Δ Delta

be thought, seem, think

δοκέω

What the boy is thought to be, and what seems so to him · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordΔοκέω, to seem; with a dative, “it seems to me”, and so “I think”; of persons, to be thought, to be reputed, to have a name for something.
  • In the CharmidesAbout fifty times, most often in “I think” and “it seems”. Eight times it is said of reputation: of the boy “who is thought the most beautiful” (154a) and thought the most temperate (157d), of his uncle (158a), of the author of a definition who “was thought to be very wise indeed” (162b).
  • In this edition“Is thought”, “in … opinion”, “think”, “seem”.
  • A place to read157c–158e.
English renderings
δοκοῦντος, dokountos, “who is thought”; δοκεῖ, dokei, “in … opinion”, “is thought”; δόξαι, doxai, “was … thought”; δοκῶ, dokō, “think I am”; ἐδόκει, edokei, “He was thought”; δοκεῖ μοι, dokei moi, “I think”, “it seems to me”; τὸ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦν, to emoi dokoun, “what I think”

Meaning

The verb has two directions. What seems to me is my opinion; what I seem to others is my reputation. Both are δόξα, the verb’s noun (see δόξα), and Greek moves between them without a change of word. Οἱ δοκοῦντες, “those who are thought something”, are men of standing; τὸ δοκοῦν μοι is what I think. Between the two lies the gap the Socratic dialogues work in, between being thought wise and being wise (see ἀλαζών).

Use in the book

The prologue speaks in the language of reputation. Critias tells Socrates that the young men coming in are “the advance guard and the lovers of the one who is thought the most beautiful—at the moment, anyway” (154a; see πρόδρομος); that the boy is a philosopher “and, in other people’s opinion as well as his own, quite the poet” (154e–155a; see ποιητικός); that “Charmides is thought to surpass those his age not only in his looks, but in the very thing you say you have the charm for”, and “that he is thought far and away the most temperate of anyone nowadays” (157d). Socrates adds that no man on the continent “was ever thought handsomer or bigger” than Pyrilampes (158a; see πρεσβεύω). The boy himself fears to deny his temperance, since, he says, “I shall be showing up Critias here as a liar, and many others too who think I am temperate, by his account” (158d; see αἰσχυντηλός). The man who said that temperance is doing one’s own business “was thought to be very wise indeed” (162b; see αἰνίττομαι).

Reputation is where the inquiry begins, and what it sets aside. Socrates does not ask the boy whether he is thought temperate, but what temperance seems to him to be (159a, 160d–e, with φαίνεσθαι), and the boy’s answers are given with δοκεῖν: “in his view”, οἷ δοκοῖ, temperance was doing everything in an orderly way and quietly (159b), and he thinks, δοκεῖ μοι, that temperance makes a person feel shame (160e). When Critias tries to make Socrates state his own view, he refuses: “Let’s not look yet at what I think”, τὸ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦν, “but at what you are saying now” (163e; see ἐάω). The dialogue thus passes from what others think of Charmides to what Charmides thinks, and keeps Socrates’ own opinion out of the examination.

Places to read

The passages in which the verb is said of reputation, what a person is thought to be.

  1. 154aThe lovers of the one who is thought the most beautiful.
  2. 154e–155aCharmides is a philosopher and, in other people’s opinion as well as his own, quite the poet.
  3. 157dHe is thought to surpass his contemporaries in looks and in temperance; he is thought the most temperate of anyone.
  4. 158aNo man on the continent was ever thought handsomer or bigger than Pyrilampes.
  5. 158dTo deny his temperance would show up Critias and many others who think him temperate.
  6. 160a–bIn deliberation it is not the quietest person who is thought to deserve praise.
  7. 162bThe author of the definition was thought to be very wise indeed.

Translation in this edition

Of reputation the edition uses “is thought” (154a5, 157d2, 157d6, 160a10) and “was thought” (162b3) and, for ὡς δοκεῖ ἄλλοις τε καὶ ἑαυτῷ (155a1), “in other people’s opinion as well as his own”. Δόξαι (158a3) is “was … thought”, and οἷς δοκῶ εἶναι σώφρων (158d4) “who think I am temperate”, turning the Greek’s “to whom I seem” into “who think”. In the first person δοκεῖ μοι is mostly “I think”, and in questions δοκεῖ σοι is “do you think”. Τὸ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦν (163e6) is “what I think”. At 157d2 Burnet prints W’s present δοκεῖ, “is thought”, where B and T have the imperfect ἐδόκει; at 157d6 he prints T’s reading, also a variant in W, where B has what the edition’s note at 157d renders “thought the most sagacious (polyphrenestatos) of very many” (apparatus, d2, d6). At 158a3 he prints T’s infinitive δόξαι, where B has the noun δόξα (apparatus, a3).

Elsewhere in Plato

In the Apology Socrates tells how he tested the oracle on a politician: it seemed to him that this man seemed wise to many other people and most of all to himself, but was not, and when he tried to show him so, he made himself hated (21c–d; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν). Critias’ phrase about his ward, “in other people’s opinion as well as his own”, has the same two parts, and can be read as setting up the boy for the test the Apology describes.

In the Republic Glaucon builds his challenge on the same gap. Injustice at its height is to be thought just while being nothing of the kind, so the perfectly unjust man must be granted the highest name for justice; and beside him is to be set the just man, plain and well-born, who in the words of the tragic poet Aeschylus wants to be good rather than to be thought so. His reputation must be stripped from him, Glaucon says, since a man held to be just will be paid in honours and presents, and no one could then tell whether his justice is for its own sake or for theirs (361a–c).

Other ancient sources

The line Glaucon has in mind is spoken in Aeschylus’ Seven against Thebes of the seer Amphiaraus, who carries no device on his shield: he does not wish to seem the best, but to be it.1

Source note

1. Aeschylus, Seven against Thebes 590–592.