More and less · Lexicon

From the book

Hipparchus

Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026

Orientation

At a Glance

The wordΜᾶλλον and ἧττον mean more and less in degree: more human, more properly a gain, or doing something to a greater degree.
In HipparchusThe first comparison concerns whether good food is more food than bad food (230a–b).
In this editionThe apparatus at 231c7 matters to the repeated quantitative premise: Burnet prints πλέον κτήσηται from a later hand in T; B is reported with κτήσηται and T with πλεονεκτήσηται.
A place to readοὔτε μᾶλλον οὔτε ἧττόν — Neither decent nor base person is more or less human.

Meaning

Μᾶλλον and ἧττον mean more and less in degree: more human, more properly a gain, or doing something to a greater degree. Πλέον and ἔλαττον are comparative forms used for a larger or smaller amount, including what one receives or spends. The distinction is important but not absolute: Greek comparative expressions, like English “more,” depend on the respect of comparison supplied by the sentence.

At 232b μᾶλλον ... ἢ has a different force, “rather than”: the companion has been compelled rather than persuaded. That idiom selects between descriptions; it does not calculate two measurable quantities of compulsion and persuasion. Lexical consistency does not require one mechanical English rendering in every construction.

Use in the book

The first comparison concerns whether good food is more food than bad food (230a–b). Neither food’s quality makes it more fully a member of its kind. A similar denial follows for decent and base persons: neither is more or less human. The claim is not that the people have equal size, equal abilities or equal possessions.

When Socrates says that the possessor of decent gain “gains no more” than the possessor of base gain (230c), the comparison changes grammatical shape, from predicate membership to an activity. The text then generalizes to doing or undergoing anything more or less with a thing to which neither more nor less belongs. Unless the comparison remains strictly “as a case of gain,” this risks inferring equal outcomes from equal classification. The article must register the risk without pretending the dialogue marks it as a formal fallacy.

At 231a the argument explicitly turns to quantities: spending less and getting more is proposed as one condition of gain. The comparative objects initially remain open. The companion narrows them to gold or silver at 231c, but the metal example shows that more by weight need not mean more in worth. The question “more in what respect?” therefore governs both stretches of the argument, though the words and examples differ.

The two problems should not be collapsed. In the earlier stretch, equal status as gain is made to imply equal gaining. In the later stretch, an increase in physical quantity is mistaken for an increase in value. Both concern illicit movement between respects of comparison, but only the latter is explicitly corrected by the speakers. The former remains a problem for the reader to assess.

Places to read

230cοὔτε μᾶλλον οὔτε ἧττόν — Neither decent nor base person is more or less human.
230cΟὐδὲν ἄρα μᾶλλον κερδαίνει — The crucial shift to the amount or degree of gaining.
231aἔλαττον ἀναλώσας πλέον λάβῃ — The proposed quantitative description of profitable acquisition.
231dΟὔτι τῇ ἀξίᾳ γε — The companion specifies worth as the relevant measure.
232bμᾶλλον ἐμέ γε ἢ πέπεικεν — The comparative construction means rather than persuaded.

Translation in this edition

The apparatus at 231c7 matters to the repeated quantitative premise: Burnet prints πλέον κτήσηται from a later hand in T; B is reported with κτήσηται and T with πλεονεκτήσηται. The edition translates the printed reading as “acquires more.” This lexicon follows that reading while distinguishing the recorded alternatives from a new collation.