Necessity

Use in the book

The initial procedure invokes necessity: if temperance is present, it must provide some awareness (159a). Later Critias refuses the consequence that a temperate person might be ignorant of himself, even if earlier concessions appear to necessitate it (164c–d). The response shows a familiar option in argument: retract a premise rather than accept the conclusion.

At 168b–d2 repeated acknowledgments of necessity support the relational sequence. A greater requires a smaller correlate, and self-application requires the relevant object-character. At 169e Critias says personal self-knowledge follows from possessing self-knowing knowledge, but Socrates challenges a further necessity: why must its possessor know what he knows and does not know?

The distinction between a consequence claimed and a consequence secured reappears at 175b. They granted many things that did not follow in their argument. The closing audit therefore invites attention to the individual steps, not just to the presence of “necessarily” in the dialogue. Character assent is evidence of a commitment being made, not the reader's warrant to skip assessing it.

Places to read

1. 159aNecessary awareness alleged at the outset
2. 164c–dCritias rejects a consequence by offering to retract
3. 168b–d2Necessity in the relational tests
4. 169d–170a2What follows from possessing reflective knowledge questioned
5. 175bUnwarranted consequences retrospectively acknowledged

Translation in this edition

The same family also describes coercion, as when Critias is forced into perplexity at 169c. A translation must distinguish logical necessity from psychological or social constraint rather than flatten all cases into formal entailment.

ἀναγκαῖος

Attested: ἀναγκαῖον (anankaion). Necessary or unavoidable; describes what treatment or an inference requires, rather than a distinct named virtue. References: 156b, 164c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀναγκαῖος. See Necessity and consequence.

ἀνάγκη

Attested: ἀνάγκη (anankē). Necessity; ranges from compulsion by an oath to a consequence said to follow from a supposition. References: 157c, 168b, 168c, 168d, 169e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀνάγκη. See Necessity and consequence.

συμβαίνω

Attested: συμβαίνειν / συμβαίνει / συμβαίνονθʼ (symbainein / symbainei / symbainonthʼ). To follow or result; Critias resists an unwelcome consequence, later claims that self-knowledge follows from the proposed knowledge, and Socrates finally admits they conceded claims that did not follow in the argument. References: 164c, 169d, 175b. Lexical identification: lemma: συμβαίνω. See Necessity and consequence.

Use in the book

At 226e Socrates calls it impossible to know that something is worth nothing and nevertheless think one ought to gain from it, on the basis of the earlier craft examples. That modal conclusion is already contestable if the examples have not exhausted possible senses of gaining. “Impossible” states the result the speakers accept, not an external guarantee supplied by the lexicon.

In the final sequence the companion answers “Necessarily” when Socrates proposes treating decent and base gain as equally gain (230c). The following question extends the reasoning: how could someone do or undergo something more or less with a thing to which neither more nor less belongs? “Impossible” again closes the step (230d). The strength of the reply can conceal the need to specify the respect in which more and less are excluded. Equal membership in a kind does not make every difference of amount or effect impossible.

Socrates then says “we must look into” what is the same in both gains. Here δεῖ directs the next task; it does not assert that a completed proof has already determined its answer. At 231d the same verb introduces a requirement for an adequate account: worth must belong to gain in addition to the quantity acquired. This is the necessity of satisfying a condition made visible by a counterexample.

At 229e the companion says he is unable to be persuaded that Socrates is not deceiving him. This inability concerns his present conviction, not the formal impossibility of Socrates’ innocence. At 232b he distinguishes being compelled by the argument from being persuaded. The dialogue therefore contains logical, procedural and psychological constraining language, and moving among them requires care.

The repeated short answers are dramatic signs of tightening pressure. They make the argument sound inexorable while leaving its premises and shifts available to a critical reader. Quoting “Necessarily” or “Impossible” cannot substitute for showing why the relevant necessity holds.

Places to read

1. 226eὅτι ἀδύνατον — The early knowledge argument is treated as establishing impossibility.
2. 229eοὐ δύναμαι πεισθῆναι — The companion reports his inability to be persuaded.
3. 230cἈνάγκη — The analogy’s application to gain receives an emphatic assent.
4. 230dἈδύνατον — The broad claim about doing or undergoing receives another.
5. 231dΔεῖ ἄρα — Worth is introduced as a necessary condition of gain.

Translation in this edition

The edition keeps the compact replies “Necessarily” and “Impossible,” rather than expanding them into explanations the companion does not give. Its “must” at the examination of gain marks the proposed task. These translations preserve both the force and the brevity of the modal language.

Use in the book

At 982b the Athenian calls the necessity belonging to a soul that has acquired sense the greatest of all necessities. He immediately explains that it gives law as ruler, not as something ruled. Necessity is thereby located within intelligent agency. The stars' stability need not show domination by an external mindless force; on this account it expresses the persistence of a soul's best rational decision.

The next clause connects the irreversible with completed deliberation. When soul has deliberated what is best according to the best sense, the result is complete and in accordance with sense. Not even adamant could be stronger or less reversible. Adamant is an image of unsurpassable firmness, not the proposed bodily material out of which the planets are made. The three Fates then hold fast and preserve the completeness of what each god has deliberated with the best counsel.

Their appearance does not supply three new elemental species. They enter as divine guarantors of a decision's fixed completion. The edition's note compares Laws 12.960c–d, where the Athenian names the Fates and associates the third with the irreversible. The Epinomis itself gives the number and collective name but does not name each Fate separately. Individual names drawn from another text therefore belong to comparative explanation, not to the local attestation list.

The contrast with changing one's mind comes at 982c–d. The heavens persist in decisions made long ago for a wonderfully long time. They do not deliberate anew up and down, act now one way and now another, wander, and change their cycles. The polemic is not against every reconsideration by a fallible human being. Its subject is a perfectly or supremely good decision by divine intelligence, a decision whose need for correction the account denies. Importing that divine condition into ordinary legislation would turn the image of lawgiving into an unsupported ban on all human revision.

This account also clarifies why order becomes evidence of intelligence. Stability is interpreted as constancy of good purpose. The argument's force depends on the priority of soul and the adequacy of its counsel, not simply on the bare fact that an event repeats. The Fates dramatize that completed counsel's permanence; they do not replace counsel with arbitrary destiny.

Places to read

1. 982bἡ ψυχῆς δὲ ἀνάγκη νοῦν κεκτημένης — Necessity belongs to a soul possessing sense
2. 982bἄρχουσα γὰρ ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀρχομένη νομοθετεῖ — It gives law as ruler, not as ruled
3. 982b–cψυχὴ τὸ ἄριστον κατὰ τὸν ἄριστον βουλεύσηται νοῦν — The fixed result presupposes the best deliberation
4. 982cοὐδὲ ἀδάμας — Adamant supplies the comparison for firmness
5. 982cτρεῖς Μοῖραι κατέχουσαι φυλάττουσι — Three Fates hold fast and guard the completed decision
6. 982cτὸ βελτίστῃ βουλῇ βεβουλευμένον — The protected thing is what has been deliberated with best counsel
7. 982dοὐ μεταβουλευόμενον ἄνω καὶ κάτω — Divine constancy is contrasted with unsettled revision

Translation in this edition

“Sense” preserves the ordinary force of nous, while “necessity” is kept for anankē even when the necessity is psychic and legislative. At 982c Burnet prints ἐκβαίνει, “comes out,” from a marginal corrective tradition instead of the manuscripts' ἐσβαίνει; the argument here follows the printed outcome. “Fates” capitalizes the named goddesses, distinct from the ordinary portions elsewhere.

Image of firmness — ἀδάμας (adamas)

ἀδάμας (adamas)

Image of firmness. Adamant supplies a comparison for exceptional strength and resistance to reversal. Even it cannot exceed the firmness of the best divine decision. Attested: ἀδάμας (982c). Necessity settled deliberation and the three Fates.

Completed divine decision — τέλεος (teleos)

τέλεος (teleos)

Completed divine decision. Completeness belongs to the outcome guarded by the Fates. A settled best decision requires no corrective reversal. Attested: τέλεον (982c). Necessity settled deliberation and the three Fates.

Best decision — βουλεύεσθαι (bouleuesthai)

βουλεύεσθαι (bouleuesthai)

Best decision. A soul deliberates the best according to the best sense; the ensuing settled result is what the Fates guard. Attested: βουλεύσηται (982b–c). Necessity settled deliberation and the three Fates.

Unsettled revision denied — μεταβουλεύεσθαι (metabouleuesthai)

μεταβουλεύεσθαι (metabouleuesthai)

Unsettled revision denied. The stars do not repeatedly reconsider up and down, performing different acts and changing cycles. The contrast presupposes their original best counsel, not the infallibility of ordinary human choices. Attested: μεταβουλευόμενον (982d). Necessity settled deliberation and the three Fates.

Best counsel — βουλή (boulē)

βουλή (boulē)

Best counsel. The best deliberation qualifies the decision preserved complete for each god. The noun does not here refer to a city’s administrative council. Attested: βουλῇ (982c). Necessity settled deliberation and the three Fates.

Three divine guardians — Μοῖραι (Moirai)

Μοῖραι (Moirai)

Three divine guardians. The three Fates hold fast and guard the completeness of each god’s best deliberation. The Epinomis gives their number and collective name without naming each separately. Attested: Μοῖραι (982c). Necessity settled deliberation and the three Fates.

Soul’s rational governance — νομοθετεῖν (nomothetein)

νομοθετεῖν (nomothetein)

Soul’s rational governance. The intelligent soul gives law as ruler rather than being ruled. Legislative language expresses the source of stable order, not a literal written cosmic statute. Attested: νομοθετεῖ (982b). Necessity settled deliberation and the three Fates.

Preservation of divine counsel — φυλάττειν (phylattein)

φυλάττειν (phylattein)

Preservation of divine counsel. The Fates guard the completed decision. The image presents destiny as preserving rational counsel rather than displacing it with arbitrary force. Attested: φυλάττουσι (982c). Necessity settled deliberation and the three Fates.

Stability of best counsel — ἀμετάστροφος (ametastrophos)

ἀμετάστροφος (ametastrophos)

Stability of best counsel. The irreversible is linked to the soul’s best deliberation and its completed outcome. It is rational constancy, not a praise of arbitrary inflexibility. Attested: ἀμετάστροφον (982b). Necessity settled deliberation and the three Fates.

Beyond adamant in firmness — ἀμετάστροφος (ametastrophos)

ἀμετάστροφος (ametastrophos)

Beyond adamant in firmness. The comparative denies that even adamant could be less reversible than the completed divine decision. The material serves as a comparison, not a stellar constituent. Attested: ἀμεταστροφώτερον (982c). Necessity settled deliberation and the three Fates.

Necessity of a rational soul — ἀνάγκη (anankē)

ἀνάγκη (anankē)

Necessity of a rational soul. The greatest necessity belongs to a soul possessing sense. It is described as ruling and giving law, so it must not be reduced to external mindless compulsion. Attested: ἀνάγκη (982b). Necessity settled deliberation and the three Fates.

Intelligent necessity rules — ἄρχειν (archein)

ἄρχειν (archein)

Intelligent necessity rules. The soul possessing sense gives law as ruler, not as something ruled. Its necessity is represented as the stability of rational agency. Attested: ἄρχουσα (982b). Necessity settled deliberation and the three Fates.

Directive understanding — νοῦς (nous)

νοῦς (nous)

Directive understanding. Possessing sense makes soul’s necessity rational and legislative. The edition keeps nous as sense, distinct from the intelligence family. Attested: νοῦν (982b). Necessity settled deliberation and the three Fates.

Best deliberative standard — νοῦς (nous)

νοῦς (nous)

Best deliberative standard. The best sense directs the soul’s best deliberation, grounding a decision that need not be reversed. Attested: νοῦν (982c). Necessity settled deliberation and the three Fates.

Ruling and not ruled it gives law (contextual phrase)

ἄρχουσα γὰρ ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀρχομένη νομοθετεῖ (982b)

The paired participles distinguish a soul that gives law from a recipient of external rule. This is the explanation of why rational psychic necessity is greatest. It should not be flattened into the idea that the stars are mechanically compelled by a power independent of intelligence. Necessity settled deliberation and the three Fates.

Best counsel preserved complete (contextual phrase)

τρεῖς Μοῖραι κατέχουσαι φυλάττουσι τέλεον εἶναι τὸ βελτίστῃ βουλῇ βεβουλευμένον (982c)

The Fates hold fast and guard the result of the best deliberation so that it remains complete. Their agency protects rationally settled counsel rather than replacing it. The three are collectively named here; individual names belong only to the supplied comparative background. Necessity settled deliberation and the three Fates.

Use in the book

The bare reply Ἀνάγκη means “necessarily” or “it must be so.” It often acknowledges what follows from an accepted premise rather than describing physical pressure. At 219c necessity governs the choice between abandoning the sequence and reaching a starting point that no longer refers onward.

The related adjective ἀναγκαῖος appears in the impersonal neuter ἀναγκαῖον. At 222a it qualifies the controversial conclusion that a genuine lover must be loved by his beloved. The vocabulary marks the claimed strength of the inference; the boys’ hesitant assent and the ensuing re-examination prevent treating that claim as a settled result.

Places to read

1. 216bοὐκ ἀνάγκη ὁμολογεῖν — Must we not agree?
2. 213b
3. 214b
4. 217a
5. 219c–d
6. 222a

Use in the book

Chapter 4 links divine necessity with the accomplishment of God’s will. Elsewhere necessity appears in a list alongside fate, choice, chance, and spontaneous occurrence. The collection can preserve such distinctions even when a different extract draws the divine names together.

Places to read

1. I.4.headingDivine necessity makes what accords with God’s will inexorable.
2. I.7.9aNecessity is one of several reported explanations of events.
3. I.5.22aNecessity and other names are explained through their verbal associations.

Translation in this edition

“Necessity” is usual in the technical or personified sense; “constraint” can express a local condition. The term is not silently replaced by “fate.”

Use in the book

Space is argued to be necessary for movement and placement. Another stark sentence ascribes evils to necessity and order while reserving goods for God’s will; the sentence offers no accompanying reconciliation, so the distinction should remain as written. When dance is called the necessary effect of certain airs, the term expresses the felt connection between rhythm and bodily response. These local arguments do not establish a doctrine that every action or evil is predetermined.

Places to read

1. II, p. 711, entry begun p. 710, no. 11, ¶2Space is necessary for movements, existences, and placements.
2. II, p. 692, entry 12, ¶1Necessity and order are sharply distinguished from God’s will.
3. I, p. 475, entry 3, ¶1Certain airs are said necessarily to produce dance.

Translation in this edition

The English translation retains “necessary” even in the musical claim; it does not dilute it to usual. In the damaged space paragraph, bracketed English readings remain qualifications on contextual English readings of damaged words, not on Joubert’s modal claim.

Use in the book

The strongest occurrences articulate the requirements of divine generosity. If love is to satisfy its own fullness, its gift cannot be confined to inadequate treasures; if power is infinite, capacity must answer it. The necessity is argued from what love and power are, not pictured as an external force compelling God against his will.

Similar reasoning governs the human response: a rightly known God and world must be enjoyed because their goodness is then seen as one’s own. Yet the Centuries continually acknowledge ignorance and refusal. Such statements describe the fitting consequence of adequate apprehension, not a denial that actual persons can fail to attain it.

Places to read

1. I.16True knowledge of self, God, and world is said necessarily to issue in enjoyment.
2. II.77Infinite treasures answer what divine love requires for its satisfaction.
3. V.4Infinite capacity is argued as the necessary counterpart of almighty power.

In this edition

Of necessity often signals a consequence within an argument about a nature or end. It should not automatically be translated into physical compulsion or determinism.

Use in the book

The decree binds acts to consequences. A divine being who pollutes his limbs by bloodshed or errs through false swearing must undergo lengthy separation from the blessed. Its antiquity, permanence, and sealing by oaths emphasize that exile is ordered rather than an accidental mishap. The passage does not say whether Necessity is identical with any one root or with either Love or Strife. Strife is named as the allegiance in which the offender goes wrong, not straightforwardly as the issuer of the sentence.

The cosmic “broad oath” of B30 provides a significant comparison: alternating divine honours are also governed by an established term. Both passages make temporal change answerable to obligation, although the shared oath-language does not prove that they describe exactly the same decree. B116 complicates any bland notion of a providential order. Grace loathes a Necessity that is difficult to endure. Because that fragment is only a broken clause, it supplies neither the occasion for the hostility nor a complete opposition between two cosmic principles.

Places to read

1. B 115.1–82An ancient everlasting decree of Necessity is sealed with oaths and governs the punishment.
2. B 116Grace is said to loathe hard-to-bear Necessity.
3. B 30.1–3A broad oath fixes the alternating time when Strife reaches its honours.

Translation in this edition

“Decree” translates chrēma in this context, followed by the more explicitly institutional “ordinance,” psēphisma. The wording does not require a separate legislative assembly or a mechanical law of nature in the modern sense.

Use in the book

A45 juxtaposes two irreducible reports. Aëtius calls necessity’s essence a cause that uses the principles and elements; Plutarch says that what most people call fate Empedocles calls Love and Strife together. The first formulation suggests a controlling causal relation to the principles, the second an identification with the two powers. The source does not show how to reconcile them.

Aristotle’s cautious A38 adds a different use: Empedocles “would seem to say” that Love and Strife necessarily prevail and move by turns, resting between. Here necessity grounds the regularity of alternation in a hypothetical reconstruction. In Plato’s anonymous polemic at A48, necessity appears in the blending of opposites alongside chance. It does not follow that necessity and chance are a contradiction for the position Plato describes: chance conjunctions can still have constrained material consequences. But that account is not securely Empedocles’ own.

The edition’s appeal to the decree of Necessity in B115 helps formulate the comparison but cannot settle it; this volume does not print the full decree at A45. The lexicon therefore distinguishes the divine name, the causal noun and the adverbial claim of regularity.

Places to read

1. A 45 (testimony)Aëtius I 26,1; Plutarch, De animae procreatione. Contrasts necessity as a cause using principles with necessity identified as Love and Strife together.
2. A 38 (polemical)Aristotle, Physics Θ 1, 252a7. Infers necessary alternation and intervening rest rather than directly quoting a doctrine.
3. A 48 (polemical)Plato, Laws X 889b. Combines chance encounters and necessary blending in an unnamed naturalist position.
4. A 32 (testimony)Aëtius I 7,28 (D. 303). Identifies the One with necessity in the compressed matter-and-forms scheme.

Translation in this edition

The modern suggestion that B115 favors Aëtius is an interpretative judgment. It must not turn a contextual cross-reference into a decisive testimony that Plutarch is wrong.