Ε Epsilon

figure

εἶδος

The boy’s figure, and the soul to be looked at first · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordΕἶδος, what is seen: the shape or build of a body, a person’s looks; then a kind, sort, type; in Plato, from the dialogues of definition on, the form that the many things called by one name have in common.
  • In the CharmidesTwice, in one exchange about the boy’s body: Chaerephon says that if he stripped he would seem faceless, “his figure is so perfectly beautiful” (154d), and Socrates proposes to look at his soul “before we look at his figure” (154e).
  • In this edition“His figure”.
  • A place to read154c–155a.
English renderings
τὸ εἶδος, to eidos, “his figure”; τοῦ εἴδους, tou eidous, “his figure”

Meaning

The noun comes from the root of ἰδεῖν, “to see”, as does ἰδέα (see ἰδέα). In Homer and in ordinary speech it is how a person looks, form or figure, often set against worth or strength; at 154d it is the body’s figure as against the face. From the visible shape it passes to the kind of thing that has a shape, and in Plato’s inquiries into “what is X?” to the one form in virtue of which many things are X.

Use in the book

The word comes in the prologue’s comedy of looking. The men in the wrestling-school are all in love with Charmides, and the boys, even the littlest, are gazing at him “as if he were a statue” (154c–d; see ἄγαλμα). Chaerephon asks whether the boy has not a lovely face, and adds that if he were willing to strip, Socrates would think him faceless, “his figure is so perfectly beautiful” (154d; see ἀπρόσωπος; εὐπρόσωπος). Socrates answers with a condition: the boy would be invincible if he has one small thing more, a soul that is well made (154d–e; see ἄμαχος). Critias assures him that he has, and Socrates proposes to strip that part of him “and take a look at it before we look at his figure”, since at his age he must be willing to talk (154e; see ἀποδύω; διαλέγομαι).

The two uses set the order of the dialogue. The figure is what the company admires; the soul is what Socrates proposes to strip first, and the stripping is to be done by conversation. The same order, the soul before the body, is the Thracian’s rule for the charm, which treats the soul first and foremost (157a; see ψυχή). The boy’s figure returns only in Socrates’ glimpse inside his cloak (155d; see φλέγομαι) and his brief compliment on “what can be seen of your looks” (158b; see ἰδέα).

The word that Plato would make the name of what a definition seeks appears in the Charmides only as the body’s shape. Socrates asks the boy instead to say what, in his opinion, temperance is (159a; see δόξα), and the dialogue never calls the object of its question an εἶδος. The figure that is admired first and examined second can be read as the dialogue’s counterpart to the form that, in later dialogues, is examined and not seen.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

  1. 154dIf Charmides stripped, he would seem faceless, his figure is so perfectly beautiful.
  2. 154eSocrates proposes to strip the boy’s soul and look at it before his figure.

Translation in this edition

Τὸ εἶδος (154d5), an accusative of respect with πάγκαλος, is “his figure” in “his figure is so perfectly beautiful”; τοῦ εἴδους (154e6), a genitive with πρότερον, is “before we look at his figure”. The edition keeps “figure” for εἶδος, and uses “looks” for ἰδέα (157d, 158b, 175d).

Elsewhere in Plato

In the Symposium Diotima teaches the lover to pass beyond the beauty of one body: the beauty on any one body is sister to the beauty on another, and if beauty in the figure, τὸ ἐπ’ εἴδει καλόν, is what he must pursue, it would be great folly not to hold the beauty on all bodies one and the same; after that he must think the beauty in souls more precious than that in the body (210b). Her ascent begins with the body and rises to the soul; the Charmides’ order, the soul looked at before the figure, can be read as her ranking, the soul’s beauty above the body’s, put first.

The word becomes Plato’s name for what definitions seek. In the Euthyphro Socrates reminds Euthyphro, the seer who is prosecuting his own father for murder, that he asked him not for one or two of the many pious things but for “that form itself” by which all pious things are pious, and asks to be taught what this character, ἰδέα, itself is, so that looking to it and using it as a pattern he may call pious whatever is like it (6d–e). In the Meno, however many and various the virtues are, they all have one and the same form through which they are virtues, and the answerer must look to it (72c). In the Republic Socrates states the custom: we are used to positing one form for each set of the many things to which we give the same name (10.596a).

Other ancient sources

Homer uses the word for looks set against worth. Hector rebukes his brother Paris as “Evil Paris, best in looks, mad for women, deceiver”;1 and the cry that rallies the Greeks calls them “base disgraces, admired for your looks”.2

Aristotle tells how the forms got their name, which in his telling is ἰδέα, with εἶδος beside it. Socrates, he says, worked on questions of conduct and let nature as a whole alone; within ethics he looked for what is common and was the first to set his mind on definitions. Plato took this up, but supposed that definitions concern something other than what we perceive, since no common account can be given of perceptible things, which are always changing; these other beings he named ideas, and the many things that share a name with the forms, τοῖς εἴδεσιν, are what they are by having a share in them.3 Elsewhere Aristotle allows Socrates two things by right, arguments that lead up from particular cases and the defining of what is common, but says that he did not set the universals or the definitions apart; others did, and named such beings ideas.4

Source note

1. Homer, Iliad 3.39.

2. Homer, Iliad 5.787, 8.228.

3. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.6, 987b1–10.

4. Aristotle, Metaphysics 13.4, 1078b27–32.