From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordἘᾶν χαίρειν, “to let (a person or thing) rejoice”: to bid it farewell, dismiss it, think no more of it.
- In the CharmidesOnce, at the turn of the dialogue’s method: “answer the question as it seems to you, and say goodbye to whether it is Critias or Socrates who is being refuted” (166d–e).
- In this edition“Say goodbye to”.
- A place to read166b–e.
- English renderings
- ἔα χαίρειν, ea chairein, “say goodbye to”
Meaning
Χαῖρε, “rejoice”, was the ordinary Greek greeting at meeting and at parting, and χαίρειν its infinitive. With ἐᾶν, “to let”, the parting sense prevails: to let something rejoice is to leave it to its own devices, and so to have done with it. Plato uses the phrase often for setting aside a person, a question or a story so that the argument may go on without it. The edition’s note at 166e gives the literal sense: “‘Say goodbye to’ is ea chairein, literally ‘let it rejoice’: perhaps a smile at Critias, who has just banished ‘rejoice’ as a greeting.”
Use in the book
Critias has claimed that temperance alone of the kinds of knowledge is knowledge of itself and of the others, and has accused Socrates of trying to refute him and letting go of what the argument is about (166c; see ἐάω; ἐλέγχω). Socrates answers that he refutes Critias for the same reason he scrutinizes himself, for fear of thinking he knows what he does not (166c–d; see ἐλέγχω), and that it is a common good that each thing should become plain as it really is (166d; see κοινὸν ἀγαθόν). Then the instruction: “Then take heart, my dear fellow … answer the question as it seems to you, and say goodbye to whether it is Critias or Socrates who is being refuted” (166d–e; see ἀποκρίνομαι).
The phrase answers Critias’ complaint in his own verb. He had accused Socrates of letting go, ἐάσας, of the subject; Socrates tells him to let go, ἔα, of the persons. What is to be dismissed is the question of whose argument wins, and what is to be kept is the argument: “Just pay attention to the argument itself” (166e; see ἐκβαίνω). Critias agrees at once, “you seem to me to be talking sense”, and gives his definition again (166e).
The note’s smile is in the sequence. Two pages earlier Critias read the Delphic inscription as the god’s greeting given “in place of ‘Rejoice!’”, on the view that “this greeting, ‘rejoice’, is not the right one” (164d–e; see Γνῶθι σαυτόν; χαίρω). Socrates now uses the word Critias banished to bid him part with his own standing in the argument. The dialogue can be read as testing whether Critias can take the advice: three pages later, unable to make the distinctions asked of him, he is “ashamed in front of the company” and covers up his perplexity rather than admit it (169c–d; see αἰσχύνομαι).
Places to read
The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the complaint it answers.
- 166cCritias: Socrates is trying to refute him and letting go of what the argument is about.
- 166c–dSocrates refutes others for the reason he scrutinizes himself; it is a common good that each thing should become plain.
- 166d–e2Answer as it seems to you, and say goodbye to whether it is Critias or Socrates who is being refuted.
Translation in this edition
Ἔα χαίρειν (166d9) is “say goodbye to”. The English keeps the parting, which lets the smile the note hears at 166e be felt, and governs the double question that follows, εἴτε Κριτίας ἐστὶν εἴτε Σωκράτης ὁ ἐλεγχόμενος, “whether it is Critias or Socrates who is being refuted”.
Elsewhere in Plato
The phrase sets persons aside for the argument in several dialogues. In the Philebus, having shown that no understanding or knowledge holds the truest truth about things that never stay the same, Socrates says that “you and I and Gorgias and Philebus” must be given a long farewell, and the following solemnly declared to the argument: that what is stable, pure and true is found in the things that are always the same, or in what is most akin to them (59b–c; see διαμαρτύρομαι). In the Sophist the visitor from Elea, having failed to speak correctly about what is not, and finding Theaetetus unwilling to try after him, proposes, “let us say goodbye to you and me”, until they meet someone who can do it (239b–c). In the Laches, Laches advises Lysimachus and his friend Melesias to let Nicias and himself go as teachers of the young, and not to let Socrates go (200c). In the Gorgias Socrates recalls telling Gorgias that if he thought being refuted a gain, as Socrates does, it was worth talking, and if not, to let it be (461a; see ἐλέγχω).
The rhetoricians whose doctrine Socrates reports in the Phaedrus use a kindred phrase, πολλὰ χαίρειν εἰπεῖν, the other way: in pursuit of the likely they bid a long farewell to the truth (272e; see εἰκός). Socrates, in the Phaedo, asks his friends to think little of Socrates and much more of the truth (91c; see ἀλήθεια).