Test and refutation

Use in the book

At 162c–d Charmides provokes Critias by presenting the third answer as refuted. Socrates compares the resulting anger to a poet's anger at an actor mishandling his verses. The image connects ownership of a statement to the risk of intellectual humiliation. The reference of the participle “refuted” is not completely settled by the Greek: translators can take Charmides as exhibiting his own defeat or presenting Critias as defeated through his formula.

Critias directly accuses Socrates of seeking to refute him instead of investigating the subject (166c). Socrates answers that even if he does refute Critias, the motive is the same as in examining his own assertions: avoiding the illusion of knowledge. He then asks them to disregard whether Critias or Socrates is refuted and attend to the tested argument (166d–e2). This exchange supplies a methodological ideal and reveals its dramatic difficulty.

The actual refutations depend on acknowledged commitments. Temperance is fine, hence cannot simply be whatever is quieter; it is good, while shame is not good in every relevant circumstance. Critias can reject a consequence by withdrawing something he earlier admitted, as at 164d. Thus an inconsistency among accepted claims does not automatically identify which original claim is false, and the dialogue does not claim that defeating successive proposals supplies a complete positive account.

Nor should refutation be equated with hostile victory. Socrates' ethical description gives it a cooperative purpose. But the ensuing anger, concealment of perplexity and final coercive joke keep the difference between that purpose and interpersonal effects in view.

Places to read

1. 159b–161b2345Tests of the first two definitions
2. 162c–dRefutation, authorship and injured reputation
3. 164c–dA rejected consequence leads to withdrawal of commitments
4. 166c–e2Critias’ accusation and Socrates’ defense of refutation

Translation in this edition

“Refute” retains the combative force without deciding that every elenchein names a formal proof of falsity. The participle at 162d is left referentially open in the edition, which should not be silently resolved in a lexical quotation.

ἐλέγχω

Attested: ἐλέγχειν / ἐξεληλεγμένος / ἐλεγχόμενος (elenchein / exelēlegmenos / elenchomenos). Examine, expose or refute; applied to speakers and arguments, with public embarrassment distinct from the search for truth. References: 166c, 162d, 166e. Lexical identification: lemmas: ἐλέγχω; related compound ἐξελέγχω. The perfect ἐξεληλεγμένος belongs to the related compound ἐξελέγχω; it is displayed here as part of the refutation family. See Refutation.

ἐκβήσεται (ekbēsetai)

Will turn out or come to an outcome; Socrates asks Critias to attend to where examination leads the argument. References: 166e. Lemma: ἐκβαίνω. See Refutation.

θαρρῶν (tharrōn)

Take courage or be confident; Socrates encourages answering without personal defensiveness. References: 166d. Lemma: θαρρέω. See Refutation.

Use in the book

The first major test asks where Alcibiades acquired knowledge of justice. Neither independent discovery nor learning from competent teachers can be established. The second begins from his claim that justice and advantage differ. Through his own answers Socrates obtains a chain connecting the just, fine, good, and advantageous. At the end Alcibiades is committed to a conclusion opposed to his initial assertion.

The method's personal force depends on the question-and-answer analysis at 113a–c. Alcibiades cannot simply attribute the result to Socrates as an external accusation. His answers supplied the commitments, and at 118b both the argument and Alcibiades himself are said to accuse him. This is why his confession of instability matters: he experiences a conflict within what he himself is prepared to say.

The procedure's success should be stated with discrimination. Exposing incompatible commitments establishes a problem in the respondent's claim to knowledge. It does not, solely by that fact, prove that every premise or every inference proposed by Socrates is beyond criticism. The argument about fine and good uses shifts between acting and faring well; the self argument later openly distinguishes adequacy from precision. The lexicon must describe these steps rather than simply call their conclusions refuted or demonstrated without explanation.

Nor is the endpoint humiliation alone. At 127d Alcibiades' inability to state a consistent account of friendship leads to recognition and then encouragement. The conversation redirects him toward care and justice. Refutation is preparatory: it disrupts the false confidence that prevented learning. The dramatic ending withholds the assurance that this moment of recognition will permanently govern his conduct.

Places to read

1. 109d–113c234567The alleged sources of knowledge of justice fail under questioning
2. 114e–117a2345Alcibiades answers against his initial claim and confesses instability
3. 118bArgument and respondent are both said to accuse Alcibiades
4. 127b–127e2The conflict over friendship produces renewed recognition and encouragement

Translation in this edition

The edition's note at 115a interprets Socrates' joking reassurance through the thought that refutation can cure rather than harm. That is an editorial comparison, not a word-for-word definition offered in the dialogue. The present entry does not import an unattested ἔλεγχος into the Greek register.

ἄκων

Attested: ἄκων (akōn; 117a). Unwillingly or against one's intention; contradictory answers are treated as revealing ignorance when they occur unintentionally. Lexical identification: lemma: ἄκων. See Refutation.

ἐναντίος

Attested: τἀναντία (tanantia; 117a). At 117a: Opposed answers given unwillingly, evidence that Alcibiades lacks stable knowledge of the subject. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐναντίος. See Refutation.

κατηγορέω

Attested: ὁ λόγος σου κατηγορεῖ (ho logos sou katēgorei; 118b). At 118b: The argument accuses Alcibiades through his own commitments, giving the diagnosis a basis beyond Socrates' authority. Lexical identification: lemma: κατηγορέω. See Refutation.

Use in the book

At 991c the movement from single items to forms is joined directly to questioning and refuting what has not been well said. The object of correction is an inadequate statement, not a person's social identity or the mere fact that someone disagrees. The procedure is to be used in each gathering, giving the curriculum a shared and discursive dimension.

The Athenian calls this the finest and first test for human beings. He then denounces pretended tests as the most futile labor. This contrast qualifies the educational value of labor itself. Persistent effort is necessary, but effort spent on an appearance of testing does not confer understanding. What matters is whether the activity genuinely examines the relevant claims and exposes what is wrongly formulated.

The description does not supply a transcript of the anticipated future questioning. It is also striking that the surrounding dialogue has become largely an Athenian monologue. A reader may reasonably notice the distance between the recommended testing procedure and the limited testing dramatized here. The lexical force of basanos does not authorize claiming that every theological or mathematical assertion in the speech has already undergone a fully displayed refutation procedure.

Nor is the word a synonym for empirical measurement alone. The surrounding passage requires classification, mathematical preparation, and attention to celestial precision, but the immediate test is conducted through questions and accounts. Its evidential setting is broad, while the correction of poorly stated propositions is explicit.

At the very end the summons to the Nocturnal Council is qualified by sufficient knowledge and scrutiny (992d–e2). The different verb dokimazein reinforces an analogous responsibility to examine the wisdom before institutional adoption. The ending therefore carries testing into civic reception rather than allowing reverence for the proposed curriculum to excuse uncritical acceptance.

The sequence allows a useful distinction among a test, an appearance of a test, an account that has survived questioning, and a proposition merely pronounced solemnly. These distinctions are interpretive responsibilities imposed by the dialogue's own language; they should remain visible even where the Athenian states his conclusions with confidence.

Places to read

1. 991cἐν ἑκάσταις ταῖς συνουσίαις — Each gathering is an occasion for the procedure
2. 991cἐρωτῶντά τε καὶ ἐλέγχοντα — Questioning and refutation are conjoined
3. 991cτὰ μὴ καλῶς ῥηθέντα — The target is what has not been well said
4. 991cκαλλίστη καὶ πρώτη βάσανος — This is declared the finest and first test
5. 991cὅσαι δὲ οὐκ οὖσαι προσποιοῦνται — Pretended tests lack the reality they claim
6. 991cματαιότατος πόνος ἁπάντων — Their labor is maximally futile
7. 992d–e2γνόντας τε καὶ δοκιμάσαντας — Knowledge and scrutiny qualify the final summons

Translation in this edition

“Questioning,” “refuting,” “test,” and “gatherings” keep the procedure concrete. The edition does not insert a noun meaning “dialectic” into the Greek. The lexical lemma ἐλέγχειν is represented locally by ἐλέγχοντα; ἐλέγχεσθαι or ἔλεγχος would be different forms and should not be fabricated as attestations of this sentence.

Unproductive examination — μάταιος (mataios)

μάταιος (mataios)

Unproductive examination. The superlative characterizes labor devoted to sham tests, showing that exertion alone does not guarantee learning. Attested: ματαιότατος (991c). Questioning refutation and the test of an account.

Setting of collective inquiry — συνουσία (synousia)

συνουσία (synousia)

Setting of collective inquiry. Each gathering is an occasion for bringing particulars to forms and testing what has not been well said. Attested: συνουσίαις (991c). Questioning refutation and the test of an account.

False claim to testing — προσποιεῖσθαι (prospoieisthai)

προσποιεῖσθαι (prospoieisthai)

False claim to testing. Practices that are not genuine tests nevertheless pretend to be, making their labor futile. Attested: προσποιοῦνται (991c). Questioning refutation and the test of an account.

Active examination — ἐρωτᾶν (erōtan)

ἐρωτᾶν (erōtan)

Active examination. Questioning is joined to refutation as the genuine test of inadequately stated accounts, rather than mere authoritative repetition. Attested: ἐρωτῶντά (991c). Questioning refutation and the test of an account.

Correction of inadequate statements — ἐλέγχειν (elenchein)

ἐλέγχειν (elenchein)

Correction of inadequate statements. The participle targets what has not been well said; it does not simply mean defeating a person regardless of the account's truth. Attested: ἐλέγχοντα (991c). Questioning refutation and the test of an account.

Genuine examination of claims — βάσανος (basanos)

βάσανος (basanos)

Genuine examination of claims. The questioning procedure is called the finest and first test for humans, in contrast to apparent tests that lack reality. Attested: βάσανος (991c). Questioning refutation and the test of an account.

Question what has not been well said (contextual phrase)

ἐρωτῶντά τε καὶ ἐλέγχοντα τὰ μὴ καλῶς ῥηθέντα (991c)

Questioning and refutation target the inadequately stated account. The phrase joins classification to a test of claims rather than making authoritative labeling sufficient for knowledge. Questioning refutation and the test of an account.

Use in the book

Socrates asks Lysis to assist him if Menexenus attempts ἐλέγχειν, “to refute” him. Here the prospective target is Socrates, which playfully reverses the expectation that Socrates will conduct the examination.

The immediate context stresses Menexenus’ contentiousness and Ctesippus’ influence, not a formal description of a named Socratic method. The verb should therefore be translated for the action performed rather than turned automatically into the abstract technical noun “elenchus.” The possibility of refutation is linked to the speaker’s risk of becoming ridiculous.

Places to read

1. 211bἐάν με ἐλέγχειν ἐπιχειρῇ ὁ Μενέξενος — if Menexenus attempts to refute me.

Use in the book

At 222d Socrates recalls that they thought they had refuted the claim that the good alone is a friend to the good. The infinitive ἐξελέγξαι depends on “we thought”; the qualification matters because their earlier reasoning is now being re-used.

The word refers to what the previous exchange seemed to establish, not to personal humiliation as an end in itself. In the closing review it prevents the speakers from accepting a familiar answer simply because it has returned in altered vocabulary.

Places to read

1. 222dᾠόμεθα ἐξελέγξαι ἡμᾶς αὐτούς — We thought that we ourselves had refuted this.

Use in the book

A saying attributed to Thales calls time the clearest test of all things because it reveals truth. Here testing occurs through experience and disclosure over time. The surrounding anecdotes similarly treat time as discoverer and teacher, broadening the term beyond an exchange of questions and answers.

Places to read

1. I.8.40aTime is the test that makes truth manifest.

Translation in this edition

“Test” is the right emphasis in the saying; “refutation” would incorrectly decide in advance that every tested claim is false.