenes gives two of their arguments: "As it is the property of heat to warm and not to chill, so it is the property of good to benefit and not to harm"; but wealth and health do no more benefit than harm, and "what can be used well and badly is not good".5 Marcus' test at 2.11 and 4.39, that what befalls good and bad alike is neither good nor bad, can be read as a form of the second. The Stoics also distinguished two senses of indifferent: what contributes neither to happiness nor to unhappiness, as wealth, fame, health and strength; and what moves neither impulse nor aversion, such as having an odd or an even number of hairs on one's head. Among the first, things that have worth, ἀξία (axia), are "preferred", and things with the opposite "dispreferred".6 Marcus' search for "what is according to worth" in things indifferent (3.11.3) can be read as a search for that worth. Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, puts the division in the mouth of a pupil who recites it as he would a line of Homer: "Of the things that are, some are good, some bad, some indifferent. Good are the virtues and what shares in them, bad are vices and what shares in vice, and indifferent what lies between these: wealth, health, life, death, pleasure, pain." Then he asks whether the pupil has tested any of it and made it a principle of his own, and whether he remembers the division in a storm at sea, when a mischievous bystander asks him whether shipwreck is a vice or shares in vice.7 Marcus' "what lies between virtue and vice" (7.31) is the same placing, and his notebook, with its constant restatement of the doctrine, can be read as the work Epictetus demands: making it his own.

ἀγαθός

Attested: ἀγαθοῖς (agathois; 1.4, 2.11.3, 2.11.4), ἀγαθούς (agathous; 1.17.1 four times), ἀγαθήν (agathēn; 1.17.1, 5.36), ἀγαθῶν (agathōn; 2.1, 2.13, 5.12, 8.1, 8.14, 11.21), ἀγαθοῦ (agathou; 2.1, 3.16.2, 4.25, 5.26, 6.41, 7.44, 7.59, 8.1, 10.1), ἀγαθόν (agathon; 2.3, 2.7, 3.6.2, 4.18, 4.39, 4.42, 5.15, 5.16 twice, 5.34, 6.30.1, 6.41, 6.51, 7.15, 7.17, 7.23, 7.26 twice, 7.46, 8.5, 8.10 twice, 8.20 twice, 9.16, 9.17, 9.41, 10.16, 10.30, 10.32, 11.5, 11.15, 11.16, 12.23, 12.29, 12.34, 12.35), ἀγαθά (agatha; 2.11.3, 2.11.4, 3.4.3, 5.12 four times, 5.15, 6.41, 6.44.2, 7.26, 9.1.2), ἀγαθῷ (agathōi; 3.6.3, 4.39, 8.10), ἀγαθός (agathos; 4.10 twice, 4.17, 5.15 twice, 7.17, 8.10, 8.22, 10.8.1, 10.13, 10.32, 11.15), ἀγαθαί (agathai; 5.36 four times), ἀγαθή (agathē; 10.1). Good; as a noun, the good, and in the plural goods. Of persons it is the good man, "in the sense in which the good man is specifically conceived" (4.10); of things, in Marcus' strict sense, only what makes a man better: "nothing is good for a man which does not make him just, self-controlled, courageous, free" (8.1). At 7.23 the word is a supplement, which Leopold prints. Lemma: ἀγαθός.

ἀδιαφορέω

Attested: ἀδιαφορῇ (adiaphorēi; 11.16), ἀδιαφορήσει (adiaphorēsei; 11.16). To treat as making no difference. The faculty to live most honourably is in the soul, "if one treats as making no difference the things that make no difference. And one will so treat them if one observes each of them both in its parts and as a whole" (11.16). Lemma: ἀδιαφορέω.

ἀδιαφορία

Attested: ἀδιαφορίᾳ (adiaphoriāi; 7.31). Indifference, the disposition of one who treats things as making no difference. "Make yourself bright with simplicity and self-respect and indifference towards what lies between virtue and vice" (7.31). Lemma: ἀδιαφορία.

ἀδιάφορος

Attested: ἀδιαφόρων (adiaphorōn; 5.20), ἀδιάφορα (adiaphora; 6.32 three times, 11.16), ἀδιάφορον (adiaphoron; 8.56). Making no difference; in the neuter plural, the Stoic term for what is neither good nor bad. A man who obstructs Marcus' work becomes "one of the things that make no difference to me" (5.20); to the understanding, "the things that make no difference are those that are not its own acts" (6.32); a neighbour's faculty of choice "makes no difference" to Marcus' own (8.56). Lemma: ἀδιάφορος.

αἰσχρός

Attested: αἰσχρόν (aischron; 2.1, 6.29, 7.37, 7.64, 8.15 twice, 11.18.3 twice, 12.23), αἰσχρῷ (aischrōi; 2.1), αἰσχρά (aischra; 2.11.4), αἰσχροῦ (aischrou; 7.45). Ugly; of conduct, shameful, the Stoic bad. "No one will involve me in what is shameful" (2.1); "if the shameful is not the only bad thing, you too must necessarily do much wrong" (11.18.3). At 7.45 the word is Socrates' at his trial, in Plato's Apology.8 Lemma: αἰσχρός.

κακία

Attested: κακίᾳ (kakiāi; 4.3.2, 9.2), κακία (kakia; 5.35, 7.1, 8.55, 8.56, 9.16, 12.1.1), κακίαν (kakian; 5.35, 6.1, 7.66, 7.71), κακίας (kakias; 7.31). Badness of soul, vice, the opposite of virtue. "What is vice? It is what you have seen often" (7.1); it harms only its owner, "to whom it has been granted also to be rid of it, as soon as he so wants" (8.55). Lemma: κακία.

κακός

Attested: κακῶν (kakōn; 2.1, 2.13, 4.39, 8.1, 8.14), κακοῦ (kakou; 2.1, 5.26, 6.41, 7.44, 8.1, 8.58), κακῷ (kakōi; 2.11.1, 4.39, 10.7.1), κακοῖς (kakois; 2.11.2, 2.11.3, 2.11.4, 9.35), κακόν (kakon; 2.11.2, 2.17.2, 4.39 twice, 4.42, 5.29, 5.36, 6.33, 6.41, 7.14, 7.26, 8.20 twice, 8.28 twice, 8.41 five times, 8.56, 9.4, 9.16, 9.17, 9.21, 9.38, 9.42.3, 10.7.1 twice, 10.33.3, 10.33.4, 10.36, 11.13, 11.17, 11.18.2, 11.18.3, 12.23 four times, 12.34), κακά (kaka; 2.11.3, 2.11.4, 6.41, 7.26, 9.1.2), κακός (kakos; 10.33.4), κακίστῳ (kakistōi; 11.25); the adverb κακῶς (kakōs; 1.15.2, 6.1, 6.2, 6.55, 7.36, 8.40, 8.45, 8.49, 9.35 twice, 12.23), one of the two at 9.35 Reiske's supplement, which Leopold prints. Bad; as a noun, the bad, what harms a man by making him worse. "What is bad for you does not subsist in another's ruling centre … Where then? Where that in you is which forms opinions about bad things" (4.39). At 9.42.3 Leopold prints a conjecture, καινόν, "new", where the manuscripts have κακόν a second time; only the first κακόν there is counted. Lemma: κακός.

καλός

Attested: καλῶν (kalōn; 1.8.2, 4.20, 6.36), καλόν (kalon; 2.1, 4.20 four times, 5.3, 6.57, 7.48, 12.23), καλά (kala; 2.11.4, 3.4.3, 5.31), καλός (kalos; 7.58, 8.10), καλῷ (kalōi; 8.10), καλοῦ (kalou; 10.1), κάλλιστα (kallista; 11.16); the adverb καλῶς (kalōs; 4.24, 4.26, 6.42, 6.44.1, 7.44, 7.58, 9.35, 9.41, 10.7.1, 10.13, 11.5, 12.5, 12.36). Beautiful; of conduct, honourable, which for the Stoics is the same as good. "I have observed the nature of the good, that it is honourable" (2.1); the honourable and good man (8.10); "want to be honourable in your own eyes in everything you do" (7.58). Beauty is the sense at 4.20, where "Everything that is in any way beautiful is beautiful of itself", and at 5.31, 6.36, 6.57, 7.48 and 12.23. Lemma: καλός.

μέσος

Attested: μέσοις (mesois; 3.11.3), μέσα (mesa; 5.36, 9.42.4, 11.10), μέσων (mesōn; 6.45), μέσαι (mesai; 7.1), μέσον (meson; 7.31), μέσου (mesou; 8.2), μέσῳ (mesōi; 10.34), μέση (mesē; 11.6.2). Middle; the neuter plural τὰ μέσα, "the middle things", is what lies between virtue and vice, "things indifferent" (3.11.3, 5.36, 6.45, 9.42.4, 11.10), and τὸ ἀνὰ μέσον ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας is "what lies between virtue and vice" (7.31). Elsewhere the word has its ordinary senses: the "middle" histories (7.1), ἐκ μέσου, "out of the way" (8.2), ἐν μέσῳ, what "lies open to all" (10.34), and "the Middle Comedy" (11.6.2). Lemma: μέσος.

σπουδαῖος

Attested: σπουδαῖα (spoudaia; 6.13), σπουδαίοις (spoudaiois; 9.1.2), σπουδαίους (spoudaious; 9.1.2), σπουδαῖος (spoudaios; 10.36), σπουδαίου (spoudaiou; 10.36). Serious, earnest about what matters; of persons, the Stoic good man, set against the base. Whoever pursues pleasure as good must blame nature, "because the base are often in pleasures and acquire what produces them, while the serious meet with pain and what produces it" (9.1.2). Even the dying man who "was serious and wise" will have someone glad to be rid of him (10.36). Of things it is "serious things" (6.13), where vanity deceives a man into thinking himself busied about them. Lemma: σπουδαῖος.

φαῦλος

Attested: φαύλους (phaulous; 5.17, 9.1.2, 11.18.6), φαύλων (phaulōn; 7.70 twice, 11.39), φαύλοις (phaulois; 9.1.2), φαῦλον (phaulon; 12.16). Base, worthless; in Stoic usage the bad man, the opposite of the serious. "It is impossible for base people not to do some things of this kind" (5.17); the gods bear with "so many base people", and Marcus is "one of the base" (7.70). Lemma: φαῦλος.

Source note

1. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 7.101–102, 7.104.

2. Menander, fr. 530.9 Kock, as the edition's note at 5.12 identifies the line.

3. Plato, Phaedo 99c–d.

4. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 7.101–102.

5. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 7.103.

6. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 7.104–105.

7. Epictetus, Discourses 2.19.12–15.

8. Plato, Apology 28d, as the edition's note at 7.45 identifies it.