Mind and moral practice

Disposition and frame of mind

ἀγνώμων; γνώμη; διάθεσις; διάκειμαι; διατίθημι; ἕξις; εὐγνωμοσύνη; εὐγνώμων; ἦθος; ὁμογνώμων

Disposition is the inward half of a life whose other half is action: "a holy disposition and social actions" (6.30.1).

From the book

Meditations

Marcus Aurelius · Diotimos Editions · 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordΔιάθεσις is the condition in which a thing is disposed, and διακεῖσθαι to be so disposed. Γνώμη, from the verb "to know", is a man's judgement, intention and bent of mind. Ἕξις, from ἔχειν (echein), "to hold", is a lasting state, and ἦθος character.
  • In the MeditationsDisposition is the inward half of a life whose other half is action: "a holy disposition and social actions" (6.30.1). It cannot be impeded (5.20); it is set right by setting right the principle (8.47); and another's is his own (5.25). The frame of mind is to be serene before death (2.17.2), and carried "towards the same things" as God (12.23).
  • In this editionΔιάθεσις is always "disposition" and διακεῖσθαι "be disposed"; γνώμη is "frame of mind", and by sense "views", "design" and "in view"; ἕξις is "state", once "cohesion"; ἦθος is always "character".
  • A place to read8.47, where Marcus asks, if something in his own disposition distresses him, who prevents him from setting right the principle.

Meaning

Διάθεσις (diathesis) is the noun of διατιθέναι (diatithenai), "to arrange, to dispose", and διακεῖσθαι (diakeisthai), "to lie in some way", serves as that verb's passive: the condition in which something has been placed. Γνώμη (gnōmē) belongs with γιγνώσκειν (gignōskein), "to come to know": the mind as it judges and intends, an opinion, a purpose. Its compounds mean fair-minded, unfair and of one mind. Ἕξις (hexis), from ἔχειν (echein), "to have, to hold", is a having, a lasting condition. Ἦθος (ēthos) is in early Greek an accustomed place, then custom, and a man's character. Marcus' use is plainer: disposition is how the ruling centre stands, frame of mind its bent, state what lies ready in a man to act, and character what others meet.

Use in the book

Marcus pairs disposition with action: "there is one fruit of life on earth, a holy disposition and social actions" (6.30.1; see Court and office); the good man is content with "his own just action and kindly disposition" (4.25; see Contentment and self-sufficiency); the soul of God and of every rational living being has "the good in a just disposition and action" (5.34; see Desire and aversion); what is worth effort ends in "a disposition that welcomes all that happens" (4.33; see Resentment and welcome); and what is enough is the present opinion, the present action and "the present disposition, well pleased with everything that happens" (9.6; see Present action). Action is what Marcus does; disposition, in these pairs, is how he stands, towards the gods, towards men and towards what happens.

Disposition is in a man's keeping. By men who stand in his way, as by the sun or the wind, "some activity may be impeded, but there are no impediments to impulse and disposition, because of the reservation and the reversal" (5.20; see Obstacle and reservation). Nor is it beyond repair: "if something in your own disposition distresses you, who prevents you from setting right the principle?" (8.47; see Assent and judgement). The question can be read as defining the word: a disposition is made of principles, and changes when they do. So reason works on it from man to man: "move a rational disposition by a rational disposition; show, remind" (5.28; see Mind and reason). Another's disposition is his: "Another does wrong to me? He will see to it. He has his own disposition, his own activity" (5.25; see Present action).

A disposition is also what a man would do if occasion came. Marcus thanks the gods that he never slipped into offending those close to him, "although I had the kind of disposition from which, had things fallen out so, I might well have done something of the sort" (1.17.1; see Gratitude). When he blames a man as faithless, "yours is the wrong, whether you trusted that a man of such a disposition would guard faith", or gave the favour without taking its whole fruit from the act itself (9.42.4; see Beneficence). Marcus' word for the lasting condition behind wrongs is ἕξις, "state". Even if Marcus abstains from certain wrongs, "yet you have at least the state inclined to them", even if it is through cowardice or courting of fame or some such bad thing that he abstains (11.18.2; see Anger); of the base man he asks, "For what is he to do, having such a state?" (12.16; see Fault and ignorance). Taken together, these can be read as a reason for mildness: the wrongdoer acts from his state as, in the same chapter, the fig tree carries juice in its figs (12.16), and Marcus carries the same state within.

Γνώμη, "frame of mind", is the mind's bent towards what happens. Philosophy lies, among other things, in "awaiting death with a serene frame of mind" (2.17.2; see Dissolution). Those who will to follow nature, "being of one mind with it, must also be equally disposed" towards what nature treats equally, pain and pleasure, death and life, fame and obscurity (9.1.3; see Good, bad and indifference); and of the man whose life ends in due time Marcus writes, "For so he too is borne by God who is carried along the same way as God and is carried, in frame of mind, towards the same things" (12.23; see Change). Elsewhere the word is ordinary Greek: the "views" of Antoninus Pius, his adoptive father, who bore with frank opposition to them (6.30.4; see Care and tolerance), the "design" Marcus is to tell from "ignorance" at another man's ruling centre (9.22; see Fault and ignorance), and the universe embraced "in view" (9.32; see Time and eternity). The compounds turn it towards men. Marcus is to remember "to how many unfair people you have been fair-minded" (5.31; see Parents and education); nature has given "against the unfair man mildness" (9.42.2; see Fault and ignorance); and to expect the base not to wrong oneself while allowing them to wrong others "is unfair and tyrannical" (11.18.6; see Anger). A hindrance too is met "by a fair-minded passing over to what is given" (8.32; see Obstacle and reservation).

Character is what others meet. Junius Rusticus, the Stoic, gave Marcus "the impression of needing correction and treatment of character" (1.7.1; see Learning, practice and correction), and his brother could rouse him "by his character" to take care of himself (1.17.4; see Lucius Verus). It is hard "to bear with even the most refined" of the characters of those who live alongside him (5.10.1; see Care and tolerance), yet "nothing gladdens so much as the likenesses of the virtues showing in the characters of those who live with us" (6.48; see Exemplary lives). Bad characters come as a row of epithets, "A black character, a womanish character, a hard character" (4.28). Their opposite is a way of spending the day: "This is what the perfection of character holds: to pass each day as the last, and to be neither feverish nor torpid nor pretending" (7.69; see Simplicity and sincerity).

Marcus' disposition is not a temperament he is bound to: it is set right with a principle (8.47). Yet it outlasts good conduct: the disposition of 1.17.1 and the state of 11.18.2 remain where no wrong has been done. The book can be read as holding a man answerable for what he is between his acts as well as for the acts.

Places to read

Every chapter in which διάθεσις, διακεῖσθαι, διατίθεσθαι (diatithesthai), γνώμη, ὁμογνώμων (homognōmōn), εὐγνώμων (eugnōmōn), εὐγνωμοσύνη (eugnōmosynē), ἀγνώμων (agnōmōn), ἕξις or ἦθος occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided. The compounds of ἦθος, καλοήθης (kaloēthēs; 1.1), κακοήθης (kakoēthēs; 3.4.2) and συνήθης (synēthēs), "usual", with συνήθεια (synētheia), "usage" (see Recurrence and repetition), and of γνώμη, συγγνώμη (syngnōmē) and its kin (see Kindness and correction), are left out.

  1. 1.7.1GreekFrom Rusticus Marcus got the impression of needing correction and treatment of character.
  2. 1.7.3GreekFrom Rusticus Marcus learned to be easily recalled towards those who had been exasperated or had given offence, as soon as they wanted to come back.
  3. 1.15.1GreekFrom Claudius Maximus, the Stoic, Marcus had self-mastery, good spirits and a well-tempered character, amiable and stately.
  4. 1.17.1GreekMarcus never slipped into offending those close to him, although he had the kind of disposition from which, had things fallen out so, he might have done so.
  5. 1.17.4GreekMarcus had a brother able by his character to rouse him to take care of himself.
  6. 2.12GreekMarcus lists how man touches God, with what part of himself, and how that part is disposed when it does.
  7. 2.17.2GreekPhilosophy lies, among other things, in awaiting death with a serene frame of mind, as nothing but the dissolution of the elements.
  8. 4.18GreekOne is to look only at what one is doing oneself, and, in the manner of the good man, not glance round at a black character but run straight along the line.
  9. 4.25GreekMarcus is to try how the life of the good man goes for him, content with his own just action and kindly disposition.
  10. 4.28GreekA row of bad characters: black, womanish, hard, bestial, cattle-like, childish, stupid, counterfeit, buffoonish, huckstering, tyrannical.
  11. 4.33GreekSince all fame fades, what is worth effort is, among other things, a disposition that welcomes all that happens.
  12. 5.9GreekMarcus is to see whether greatness of soul, freedom, simplicity, fair-mindedness and holiness are not more agreeable than pleasure.
  13. 5.10.1GreekIt is hard to bear with even the most refined of the characters of those who live alongside one.
  14. 5.20GreekSome activity may be impeded by men, but there are no impediments to impulse and disposition, because of the reservation and the reversal.
  15. 5.25GreekIf another does wrong to Marcus, that is his affair: he has his own disposition, his own activity.
  16. 5.28GreekMarcus is not to be angry with the man who smells, but, since he too has reason, to move a rational disposition by a rational disposition.
  17. 5.31GreekMarcus is to remember how many things he has come through, and to how many unfair people he has been fair-minded.
  18. 5.34GreekCommon to the soul of God and of every rational being is to have the good in a just disposition and action.
  19. 6.5GreekThe governing reason knows how it is disposed, what it does and on what material.
  20. 6.14GreekThe multitude admires things held together by cohesion or by nature; the man who honours a rational and civic soul preserves his own.
  21. 6.30.1GreekLife is short, and there is one fruit of life on earth, a holy disposition and social actions.
  22. 6.30.3GreekAntoninus was an exact examiner of characters and actions, not a reproacher or a sophist.
  23. 6.30.4GreekAntoninus bore with frank opposition to his views, and rejoiced if someone pointed out a better course.
  24. 6.48GreekNothing gladdens so much as the likenesses of the virtues showing in the characters of those who live with us.
  25. 7.66GreekMarcus asks how we know whether Telauges, probably the Pythagorean ascetic of a dialogue of Aeschines the Socratic, was not better in disposition than Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, and what sort of soul Socrates had.
  26. 7.69GreekThe perfection of character is to pass each day as the last, neither feverish nor torpid nor pretending.
  27. 8.32GreekIf an action is prevented, being well pleased with the hindrance and a fair-minded passing over to what is given put another action in its place.
  28. 8.47GreekIf something in his own disposition distresses Marcus, no one prevents him from setting right the principle.
  29. 9.1.3GreekThose who will to follow nature, being of one mind with it, must be equally disposed towards what the common nature treats equally.
  30. 9.3.2GreekWhat makes Marcus most at ease towards death is attention to the things he is about to leave, and to the sort of characters he will be free of.
  31. 9.6GreekEnough: the present opinion firmly grasping, the present action social, and the present disposition well pleased with everything that happens.
  32. 9.22GreekMarcus is to run to another man's ruling centre, to attend whether it is ignorance or design, and to reckon that it is kin.
  33. 9.32GreekMarcus can strip away many superfluous things that lie in his opinion and make much room for himself, embracing the whole universe in view and comprehending eternity.
  34. 9.42.2GreekNature has given man mildness as an antidote against the unfair man.
  35. 9.42.4GreekWhen Marcus blames a man as faithless, the wrong is his own, whether he trusted a man of such a disposition to keep faith or gave a favour expecting more than the act.
  36. 10.1GreekMarcus asks his soul whether it will ever taste the loving and cherishing disposition.
  37. 10.2GreekMarcus is to watch what his nature seeks as of one governed by nature alone, and do it, if his nature as a living being is not going to be put in a worse condition; then what his nature as a living being seeks, and take it on, if his nature as a rational living being is not.
  38. 11.13GreekA man must be seen by the gods disposed to be indignant at nothing and to complain of nothing.
  39. 11.18.2GreekWrongdoers are annoyed at being called unfair; and even if Marcus abstains from certain wrongs, he has the state inclined to them.
  40. 11.18.6GreekTo allow the base to wrong others and expect them not to wrong oneself is unfair and tyrannical.
  41. 12.16GreekMarcus asks what the base man is to do, having such a state; if Marcus is vehement, he is to cure this.
  42. 12.23GreekHe who ends his life in due time has not been put in a bad condition, and he is borne by God who is carried, in frame of mind, towards the same things as God.

Translation in this edition

Διάθεσις is "disposition" at all thirteen of its places (1.17.1, 4.25, 4.33, 5.20, 5.25, 5.28 twice, 5.34, 6.30.1, 7.66, 8.47, 9.6, 9.42.4, 10.1). Διακεῖσθαι is "is disposed" (2.12, 6.5) and, with ἐπίσης (episēs), "equally", "be equally disposed" (9.1.3); at 1.7.3, with two adverbs, it is "to be": "to be easily recalled and easily reconciled". The passive of διατιθέναι is "be put in a worse condition" (10.2 twice) and "been put in a bad condition" (12.23), with the adverbs "worse" and "badly", and "disposed" at 11.13, "disposed to be indignant at nothing". "Disposed" at 10.35, "the healthy stomach must be disposed alike towards all foods", renders ὁμοίως ἔχειν (homoiōs echein), and "the present condition" at 10.1 renders κατάστασις (katastasis). Γνώμη is "frame of mind" (2.17.2, 12.23), and is split by sense, as the Glossary records: "views" (6.30.4), "design" (9.22), and, in the dative of means, "in view" (9.32). Ἐπιβολή (epibolē), "project" (11.6.2), is kept apart from it (see Drama and role). Ὁμογνώμων is "of one mind" (9.1.3); εὐγνώμων is "fair-minded" (5.31, 8.32) and εὐγνωμοσύνη "fair-mindedness" (5.9); ἀγνώμων is "unfair" at all its places (5.31, 9.42.2, 11.18.2, 11.18.6). Συγγνώμη, "forgiveness", and its kin have their sub-entries in Kindness and correction. Ἕξις is "cohesion" at 6.14, where it names the lowest rung of the Stoic scale of being (see Living being), and "state" at 11.18.2 and 12.16. "State" also renders ἔχειν with an adverb ("in a state according to nature", 4.1; "in a rational and social state", 6.14); at 2.12 "in what state" renders πῶς (pōs), "how", with διακέηται, and at 6.24 and 9.33 "state" renders καθίστασθαι (kathistasthai). Ἦθος is "character" at all its places; "good character" at 1.1 renders καλόηθες (see Parents and education), and κακόηθες is "malicious" (3.4.2). The "characters" of 6.26 are the letters of a name. At 10.36, where Marcus is to go away "preserving your own habit", the apparatus of J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, records the proposal of Herbert Richards, whose notes on Marcus Aurelius appeared in the Classical Review in 1905, to read ἦθος, "character", for ἔθος (ethos), "habit" (see Learning, practice and correction).

Greek forms and English renderings

How a man stands between his acts · Meditations

διάθεσις, diathesis, "disposition"; διακεῖσθαι, diakeisthai, "be disposed", "be equally disposed", "to be"; διατίθεσθαι, diatithesthai, "be put in a worse condition", "be put in a bad condition", "disposed"; γνώμη, gnōmē, "frame of mind", "views", "design", "in view"; ὁμογνώμων, homognōmōn, "of one mind"; εὐγνώμων, eugnōmōn, "fair-minded"; εὐγνωμοσύνη, eugnōmosynē, "fair-mindedness"; ἀγνώμων, agnōmōn, "unfair"; ἕξις, hexis, "state", "cohesion"; ἦθος, ēthos, "character"

Epictetus and the Stoics

Diogenes Laertius, the biographer of the philosophers, of the third century AD, whose seventh book sets out the Stoic doctrines, reports that of the goods of the soul some are states, ἕξεις (hexeis), some dispositions, διαθέσεις (diatheseis), and some neither: the virtues are dispositions, the pursuits are states, and the activities are neither.1 Virtue itself they called "a disposition in agreement with itself" (see Virtue and excellence). The pair had been the terms of Aristotle, the philosopher of the fourth century BC. In the Categories state and disposition are one kind of quality, and a state differs from a disposition by being more lasting and harder to move: the sciences and the virtues are states, while heat and chill, sickness and health are dispositions, by which a man is disposed in some way but quickly changes.2 Simplicius, the Neoplatonist commentator of the sixth century, explains in his commentary on the Categories that the Stoics seemed to some to have reversed this and made disposition the more lasting, and grants that this has some ground, but says that their distinction did not lie in lasting: states can be tightened and slackened, dispositions cannot. So they called the straightness of a stick a disposition, though the stick can be bent, since straightness admits no more and less; and the virtues are dispositions in this way, not because they last but because they admit no increase, while the arts, hard to move though they are, are not dispositions.3 Marcus does not use the words as the school's terms: his disposition is the ordinary word for how a man stands, holy (6.30.1) or such as might have offended (1.17.1), and his ἕξις is never a virtue. Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, held that every state is kept and increased by the acts that answer to it (see Temperance and self-mastery), which can be read beside the state "inclined to" wrongs that Marcus finds in himself (11.18.2). For γνώμη Epictetus has the thought behind Marcus' "of one mind": the man of worth has made his own γνώμη subject to the governor of the whole and keeps it fitted to what happens (see Resentment and welcome).4 He bids his hearer dare to look up to God and say, "From now on use me for what you will; I am of one mind with you", ὁμογνωμονῶ σοι (homognōmonō soi), "… I decline nothing you see fit."5 Marcus' "being of one mind with it" (9.1.3) and his frame of mind "carried … towards the same things" as God (12.23) can be read as Epictetus' thought in his own words.

ἀγνώμων

Attested: ἀγνώμονας (agnōmonas; 5.31), ἀγνώμονα (agnōmona; 9.42.2), ἀγνώμονες (agnōmones; 11.18.2), ἄγνωμον (agnōmon; 11.18.6). Without good sense or feeling; unfair, ungrateful. "To how many unfair people you have been fair-minded" (5.31); "against the unfair man mildness" (9.42.2); wrongdoers are annoyed "at being called unjust and unfair and grasping" (11.18.2); to expect the base not to wrong oneself "is unfair and tyrannical" (11.18.6). Lemma: ἀγνώμων.

γνώμη

Attested: γνώμῃ (gnōmēi; 2.17.2, 9.32, 12.23), γνώμαις (gnōmais; 6.30.4), γνώμη (gnōmē; 9.22). Judgement, mind, purpose; an opinion; the bent of mind. "Awaiting death with a serene frame of mind" (2.17.2); "⟨those⟩ who frankly opposed his views" (6.30.4); "whether it is ignorance or design" (9.22); "having embraced the whole universe in view" (9.32), where the "⟨by⟩" before these words renders ⟨τῷ⟩ (tōi), the supplement of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, which Leopold prints; "carried, in frame of mind, towards the same things" (12.23). Lemma: γνώμη.

διάθεσις

Attested: διάθεσιν (diathesin; 1.17.1, 5.25, 5.28, 7.66, 9.42.4), διαθέσει (diathesei; 4.25, 5.28, 5.34, 8.47), διάθεσις (diathesis; 4.33, 6.30.1, 9.6), διαθέσεως (diatheseōs; 5.20, 10.1). Arrangement; the condition in which a thing is disposed; a man's disposition. "A holy disposition and social actions" (6.30.1); "no impediments to impulse and disposition" (5.20); "He has his own disposition, his own activity" (5.25); "move a rational disposition by a rational disposition" (5.28); "if something in your own disposition distresses you, who prevents you from setting right the principle?" (8.47). Lemma: διάθεσις.

διάκειμαι

Attested: διακεῖσθαι (diakeisthai; 1.7.3, 9.1.3), διακέηται (diakeētai; 2.12), διακείμενος (diakeimenos; 6.5). To be in a certain condition, to be disposed. "The governing reason knows how it is disposed, and what it does, and on what material" (6.5); those who follow nature "must also be equally disposed" (9.1.3). At 2.12, "in what state that part of man [stands and] is disposed", Leopold brackets ἔχῃ (echēi), "stands", after Johann Matthias Schultz, who edited the Meditations in 1802; A, the Vatican manuscript, has a corrupt form of the verb and D, the Darmstadt manuscript, the indicative. At 1.7.3 the infinitive goes with two adverbs, "to be easily recalled and easily reconciled", where "easily reconciled" is the reading of D and of Wilhelm Xylander, the first editor (see Anger). Lemma: διάκειμαι.

διατίθημι

Attested: διατίθεσθαι (diatithesthai; 10.2 twice), διατιθέμενον (diatithemenon; 11.13), διετέθη (dietethē; 12.23). To arrange, to dispose; in the passive, to be put in a condition, to be disposed. Marcus is to do what his nature seeks, "if your nature as a living being is not going to be put in a worse condition" (10.2; see Living being); "a man must be seen by the gods disposed to be indignant at nothing" (11.13); he who ended life in due time has not "been put in a bad condition" (12.23). Lemma: διατίθημι.

ἕξις

Attested: ἕξεως (hexeōs; 6.14), ἕξιν (hexin; 11.18.2, 12.16). A having; a lasting state; in the Stoic scale of being, the cohesion that holds stones and timber together. "Things held together by cohesion or by nature" (6.14; see Living being); "yet you have at least the state inclined to them" (11.18.2), where P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, has ποιητικήν (poiētikēn), "productive of them", for ἐποιστικήν (epoistikēn), as Leopold reports; "For what is he to do, having such a state?" (12.16). Lemma: ἕξις.

εὐγνωμοσύνη

Attested: εὐγνωμοσύνη (eugnōmosynē; 5.9). Good feeling, fairness of mind. "But look whether greatness of soul, freedom, simplicity, fair-mindedness, holiness are more agreeable" (5.9; see Philosophy). Lemma: εὐγνωμοσύνη.

εὐγνώμων

Attested: εὐγνώμων (eugnōmōn; 5.31), εὐγνώμονι (eugnōmoni; 8.32). Of good mind; fair, reasonable. "To how many unfair people you have been fair-minded" (5.31), where P has ἀγνώμων, "unfair", as Leopold reports; "by a fair-minded passing over to what is given" (8.32). Lemma: εὐγνώμων.

ἦθος

Attested: ἤθους (ēthous; 1.7.1, 1.15.1, 1.17.4, 7.69), ἦθος (ēthos; 4.18, 4.28 three times), ἤθη (ēthē; 5.10.1), ἠθῶν (ēthōn; 6.30.3, 9.3.2), ἤθεσι (ēthesi; 6.48). Accustomed place; custom; character. "Correction and treatment of character" (1.7.1); "a well-tempered character, amiable and stately" (1.15.1); "an exact examiner of characters and actions" (6.30.3); "This is what the perfection of character holds" (7.69). At 4.18 A leaves out the words "not to glance round at a black character, but to run straight along the line", as Leopold reports. Lemma: ἦθος.

ὁμογνώμων

Attested: ὁμογνώμονας (homognōmonas; 9.1.3). Of one mind. "Those who will to follow nature, being of one mind with it, must also be equally disposed" (9.1.3). Lemma: ὁμογνώμων.

Source note

1. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 7.98.

2. Aristotle, Categories 8, 8b26–9a13.

3. Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's Categories, pp. 237.25–238.5 Kalbfleisch.

4. Epictetus, Discourses 1.12.7 and 1.12.17.

5. Epictetus, Discourses 2.16.42.