Hypothesis

Use in the book

At 160d the fineness of temperance is described as something laid down in the argument. At 163a Socrates asks whether someone who posits “doing one's own business” can accept the consequences being drawn. Such starting points are subject to examination; being posited does not guarantee being true.

The later argument distinguishes granting an account its strongest case from establishing that case. Possibility is granted at 169d. At 172c–d both possibility and the original power to identify what people know are restored. The dream then imagines those powers operating fully in social life. At 174a a person knowing all past, present and future things is posited to isolate the question of which knowledge makes him happy.

This procedure permits an especially strong test: even with controversial capacities granted, the intended benefit may fail to follow. Conversely, the scenario's consequences must not be cited as unconditional claims about human psychology, social institutions or the actuality of prophecy. The repeated supposition markers identify the local argumentative status.

Places to read

1. 160dFineness as an agreed starting point
2. 163aA definition described as posited
3. 169dPossibility assumed to advance the inquiry
4. 172c–174a23Strong concessions and imagined complete knowledge

Translation in this edition

“Even if”, “let us grant” and “let us suppose” carry indispensable logical information. At 174a Burnet prints θῶμεν, “let us posit”; the apparatus records φῶμεν, “let us say”, as a proposed alternative, not the adopted text.

ἄν

Attested: ἂν (an). Particle marking a potential or conditional consequence; crucial to separating a supposed case from an unconditional assertion. References: 167b, 171d. Lexical identification: particle: ἄν. See Hypothesis.

διισχυρίζομαι

Attested: διισχυριζώμεθα / διισχυρίσασθαι (diischyrizōmetha / diischyrisasthai). To assert firmly or insist; Socrates declines to pronounce knowledge of knowledge impossible before examination, and later declines to guarantee that it can exist. References: 168a, 169b. Lexical identification: lemma: διισχυρίζομαι. See Hypothesis.

εἰ δυνατόν

Attested: εἰ δυνατόν (ei dynaton). Whether it is possible; introduces the first question about knowing what one knows and does not know, before the independent question of its benefit. References: 167b. Lexical identification: phrase template: εἰ δυνατόν. See Hypothesis.

εἴπερ

Attested: εἴπερ (eiper). If indeed, or if as assumed; adds emphasis to a conditional premise, such as temperance’s goodness, knowledge’s relation to ignorance, or the requirements of a capacity acting on itself. References: 161a, 166e, 167a, 168d, 170c, 175e. Lexical identification: lemma: εἴπερ. See Hypothesis.

ὅτι μάλιστα

Attested: ὅτι μάλιστα (hoti malista). As fully or as much as possible; strengthens the provisional supposition without converting it into an established conclusion. References: 160c, 166c, 167b, 172e. Lexical identification: expression / normalized lookup: ὅτι μάλιστα. See Hypothesis; Maximal concession.

προτίθημι

Attested: προτιθέμενον (protithemenon). What is put forward or proposed; Socrates explains that he investigates each proposed claim with Critias because he himself does not know the answer. References: 165b. Lexical identification: lemma: προτίθημι. See Hypothesis.

ὑποτίθημι

Attested: ὑποθέμενος / ὑπετιθέμεθα / ὑπετέθη (hypothemenos / hypetithemetha / hypetethē). Lay down or suppose an account; introduces a definition or a case provisionally accepted for examination. References: 163a, 171d, 160d. Lexical identification: lemma: ὑποτίθημι. See Hypothesis.

Use in the book

The Phaedo tests the proposal that soul is harmony by deriving an unacceptable consequence: all souls would be equally good. The speakers reject that outcome and question the premise. The passage is evidence for a method of examination, not a claim that the proposed equality of souls is true.

Places to read

1. I.49.13.11An unacceptable consequence is used to challenge the harmony hypothesis.

Translation in this edition

“Premise” fits the argument’s immediate structure; “hypothesis” retains the broader idea of a proposed starting point.

Use in the book

The Descartes comparison presents a hypothesis useful for producing arts as apparently equal to truth in usefulness, beauty and value. In the Condillac discussion, convenience for making thought understood opens into a criticism of forbidden metaphors that return as arrangement, seal and imprint. The intentional-species passage grants explanatory hypotheses a conditional legitimacy: the mind must not become their dupe or treat mere suppositions as realities. Attraction is useful yet can attract excessive belief. The narrative note then shifts toward effects on the mature mind and bad consequences as a ground for disputing hypotheses. Applied to religion, entering a role allows emotion from merely supposing the true. That possibility is not a claim that a supposition has thereby been proved.

Places to read

1. I, p. 240, entry 11, ¶1A useful Cartesian hypothesis is compared with truth itself.
2. I, p. 284, entry 7, ¶1A convenient hypothesis reintroduces prohibited metaphors.
3. I, p. 447, entry 1, ¶2Useful suppositions are permitted if not mistaken for realities.
4. II, p. 627, entry 3, ¶2The effect and consequence of a supposition become tests.
5. II, p. 803, entry 5, ¶1Supposing the true can elicit emotion within a religious role.

Translation in this edition

The English translation retains hypothesis and hypotheses. The Descartes and Condillac quotations or assessments are given through Joubert’s report. Intentional species remains a scholastic term, not a claim of deliberate choice. The limits “provided,” “perhaps” and “can” prevent the contextual permissions from becoming blanket approval.

Intentional species

French: espèce intentionnelle.

Espèces intentionnelles is retained as intentional species, a historical term involving forms or representations in cognition. Intentional does not mean simply deliberately selected. Joubert conditionally entertains these as images sustaining attention without being seen and judges their name obscure and repellent. The repeated perhaps and if matter: explanatory convenience might justify their invention, provided a mind does not mistake its suppositions for realities. The text offers a bounded hypothetical defense, not an unconditional endorsement of a scholastic doctrine.

Places to read: I, p. 447, entry 1, ¶2.