Persuasion and obedience

Use in the book

Charmides initially assumes he will copy Socrates' charm. Socrates asks whether that will happen only if the boy persuades him or even without persuasion, and Charmides laughingly accepts the condition (156a). The small exchange asserts Socrates' participation as something to be secured, not simply commanded.

In the Thracian story the same family governs Socrates' responsibilities. No one, however rich, wellborn or beautiful, is to persuade him to treat the head before the soul; he says he has sworn an oath and must obey the healer's instructions (157b–c2). The target of persuasion is resisted because of another accepted authority. This is presented as Socrates' reported commitment within the therapeutic story, not a general rule that obedience always outranks reason.

The ending returns to the ambiguity. Charmides is not wholly persuaded by Socrates' account of failure and asks for continued charming (176a–b2). Shortly afterwards he declares that he must obey Critias as his guardian (176b–c). His demand upon Socrates then moves toward force, and Socrates yields (176c–d). The verbal continuity highlights different sources of assent: an argument can remain unpersuasive, a guardian's command can nevertheless receive compliance, and the other's consent can be overridden in play.

Because the scene is comic and affectionate, one should not describe a completed physical assault that the text does not narrate. But its language does prevent obedience from becoming an uncomplicated final definition of temperance. Critias treats compliance as evidence of the virtue while the dialogue has not established that correct judgment follows from deference to him.

Places to read

1. 156aSocrates makes persuasion a condition of sharing the charm
2. 157b–c2The healer forbids contrary persuasion, and Socrates promises obedience
3. 176a–c2Charmides moves from not being persuaded by Socrates to obeying Critias
4. 176c–dThe exchange turns from persuasion toward threatened force

Translation in this edition

The edition explicitly alternates “persuade,” “be persuaded” and “obey” to keep the family visible across the frame. The apparatus at 156a records H. Richards' proposed futures against the printed present forms; the choice does not eliminate the principle that Charmides is to secure Socrates' assent.

πείθομαι

Attested: πείθεσθαι / πείσομαι / πείθομαι / πειθοίμην (peithesthai / peisomai / peithomai / peithoimēn). To be persuaded or obey; Socrates obeys his oath-bound teacher, Charmides does not accept Socrates’ self-deprecating counsel and says he still needs the charm, and he then promises obedience to his guardian. References: 157c, 176b, 176c. Lexical identification: lemma: πείθομαι. See Persuasion and obedience.

πείθω

Attested: πείθῃς / πείθω / πείσει (peithēis / peithō / peisei). To persuade; Charmides must persuade Socrates to give him the charm, while Socrates has been warned not to let anyone’s wealth, birth or beauty persuade him to bypass treatment of the soul. References: 156a, 157b. Lexical identification: lemma: πείθω. See Persuasion and obedience.

γελάσας (gelasas)

Having laughed; Charmides responds playfully to the question whether persuasion is required before receiving the charm. References: 156a. Lemma: γελάω. See Persuasion and obedience.

Use in the book

The historical narrative makes the vocabulary concrete before the final logical exchange. Hipparchus compelled the rhapsodes to perform Homer in ordered succession (228b), while he kept Simonides with him by “persuading him with large fees and gifts” (228c). Persuasion here includes material inducement. Socrates himself claims that he must obey a good and wise man, Hipparchus, and therefore must observe the inscription forbidding deception of a friend. Whether that appeal is serious, comic or both, obedience to a saying is offered as evidence about the trustworthiness of a living conversation.

The companion turns the appeal against Socrates at 229d–e2: either Socrates does not regard him as a friend or does not obey Hipparchus, because he cannot be persuaded that Socrates is not deceiving him. The repeated verb binds the two accusations together. Socrates’ assent to an authority has not produced the companion’s assent to Socrates. The offer to retract a premise then attempts to restore the conditions for persuasion rather than merely invoking Hipparchus again.

At 232b the argument, now personified as the agent that compels, has brought the companion back to “all gains are good.” His answer explicitly withholds persuasion. Socrates does not answer that compulsion and persuasion are identical. He allows that persuasion might follow later, then proceeds on the agreement already obtained. The closing deduction thus rests on recorded concessions while the dramatic situation records an unresolved objection. This need not prove that every step is false; it does prevent the reader from treating the companion’s final assent as enthusiastic understanding.

Places to read

1. 228bοὐ πειθόμενος — Socrates’ claim that he would not act well by disobeying the wise man.
2. 229d–e2οὐ πείθεσθαι Ἱππάρχῳ — Obedience to Hipparchus becomes the companion’s test of friendship.
3. 229eοὐ δύναμαι πεισθῆναι — The companion cannot be persuaded that he is not being deceived.
4. 232bμᾶλλον ἐμέ γε ἢ πέπεικεν — The companion distinguishes having been compelled from having been persuaded.

Translation in this edition

The edition renders the final μᾶλλον ... ἢ as “rather than,” not as a measurement of how much persuasion has occurred. Its Note on this Edition records that correction. Socrates’ next “it might also persuade you” confirms the distinction. “Obey,” “persuade” and “compel” should remain visibly connected without being flattened into a single English word.

Use in the book

The Timarchus story presents disobedience as a progression. He first says where he intends to go only vaguely and agrees to remain when Socrates reports the sign. After an interval he renews the attempt, receives a second warning and again stays. On the third attempt he changes his procedure: he ceases announcing departure, watches for Socrates’ diverted attention and slips away. The third episode reports no new utterance of the voice. It explains how Timarchus evades the human communication and restraint that worked twice before.

The plot is hidden from Socrates, but the desire to leave is initially visible. This distinction matters: successful prevention does not require a narrated disclosure of the murder plot. Conversely, departure during inattention should not be described as Socrates approving the plan. Timarchus arranges the absence of warning in the immediate interaction; he does not receive an affirmative divine permission.

The final statement attributes his death to unwillingness to obey Socrates. The reported explanation later uses apistēsai, translated “disobeyed”. In context the practical refusal, rather than a formulated philosophical denial of divine signs, is decisive. The passage does not say whether Timarchus disbelieved Socrates’ experience, dismissed its relevance, hoped to evade its consequence, or simply valued his plan more.

The language has an instructive parallel with the opening father-son negotiation: Demodocus eventually thinks it best to “obey” his son when soothing can no longer hold him back. The shared verb does not equate the two decisions morally. It shows that accepting another’s lead may arise from persuasion, trust or practical constraint, and that the relationship and circumstances determine the force.

Places to read

1. 122aπείθεσθαι αὐτῷ — Demodocus decides to comply with his son’s demand rather than risk an unsupervised encounter
2. 129aΣωκράτει οὐκ ἤθελον πείθεσθαι — Timarchus describes a refusal of obedience
3. 129b–cἐπέσχε; ἐπισχεῖν — he is twice held back from departure
4. 129cβουλόμενός με λαθεῖν; λαθών — the third departure is deliberately concealed
5. 129cἄλλοσε τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα — Timarchus exploits Socrates’ attention elsewhere
6. 129cδιὰ τὸ ἐμοὶ ἀπιστῆσαι — Socrates’ recap attributes the consequence to disobedience

Translation in this edition

“Obey” and “disobey” make the practical connection audible, while “escaping my notice” preserves the repeated concealment language. The translation does not turn the third departure into divine permission. It also keeps Timarchus’ own final explanation distinct from the narrator’s account of each preceding action.

Disobey; distrust — ἀπιστεῖν

Disobey; distrust. To refuse belief or compliance; in the recap it refers to Timarchus’ practical disregard of Socrates’ warning. Attested: ἀπιστῆσαι (129c). Obedience, inattention, and leaving unnoticed.

Escape notice — λανθάνειν

Escape notice. To act without being noticed; Timarchus deliberately conceals his third attempt to leave. Attested: λαθεῖν (129c). Obedience, inattention, and leaving unnoticed.

Get up — ἀνίστασθαι

Get up. To rise from one’s place; the visible departure attempt that precedes the warning at the party. Attested: ἀνιστάμενος (129b). Obedience, inattention, and leaving unnoticed.

Hold back — ἐπέχειν

Hold back. To pause or restrain one’s movement; Timarchus stays after the first warning. Attested: ἐπέσχε (129b). Obedience, inattention, and leaving unnoticed.

Let an interval pass — διαλείπειν

Let an interval pass. To leave a gap; Timarchus allows time between his first and second attempts to go. Attested: διαλιπὼν (129c). Obedience, inattention, and leaving unnoticed.

Make; compel — ἀναγκάζειν

Make; compel. To cause another to comply; Socrates makes Timarchus hold back on the second attempt, without describing physical force. Attested: ἠνάγκασα (129c). Obedience, inattention, and leaving unnoticed.

Mind; attention — νοῦς

Mind; attention. The capacity directed elsewhere when Timarchus leaves; ordinary attentional language, not an articulated theory of intellect. Attested: νοῦν (129c). Obedience, inattention, and leaving unnoticed.

Obey; comply — πείθεσθαι (peithesthai)

πείθεσθαι (peithesthai)

Obey; comply. To accept another’s direction; Timarchus says his unwillingness to obey Socrates explains his impending death. Attested: πείθεσθαι (129a). Obedience, inattention, and leaving unnoticed.

Set oneself in motion — ὁρμᾶσθαι

Set oneself in motion. To make a move or start out; Timarchus again prepares to leave before the renewed prohibition. Attested: ὡρμᾶτο (129c). Obedience, inattention, and leaving unnoticed.

Watch for an occasion — ἐπιτηρεῖν

Watch for an occasion. To watch attentively for an opportunity; Timarchus waits for Socrates’ diverted attention before departing. Attested: ἐπιτηρήσας (129c). Obedience, inattention, and leaving unnoticed.