Soul as cause bodily passivity and self movement

Use in the book

At 983c–d2 the Athenian rejects an appeal to bodily rushes, natures, or something of that sort as giving no clear account. He then asks whether his own account has reason or falls short. The contrast is categorical: beings are of two kinds, soul and body; there are many of each, different both within each kind and across the two kinds, with no third common thing. Soul is intelligent and ruling, body unintelligent and ruled; soul is cause of all, body cause of no affection at all.

This is stronger than saying that soul is one cause among several coordinate efficient causes. Nevertheless, the denial of bodily causal initiative does not erase the body's constitutive role. The heavenly things are immediately called offspring of soul and body. The body supplies what is molded and moved, and the particular bodily mixture distinguishes kinds. Constituting a living compound and originating its purposive movement are not the same explanatory task.

The phrase “the account has reason” also keeps scrutiny in view. The speaker offers a division that he thinks defeats unintelligent bodily explanations. A sympathetic exposition can show its internal coherence without claiming that every possible rival account is individually refuted. The reference to unspecified “natures” is polemical; it is not a catalogue of named thinkers with their exact positions.

The later recapitulation at 988c–e2 contrasts bodies said to move themselves through heat, coldness, and similar conditions with soul moving body and itself. The approved statement is that, if soul comes to be in a body, it moves and carries round both that body and itself. The passage does not merely say that soul is pushed by body and passes the push onward. It assigns the origin of movement to soul while acknowledging its embodied operation. The old priority claim is thus restated dynamically.

A further distinction limits the moral inference. At 988e soul is cause of all motion, but motion toward the good belongs to the best soul, while contrary motion belongs to the contrary. “Soul causes” does not therefore mean “every psychic cause is equally good.” The theological argument requires the best soul to explain the heavens' beneficent order. The concluding assertion that good has conquered and must conquer adds that evaluative condition to the general causal thesis.

Finally, the soul's bodily location is not consistently reduced to one formula. At 983c soul is with each cosmic body “or even in each”; at 988d embodiment appears as a condition. The text supplies distinctions of agency and dependence more confidently than a detailed physical mechanism. Importing a full later metaphysics of immaterial causation would exceed what these formulations themselves establish.

Places to read

1. 983c–d2πότερον ἔχει λόγον ὁ λόγος — The account itself is subjected to a test of reason
2. 983dτὸ μὲν ψυχήν, τὸ δὲ σῶμα — Soul and body are the two explanatory kinds
3. 983dτὸ μὲν αἴτιον ἁπάντων, τὸ δὲ ἀναίτιον πάσης πάθης — Causal activity and passivity are sharply divided
4. 983eψυχῆς τε καὶ σώματος … γεννήματα — Heavenly things remain offspring of both soul and body
5. 988c–d2ψυχὴ σῶμά τε καὶ ἑαυτήν — Soul carries body and itself
6. 988dκινεῖν τε καὶ περιφέρειν τοῦτο καὶ ἑαυτήν — Embodied soul moves the body and itself
7. 988eτὴν δ’ ἐπὶ τἀγαθὸν φορὰν καὶ κίνησιν τῆς ἀρίστης ψυχῆς εἶναι — Good-directed motion requires the best soul

Translation in this edition

“Cause of no affection at all” preserves the force of anaitios rather than quietly weakening it to “secondary cause.” “Motion” and “movement” distinguish φορά and κίνησις in the later statement. The Laws comparison concerns the argument recalled by this speaker; authorship uncertainty makes “the Epinomis argues” preferable to treating the entire passage as an uncontested summary of Plato's doctrine.

A test of reasonableness — λόγος (logos)

λόγος (logos)

A test of reasonableness. In the formula the account has reason, the first logos names rational adequacy and the second the account under examination. The repeated word has distinct grammatical jobs. Attested: λόγον (983d). Soul as cause bodily passivity and self movement.

What body does not originate — πάθη (pathē)

πάθη (pathē)

What body does not originate. The noun means an affection or undergoing within the causal division. It should not be restricted to emotional pain, for which the passage later uses lypē. Attested: πάθης (983d). Soul as cause bodily passivity and self movement.

Passive explanatory kind — σῶμα (sōma)

σῶμα (sōma)

Passive explanatory kind. Body is contrasted with intelligent ruling soul as ruled and without causal initiative. This does not cancel the body’s constitutive role in their living offspring. Attested: σῶμα (983d). Soul as cause bodily passivity and self movement.

Soul moves body and itself — περιφέρειν (peripherein)

περιφέρειν (peripherein)

Soul moves body and itself. Embodied soul carries round the body and itself. The reflexive object preserves a distinction from the rejected account of bodily self-motion through heat and cold. Attested: περιφέρειν (988d). Soul as cause bodily passivity and self movement.

Soul’s causal initiative — αἴτιος (aitios)

αἴτιος (aitios)

Soul’s causal initiative. Soul is set down as cause of all things, in contrast with body’s lack of causal agency. The strength of the statement should not be silently weakened. Attested: αἴτιον (983d). Soul as cause bodily passivity and self movement.

Denial of psychic causation — μωρία (mōria)

μωρία (mōria)

Denial of psychic causation. Great folly characterizes denying that heavenly things arise as offspring of soul and body. The evaluative word marks the force of the speaker’s polemic, not an independently named school. Attested: μωρία (983e). Soul as cause bodily passivity and self movement.

Soul as cognitive ruler — ἔμφρων (emphrōn)

ἔμφρων (emphrōn)

Soul as cognitive ruler. Soul is characterized as intelligent against body’s unintelligence. The predicate is part of the causal division rather than a separate account of every soul’s moral excellence. Attested: ἔμφρον (983d). Soul as cause bodily passivity and self movement.

Direction toward good — φορά (phora)

φορά (phora)

Direction toward good. Motion toward the good belongs to the best soul, while contrary motion belongs to the contrary. Soul's causing motion does not make every motion good. The edition distinguishes this noun from kinēsis, movement. Attested: φορὰν (988e). Motion toward good and toward its contrary; Soul as cause bodily passivity and self movement.

Soul’s dynamic agency — κινεῖν (kinein)

κινεῖν (kinein)

Soul’s dynamic agency. Soul in a body can move that body and itself. The phrase is the local warrant for speaking of self-movement; the technical adjective autokinētos is not attested here. Attested: κινεῖν (988d). Soul as cause bodily passivity and self movement.

Psychic origin and moral direction — κίνησις (kinēsis)

κίνησις (kinēsis)

Psychic origin and moral direction. Soul is cause of every movement, but good-directed movement is specifically assigned to the best soul. Psychic causation and moral excellence are related without being identical. Attested: κινήσεως (988e). Soul as cause bodily passivity and self movement.

Composite celestial products — γέννημα (gennēma)

γέννημα (gennēma)

Composite celestial products. The heavenly beings are offspring of soul and body. The generation metaphor keeps both constituents present despite the strong division of active cause from passive material. Attested: γεννήματα (983e). Soul as cause bodily passivity and self movement.

Inadequate bodily explanation — ῥύμη (rhymē)

ῥύμη (rhymē)

Inadequate bodily explanation. Bodily rushes are rejected as an unclear causal account when offered in place of soul. The rejection concerns their explanatory role. Attested: ῥύμας (983c). Soul as cause bodily passivity and self movement.

Mover of itself and body — ψυχή (psychē)

ψυχή (psychē)

Mover of itself and body. Embodied soul can move and carry round the body and itself. Psychic agency is treated as explanatory rather than as a late effect of independent bodily motion. Attested: ψυχὴν (988d). Soul as cause bodily passivity and self movement.

Body without psychic direction — ἄφρων (aphrōn)

ἄφρων (aphrōn)

Body without psychic direction. Body is set down as unintelligent in contrast with intelligent soul. The distinction assigns cognition to the ruling principle, not to matter by itself. Attested: ἄφρον (983d). Soul as cause bodily passivity and self movement.

An inadequate rival account — ἀλογία (alogia)

ἀλογία (alogia)

An inadequate rival account. Want of reason accompanies folly in the rejection of accounts that bypass the soul–body origin of the heavens. It contrasts with the immediately preceding test whether the account has logos. Attested: ἀλογία (983e). Soul as cause bodily passivity and self movement.

Body’s passivity — ἀναίτιος (anaitios)

ἀναίτιος (anaitios)

Body’s passivity. Body is described as cause of no affection at all. It remains a constituent of living beings, so lack of causal initiative does not mean absence from the explanation of their composition. Attested: ἀναίτιον (983d). Soul as cause bodily passivity and self movement.

Does the account have reason? (contextual phrase)

πότερον ἔχει λόγον ὁ λόγος ἢ πάντως ὑστερεῖ (983d)

The first λόγον is the reason or rational adequacy that an account can possess; the second λόγος is that account itself. The alternative, or falls short entirely, marks the speaker’s invitation to scrutinize the explanation rather than treating its solemn delivery as its only warrant. Soul as cause bodily passivity and self movement.

Many of each no third common thing (contextual phrase)

καὶ πολλὰ ἑκατέρου, πάντα δὲ ἀλλήλων ἄλλα καὶ ἑκάτερα ἑκατέρων (983d)

The division into soul and body is compatible with a plurality within each kind, with differences both within and between kinds. Generic singular soul elsewhere cannot therefore by itself prove a single individual world-maker. The following denial of a third common thing sharpens the twofold division. Soul as cause bodily passivity and self movement.

Cause of all and cause of none (contextual phrase)

τὸ μὲν αἴτιον ἁπάντων, τὸ δὲ ἀναίτιον πάσης πάθης (983d)

The balanced construction gives soul causal initiative and body none with respect to any affection. This is stronger than a bland statement that mind is important. The next description still calls heavenly beings offspring of soul and body, distinguishing causation from material constitution. Soul as cause bodily passivity and self movement.

Soul moving both body and itself (contextual phrase)

κινεῖν τε καὶ περιφέρειν τοῦτο καὶ ἑαυτήν (988d)

The two objects distinguish the body, this, from the soul itself. The phrase grounds an explanatory description of psychic self-movement without supplying the unattested adjective autokinētos. Its contrast is with the rival account of bodies moving themselves through heat, cold, and related conditions. Soul as cause bodily passivity and self movement.

The best soul for movement toward good (contextual phrase)

τὴν δ’ ἐπὶ τἀγαθὸν φορὰν καὶ κίνησιν τῆς ἀρίστης ψυχῆς εἶναι (988e)

Good-directed motion is specifically assigned to the best soul after soul has been made cause of all movement. The moral qualification matters: psychic causation alone does not make every motion good. The following contrary case confirms that distinction. Soul as cause bodily passivity and self movement; Motion toward good and toward its contrary.