Piety

Use in the book

The decisive comparison is not between someone who performs rituals and someone who performs none. It is between the material gifts visible in a ceremony and the soul of the giver. Sacrifice can be lavish even when that agent has made many mistakes toward both gods and people. Holiness consequently cannot be inferred from religious expenditure alone.

The conclusion names justice and intelligence as honoured by gods and by human beings who have sense. It then identifies the intelligent and just with those who know what they must do and say toward gods and humans. Holiness is drawn into an account of informed conduct, rather than isolated as an instinct of reverence or a capacity to pay for correct ceremonies.

Alcibiades’ final practical obligation is to wait until he learns how to be disposed toward both groups. This extends the issue from isolated words to the condition from which speech and action proceed. Yet the dialogue does not offer a complete definition of holiness or a code of duties. It identifies a need for education and the insufficiency of externals while leaving the positive instruction largely prospective.

Places to read

1. 149eThe gods ought to attend to the soul, whether the person is holy and just.
2. 150a–150bJustice and intelligence determine the assessment of speech and action toward gods and people.
3. 150dAlcibiades must learn an appropriate disposition before resuming the religious errand.

Translation in this edition

The English holy renders hosios at 149e; the poetic holy Ilium at 149d uses a different form, hirē, and is not evidence that the Trojans satisfy the ethical condition. The polytheistic vocabulary and ceremonial setting should be retained rather than translated into a later doctrine of inward faith.

Use in the book

The return to human wisdom begins with an acknowledgment of the speakers' inadequate judgment concerning just things (988e–989a). The Athenian diagnoses a failure to practice the greatest part of virtue well, then forbids persuasion that anything of virtue is greater for the mortal race than piety (989b). This is the ethical pivot of the astronomical curriculum: the wisdom sought must correct a deficiency in reverence, not merely extend technical competence.

The cause is the greatest amathia, present even among the best natures. That claim prevents an easy equation of good natural disposition with completed piety. The missing content must be learned. When the subject is finally named astronomy, it is introduced as the answer to what things of theosebeia one must learn and how (989e–990a). Eusebeia and theosebeia converge in the proposed education while remaining distinct Greek words and distinct English renderings.

The suitable learners' conduct makes the civic stakes explicit. With the right nourishment and education they can act and speak about gods, sacrifices, and purifications as required and at the required times (989c). This is not a proposal to abolish all ritual in favor of private mathematical contemplation. The earlier protection of ancestral rites remains relevant; the new astronomical honors and informed service must join a properly ordered city's religious life.

The contrast with outward show is decisive. The rulers are not to contrive by schemata but to honor virtue in truth. Their authority therefore requires more than success in managing appearances or manipulating the population's beliefs. The Athenian grounds civic benefit in a claimed correspondence between understanding, virtue, and practice. Whether his astronomical theology sufficiently establishes that correspondence remains a question for interpretation, not a fact secured by translating eusebeia as “piety.”

The claim of piety's supremacy must also be read beside the earlier designation of wisdom as the greatest part of virtue. The dialogue does not pause to build a formal hierarchy resolving every possible comparison among named virtues. Its solution is to connect true wisdom with rightly understood divine things. The reader should preserve that connection without pretending the work has supplied a separate definitional proof that the two words are interchangeable in every context.

Places to read

1. 989aτὸ δὴ μέγιστον ἀρετῆς οὐ καλῶς πραττόμενον — The failure concerns the greatest aspect of virtue
2. 989bτῆς εὐσεβείας — Piety is named in the superlative ethical claim
3. 989bδι’ ἀμαθίαν τὴν μεγίστην — The cause of its absence is the greatest stupidity
4. 989cὡς δεῖ τε καὶ ὅτε δεῖ — Right manner and right occasion govern religious action and speech
5. 989cπερὶ θυσίας τε καὶ καθαρμοὺς — Sacrifices and purifications remain among the educated person's concerns
6. 989c–dοὐ σχήμασι τεχνάζοντας, ἀλλὰ ἀληθείᾳ τιμῶντας ἀρετήν — Genuine honor is opposed to contrivance by outward show
7. 990aθεοσεβείας ᾧτινι τρόπῳ τις τίνα μαθήσεται — Reverence toward gods is an explicit object of learning

Translation in this edition

Eusebeia is “piety,” theosebeia “reverence toward the gods,” and amathia “stupidity.” The strong last word is the edition's rendering, not a clinical or intellectual diagnosis of actual people. “Outward show” gives schemata its local rhetorical force without making every occurrence of schēma elsewhere mean deceit.

Manipulation through appearances — τεχνάζειν (technazein)

τεχνάζειν (technazein)

Manipulation through appearances. The verb describes the rejected use of outward show in civic religious conduct; it is not a rejection of every craft as such. Attested: τεχνάζοντας (989c). Piety virtue and truthful civic worship.

Rejected religious show — σχῆμα (schēma)

σχῆμα (schēma)

Rejected religious show. The plural outward forms is opposed to honoring virtue in truth; educated leaders should not merely manipulate appearances. Attested: σχήμασι (989c). Piety virtue and truthful civic worship.

Prohibition of neglect — θεμιτός (themitos)

θεμιτός (themitos)

Prohibition of neglect. Once the favorable divine account is plain, neglecting the gods is not religiously permissible. Attested: θεμιτόν (992a). Piety virtue and truthful civic worship.

Highest mortal virtue in the local claim — εὐσέβεια (eusebeia)

εὐσέβεια (eusebeia)

Highest mortal virtue in the local claim. Nothing of virtue is to be held greater for the mortal race; astronomy will be connected to repairing the ignorance that obstructs it. Attested: εὐσεβείας (989b). Piety virtue and truthful civic worship.

Informed ritual practice — καθαρμός (katharmos)

καθαρμός (katharmos)

Informed ritual practice. Purifications concerning gods and humans remain objects of educated action alongside sacrifices; astronomy does not simply abolish ritual. Attested: καθαρμοὺς (989c). Piety virtue and truthful civic worship.

Learnable divine regard — θεοσέβεια (theosebeia)

θεοσέβεια (theosebeia)

Learnable divine regard. The curriculum answers what things of reverence toward gods can be learned and how; it is not merely a practical observing skill. Attested: θεοσεβείας (990a). Piety virtue and truthful civic worship.

Obstacle even in excellent natures — ἀμαθία (amathia)

ἀμαθία (amathia)

Obstacle even in excellent natures. The greatest ignorance or stupidity explains the failure of piety even among the best natural dispositions. Attested: ἀμαθίαν (989b). Piety virtue and truthful civic worship.

Confessed ethical deficit — ἀγνώμων (agnōmōn)

ἀγνώμων (agnōmōn)

Confessed ethical deficit. The speakers would lack judgment of just things without the wisdom being sought; the Athenian says they seem to be in that condition. Attested: ἀγνώμονες (989a). Piety virtue and truthful civic worship.

Manner and occasion together (contextual phrase)

ὡς δεῖ τε καὶ ὅτε δεῖ (989c)

The educated person's acts and speech about the gods must be right both in how they are done and when. This keeps informed practice and timing within piety rather than reducing it to a set of abstract propositions. Piety virtue and truthful civic worship.

True honor rather than contrived show (contextual phrase)

οὐ σχήμασι τεχνάζοντας, ἀλλὰ ἀληθείᾳ τιμῶντας ἀρετήν (989c–d)

The opposition distinguishes manipulation through external forms from real honor of virtue. It does not say that every ritual form is false; it evaluates the educated ruler's orientation and manner of conduct. Piety virtue and truthful civic worship.

Use in the book

The work addressed to Tat calls understanding the things that exist and giving thanks to their maker the most fitting piety. Its account of the goal of piety joins living well, dying blessed, and knowing the soul’s upward destination. The road to truth is thus described as a way of life, difficult for an embodied soul even though venerable and smooth in itself.

Places to read

1. I.41.1.1Understanding and gratitude express piety.
2. I.41.1.4Piety’s goal is linked with truth and the soul’s destination.
3. I.4.2dPiety is set against Necessity in an edited tragic verse.

Translation in this edition

“Reverence” conveys the attitude toward God; “piety” preserves the term when its nature or goal is explicitly discussed.

Reverent holiness

Hosios means holy, reverent, or religiously right; hosiotēs names holiness. The verse at I.4.2d uses hosia as the noun rendered piety and opposes it to Necessity. That reading is editorially adopted over a manuscript adjective. The moral and religious sense is clear in the printed verse, while its textual qualification should remain visible.

Use in the book

Piety is to the heart what poetry is to imagination and beautiful metaphysics to mind: it exercises sensibility’s full extent. Yet Joubert also says religious morality cannot by itself regulate manners, making politeness and honor separately necessary. The heavenly-court image gives piety an ennobling social setting without identifying the unnamed people whom it ennobles. Holiness is a related but stronger category: the distinction between reason making one moderate and holiness making one chaste should not be erased by treating every religious virtue as identical.

Places to read

1. I, p. 130, entry 3, ¶1Piety exercises the heart and the extent of sensibility.
2. I, p. 434, entry 6, ¶1Politeness and honor have disciplines not supplied by piety alone.
3. II, p. 840, entry 13, ¶1Piety’s ennobling work is figured as life at the heavenly court.

Translation in this edition

The English translation keeps piety distinct from devotion and preserves the court metaphor. “Them” in the ennobling fragment remains unspecified. The variant French spellings anoblit/annoblit do not produce different English senses.

Holiness

French: sainteté.

Saintliness is distinguished from mere moderation; a saint who remains within holiness is placed above a sage. These are comparative judgments, not a general definition of sainthood.

Places to read: I, p. 174, entry 7, ¶1; II, p. 845, entry 8, ¶1.

Use in the book

I.84 places piety in the difficult practice of continuing to benefit people who disappoint or mistreat the giver. Christ’s unwearied love provides the example; the desired result is a virtue strengthened rather than extinguished by others’ failures.

IV.98 uses the term for a generous judgment about divine giving. Traherne considers it pious to believe that God has truly, without mere metaphor, placed humanity under infinite obligation. The connection is confidence in the scale of goodness. Piety receives the gift with adequate seriousness and then attempts a response whose conduct bears that recognition out.

Places to read

1. I.84Piety persists in cheerful beneficence despite mistreatment.
2. IV.98Believing the literal greatness of divine obligation is presented as piety.

In this edition

The first passage concerns conduct and the second an affirmative theological judgment. Neither reduces piety to observance detached from the understanding of love.

Use in the book

Lamennais’s house attracts Guérin because it joins learning and piety. The conjunction matters: the sought refuge is not an abandonment of intellectual life. Religious practice also appears through the rhythm of early Mass, Easter communion, and retreat. Yet these settings do not guarantee a compliant inner state, as the Good Friday entry makes plain.

At Le Val piety is domestic. The host is at once pious and a poet, and household happiness spreads like invisible incense. Meals, shared work, conversation, and care for a child become the temporal substance of this atmosphere. Its religious quality is carried by relations as well as explicit ritual.

The two printed witnesses make an important difference here. The 1861 account explicitly couples morning prayer to a subsequent kneeling before nature and includes thanksgiving through the sign of the cross. The 1864 account retains adoration of nature and the incense-like atmosphere but does not retain those particular sentences. One may compare the textures without deciding, on this evidence alone, that an ideological motive explains every alteration.

Places to read

1. 13 August 1832 · ¶1Learning and piety jointly define the appeal of Lamennais’s house.
2. 9 December 1833 · ¶1The early Mass is valued for its position between starlight and sunrise.
3. 20 December 1833 · ¶1A pious and happy household surrounds the guest like invisible incense.
4. 20 December 1833 · ¶2Domestic acts form a sustained rhythm of intimacy, work, and shared delight.
5. 20 December 1833 · ¶1 · 1861 variantThe separate 1861 witness includes morning prayer, kneeling before nature, and the sign of the cross, making ritual gestures more explicit.

Translation in this edition

The English “pious” preserves pieux without substituting a generic “kind.” “Adoration” likewise remains adoration in the main domestic passage, so the religious resonance is not confined to the longer variant’s explicit gestures.

Use in the book

B32 makes piety a condition of good discourse. Holy mouths are to release a pure spring, and the Muse is asked to bring only what ephemeral hearers may lawfully hear. Ambition for honour must not push speech beyond holiness. The movement into methodological advice shows that reverence here is compatible with careful use of evidence; piety is not defined as refusing to examine appearances.

B1282 embodies the same word-family in worship. Pious images, perfumes, incense, and honey please Cypris without the killing condemned later in the fragment. B137 exposes the contrary possibility: a father may utter a prayer while doing something appalling because he does not recognize his transformed son. The external form of prayer therefore does not guarantee right action. Piety in this vocabulary must be read with knowledge, restraint, and the character of the offering, not simply with the presence of religious ceremony.

Places to read

1. B 3.1–8The Muse comes from Piety; speech is bounded by holiness and purity.
2. B 128.4–102The offerings to Cypris include pious images and exclude slaughter-blood.
3. B 137.1–4A prayer accompanies the father’s unrecognized kin-murder.

Translation in this edition

“House of Piety” is the translator's spatial expansion of the Greek phrase; the personified name itself is secure. The connection between the two passages rests on the shared word-family, not proof of an organized cult called Piety.