From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Orientation
At a Glance
- The wordἈναγκάζειν is to put someone under ἀνάγκη, “necessity”: to compel, by force, by law, by circumstance or by argument. In the Charmides it occurs only in the passive.
- In the CharmidesThree times, each of a person forced. Critias jokes that the boy’s headache will be a godsend “if on account of his head he is going to be forced to improve his mind as well” (157c–d); Socrates proposes a shared inquiry “so that you won’t be forced to say what you don’t want to” (158e); and Critias, seeing Socrates at a loss, seems “to be forced” by Socrates’ perplexity into his own (169c).
- In this edition“Be forced” all three times.
- A place to read158c–e, from the boy’s dilemma to the offer of a joint inquiry.
- English renderings
- ἀναγκασθήσεται, anankasthēsetai, “is going to be forced”; ἀναγκάζῃ, anankazēi, “be forced”; ἀναγκασθῆναι, anankasthēnai, “to be forced”
Meaning
Ἀναγκάζειν (anankazein) is the verb of ἀνάγκη (see ἀνάγκη). Where the noun names a constraint, the verb makes it someone’s act: a master compels a slave, a law a citizen, an argument the man who has granted its premises. The passive, the only voice of the verb in the dialogue, puts the weight on the one who suffers the compulsion, and leaves open whether what forces him is a person, a fact or a chain of reasoning.
Use in the book
The three uses name three kinds of compulsion. The first is Critias’ joke, the compulsion of circumstance. Socrates has just said that the Thracian forbade him to treat the head before the soul (157b–c); Critias answers that the head will do the forcing: “this trouble with his head will turn out to be a godsend for the young man, if on account of his head he is going to be forced to improve his mind as well” (157c–d; see ἀσθένεια; ἕρμαιον). The joke turns the Thracian’s order upside down, with the body driving the soul to its cure.
The second is a compulsion refused. Asked whether he has temperance, the boy has said that he can neither agree nor deny without either showing up his guardian as a liar or praising himself (158c–d). Socrates removes the bind by making the question a shared one: “we ought to look into it together, whether or not you possess what I am asking about, so that you won’t be forced to say what you don’t want to, and I in turn won’t set about my doctoring without looking into things” (158d–e; see ἀσκέπτως; κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι). The offer ends with a choice: “if not, let’s leave it” (158e). The inquiry begins by consent, and the boy consents gladly.
The third is the compulsion of the argument itself, working by contagion. When Socrates admits that he is at a loss, Critias seems to him “to be forced by my perplexity” into perplexity of his own (169c; see ἁλίσκομαι; ἀπορία). No argument forces Critias; Socrates’ own perplexity does, passing to him as a yawn passes, and his shame keeps him from saying so (see αἰσχύνομαι).
The verb measures the distance between the inquiry and the scene that closes the dialogue. Socrates promises the boy that he will not be forced to say what he does not want to; at the end the boy, at his guardian’s order, will use force on Socrates: “So you’ll use force,” Socrates asks, “and won’t even give me a preliminary hearing?” “Count on force,” the boy answers (176c; see βιάζομαι). The dialogue can be read as moving from the compulsion that argument exerts on a willing partner to the violence that needs no argument at all.
Places to read
Every passage in which the verb occurs.
- 157c–dCritias: the trouble with his head will be a godsend if on account of it the boy is forced to improve his mind as well.
- 158eSocrates proposes to look into the question together, so that the boy will not be forced to say what he does not want to.
- 169cSeeing Socrates at a loss, Critias seems forced by his perplexity to be caught by perplexity himself.
Translation in this edition
Ἀναγκασθήσεται (157c9) is a future passive, “is going to be forced”; ἀναγκάζῃ (158e1) a present passive subjunctive in the purpose clause μήτε … μήτ’, “so that you won’t be forced … and I in turn won’t”; ἀναγκασθῆναι (169c6) an aorist passive infinitive, which the nineteenth-century English scholar Charles Badham would delete; Burnet keeps it and asks whether Plato wrote ἀναπλησθῆναι, “infected”, the verb Thucydides uses of catching the plague (apparatus, c6; Thucydides 2.51; the edition’s note at 169c). The edition uses “forced” for all three, and the same English word serves for βιάζεσθαι at the end, “use force” (176c), where the Greek has a different verb.
Elsewhere in Plato
In the Republic Socrates makes compulsion the first step of education. If one of the prisoners in the cave were set free and “forced all at once to get to his feet, twist his neck round, walk, and lift his eyes to the light”, he would be in pain and dazzled; and if someone pointed to each thing passing by and “forced him, by questioning, to say what each thing is”, he would be at a loss and think the shadows truer; and if he were dragged by force up the steep ascent, he would be pained and angry (515c–516a). The prisoner can be read as forced to answer as the boy of the Charmides is promised he will not be. Critias’ joke, in which an ailment drives the boy to improve his mind, can be read as nearer to the cave than to Socrates’ offer.