From the book
Symposium
Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Orientation
At a Glance
- The wordLikely and necessary mark different strengths of claim, not alternative translations of one judgement.
- In the SymposiumAgathon tentatively answers that the lover probably does not have what he desires.
- Reading contextAgathon tentatively answers that the lover probably does not have what he desires.
- A place to readAgathon’s contrasting mythic reign of Necessity.
Meaning
Likely and necessary mark different strengths of claim, not alternative translations of one judgement.
Use in the book
Agathon tentatively answers that the lover probably does not have what he desires. Socrates presses for necessity and tests apparent counterexamples through the distinction between present possession and future retention. The resulting necessity is asserted within the agreed argument. Its scope is not an unqualified empirical assertion that people can never want anything they presently possess. Earlier Necessity appears as a personified ruler of divine affairs; that mythic figure is not the grammatical subject of this argument.
Places to read
ἀνάγκη (anankē)
anankē — Necessity or a necessary conclusion; distinct here from the personified Necessity of earlier speeches.
- 200a — ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰκότος εἰ ἀνάγκη. Socrates explicitly replaces a probability test with a necessity test.
Read: Probability and necessity.
εἰκός (eikos)
eikos — Likely or probable, offered before Socrates asks whether the conclusion is necessary.
- 200a — ὡς τὸ εἰκός γε. Agathon initially qualifies his answer that the lover does not have the desired object.
Read: Probability and necessity.