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feel shame, be ashamed

αἰσχύνομαι

Shame in the answer, and shame in the man who answers · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordΑἰσχύνεσθαι is to feel shame, to be ashamed of an act or before persons.
  • In the CharmidesThree times, each about a speaker and his words. Charmides says that temperance “makes a person feel shame” (160e). Critias would “sooner take back some of it, and not be ashamed to say I had spoken wrongly” (164c–d). And Critias, “used to being admired on every occasion”, is “ashamed in front of the company” and will not admit that he is at a loss (169c).
  • In this edition“Feel shame” and “be ashamed”.
  • A place to read169c–d.
English renderings
αἰσχύνεσθαι ποιεῖν, aischynesthai poiein, “makes a person feel shame”; αἰσχυνθείην, aischyntheiēn, “be ashamed”; ᾐσχύνετο, ēischyneto, “was ashamed”

Meaning

Αἰσχύνεσθαι (aischynesthai) is the middle of αἰσχύνειν, “to disfigure, disgrace”, from αἶσχος, “shame”. With an infinitive it is to be ashamed to do something, with a participle to be ashamed at doing it, and with an accusative of persons to feel shame before them, as Critias feels shame before “the company” (τοὺς παρόντας, 169c). Shame of this kind is shame at being seen.

Use in the book

The first use is the boy’s. Asked to look within and say what temperance makes him, Charmides answers that temperance “makes a person feel shame” and is modesty (160e; see αἰδώς). Socrates refutes the definition, and the boy gives it up without embarrassment (161b).

The second is Critias’ boast. Rather than concede that a man who does not know himself is temperate, “I would sooner take back some of it, and not be ashamed to say I had spoken wrongly” (164c–d; see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; ἀνατίθημι). He does take it back, and more than he was asked: “Everything before this I give up to you” (165b).

The third undoes the boast. When Socrates asks him to show that knowledge of knowledge is possible and beneficial, Critias catches Socrates’ perplexity “like people who catch a yawn”, and, “Since he was used to being admired on every occasion, he was ashamed in front of the company; he was not willing to concede to me that he could not make the distinctions I was challenging him to make” (169c–d; see ἁλίσκομαι; εὐδοκιμέω), and he covered up his perplexity instead (169d; see ἐπικαλύπτω). Socrates must grant the point himself, “to keep our argument moving” (169d). The company is the one before which, at 162c, Critias was “eager to shine before Charmides and the company”, τοὺς παρόντας both times (162c2, 169c7): the ambition that brought him into the argument and the shame that stops him there can be read as one trait seen twice.

The verb measures a reversal. The boy names shame as the mark of temperance and is refuted. Critias disowns shame when retracting costs him nothing, and gives way to it when admitting perplexity would cost him the company’s admiration. The shame that serves inquiry, at one’s own ignorance, is the one he lacks; the shame he has, before an audience, stops the inquiry. Charmides’ definition, refuted in argument, can be read as vindicated in the drama: the man without the right shame is the one who proves least temperate.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

  1. 160eCharmides says that temperance makes a person feel shame and bashful, and is modesty.
  2. 164c–dCritias would sooner retract, and not be ashamed to say he spoke wrongly, than concede that a man who does not know himself is temperate.
  3. 169c–dUsed to being admired, Critias is ashamed before the company, will not admit that he cannot make the distinctions, and covers up his perplexity.

Translation in this edition

Αἰσχύνεσθαι ποιεῖν (160e) is “makes a person feel shame”, αἰσχυνθείην (164d) “be ashamed”, and ᾐσχύνετο τοὺς παρόντας (169c) “he was ashamed in front of the company”. At 164d1 Burnet prints μή from Stobaeus after “not be ashamed”, where B and T have ὅτι μή.

Elsewhere in Plato

The Gorgias names the shame that stops an argument. Callicles, the ambitious Athenian with whom the dialogue ends, recalls that Polus had accused Gorgias of contradicting himself out of shame, and says that Polus has now fared the same: ashamed to say what he thought, he was tied up in the argument and muzzled (482c–e). Socrates takes up the diagnosis as praise of Callicles: Gorgias and Polus, wise and friendly as they are, lack frankness and are “more bashful than they should be”, so far gone in shame that each has dared to contradict himself before many people on the greatest matters, while Callicles has the frankness they lack (487a–b). In the Sophist, refutation leads the man refuted into shame and so frees him from the opinions that block learning (230b–d; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν). Critias at 169c shows the first kind of shame and is denied the second.