Mind and moral practice

Resentment and welcome

ἀντιδυσχεραίνω; ἀπόδεξις; ἀποδέχομαι; ἀρέσκεια; ἀρεσκεύομαι; ἀρεσκευτικός; ἀρέσκω; ἀρεστός; ἀσπάζομαι; δέχομαι; δυσχεραίνω; δυσχεραντικός; δυσχερής; προσίημι

"To resent anything that happens is to stand apart from nature" (2.16), and Marcus asks himself whether he resents the vice of men or what is allotted from the whole (4.3.2).

From the book

Meditations

Marcus Aurelius · Diotimos Editions · 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordΔυσχεραίνειν is to find a thing hard to handle, to take it ill; ἀσπάζεσθαι is to greet, and so to welcome gladly; ἀρέσκεσθαι is to be pleased with, and δέχεσθαι to receive.
  • In the Meditations"To resent anything that happens is to stand apart from nature" (2.16), and Marcus asks himself whether he resents the vice of men or what is allotted from the whole (4.3.2). Against resentment he sets welcome: what is worth effort ends in "a disposition that welcomes all that happens" (4.33), as rough prescriptions are welcomed "in the hope of health" (5.8.3).
  • In this editionΔυσχεραίνειν is "resent", and twice "be resentful"; ἀσπάζεσθαι is always "welcome", ἀρέσκεσθαι "be pleased", δέχεσθαι always "receive" and ἀποδέχεσθαι "accept".
  • A place to read4.33, where, once every famous name has faded, what is worth effort ends in a disposition that welcomes all that happens.

Meaning

Δυσχεραίνειν (dyscherainein) is formed from δυσχερής (dyscherēs), "hard to handle", from δυσ- (dys-), "ill", and χείρ (cheir), "hand": to find a thing hard to bear. Its adverb δυσχερῶς (dyscherōs) is "with reluctance" (8.12), and δυσχεραντικός (dyscherantikos) "short-tempered" (1.8.2). Ἀσπάζεσθαι (aspazesthai) is to greet, to embrace, and so to welcome gladly. Ἀρέσκειν (areskein) is to please, and its middle ἀρέσκεσθαι (areskesthai), with the dative, to be pleased with; ἀρεσκεύεσθαι (areskeuesthai) is to court favour, and ἀρεστός (arestos) "pleasing". Δέχεσθαι (dechesthai) is to take what is offered, to receive; ἀποδέχεσθαι (apodechesthai) is to accept, and ἀπόδεξις (apodexis) acceptance. Diogenes Laertius, the biographer of the philosophers, reports that the Stoics counted ἀσπασμός (aspasmos), welcoming, among the kinds of wish, the good feeling that answers to craving (see Desire and aversion).1

Use in the book

For Marcus resentment is a breach before it is a mood. The soul does violence to itself first when it becomes an abscess on the universe, "for to resent anything that happens is to stand apart from nature" (2.16; see Interconnection), and "whenever the ruling centre resents anything that happens, then too it leaves its own place" (11.20.2; see Gods).

The retreat of 4.3 names its two objects. "For what will you resent? The vice of men?" Against that he is to reckon up that rational beings have come to be for one another, that forbearance is a part of justice and that they do wrong unwillingly (see Care and tolerance). "But will you also resent what is allotted from the whole?" Against this he is to renew the disjunction, providence or atoms (4.3.2; see Providence and atoms); the brief principles of the retreat are to send him back "not resenting the things to which you return" (4.3.1; see Inner retreat and citadel). The first returns among the heads against anger (11.18.2; see Anger). Against the second the arguments are from nature. "If, then, there happens to each what it is used to and is by nature, why would you resent it?" (8.46; see Courage and endurance); what he is not by nature able to bear he is not to resent either, "for it will perish when it has consumed you" (10.3; see Pain and pleasure); and if someone, even leaving nature aside, explains change by things being so by nature, it is ridiculous at once to say that the parts of the whole are by nature such as to change and at once to be astonished or to resent it as contrary to nature (10.7.2; see Dissolution).

Not resenting is the lesser half; Marcus asks for welcome, the Greek word of greeting. Its object is what happens or is allotted, or its images, the doctor's prescriptions and the city's allotments. The good man is "welcoming with his whole soul all that happens and is allotted to him", and the welcome rests on a judgement: of his own concerns and of what is spun for him, "the first he makes honourable, the second he is persuaded are good" (3.4.3; see Fate and allotment). 4.33 gives the grounds. All things fade and quickly become legend, and everlasting remembrance is "Wholly empty"; what one must spend effort on is "a just understanding, social actions, speech such as never to lie, and a disposition that welcomes all that happens as necessary, as familiar, as flowing from such a beginning and spring". "Familiar" has its contrary at 7.66, where Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, is to be judged by whether he could be content to be just and holy, "neither receiving anything allotted from the whole as something strange nor enduring it as unbearable" (7.66; see Body and flesh).

Welcome does not wait for the thing to be pleasant. In the prescriptions of Asclepius, the god of healing, "many things … are rough, but we welcome them in the hope of health" (5.8.3), and so Marcus is to "welcome everything that comes about, even if it seems rather harsh, because it leads you there, to the health of the universe" (5.8.4; see Whole and part). The ground is that he is a part. A rational nature journeys well when, among other things, "what by the common nature is allotted it welcomes, all of it; for it is a part of it, as the nature of the leaf is of the nature of the plant", though of a nature that, unlike the plant's, is "unimpeded" and "intelligent" (8.7), and when he is so disposed to the whole and to his kin, life must flow smoothly, like that of a citizen who "welcomes whatever the city allots" (10.6.2; see Citizenship). The welcome holds even on the lesser hypothesis: if the gods took no counsel about him individually, they took it about the common affairs, and what follows from these "I ought to welcome and cherish" (6.44.1; see Gods).

Receiving is the plainer word. Philosophy lies, among other things, in "receiving what happens and is allotted as coming from there, wherever that is, whence it came itself" (2.17.2; see Daimon); "Does something happen to me? I receive it, referring it to the gods and to the spring of all things" (8.23; see Fate and allotment). Receiving leads to use: what gladdens Marcus is a sound ruling centre, "looking on everything with kindly eyes, and receiving and using each according to worth" (8.43). At 11.13, in the text of J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, which here follows Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century, in reading "and receiving" where P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, has "not receiving", nothing is bad for Marcus if he is doing what is proper to his nature "and receiving what is now timely for the nature of the whole". To be pleased is the same welcome named by its feeling: the good man is "pleased with what is allotted from the whole" (4.25; see Contentment and self-sufficiency).

The word keeps its edge: at every deathbed, Marcus' own included, there will be "some standing by who welcome the bad thing that is happening" (10.36; see Death). Welcome in the Meditations is not resignation but a greeting given on reasons, by a part to its whole and a citizen to his city; its test is the rough prescription, and resentment, as 2.16 has it, is standing apart from nature.

Places to read

Every chapter in which δυσχεραίνειν, ἀντιδυσχεραίνειν (antidyscherainein), δυσχεραντικός, δυσχερῶς, ἀσπάζεσθαι or ἀρέσκειν occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided, with the places where δέχεσθαι, ἀποδέχεσθαι or ἀπόδεξις is the receiving of what happens or is allotted (2.17.2, 5.8.3, 7.66, 8.23, 8.43, 9.28, 10.8.1, 11.13, 12.11). The other places of δέχεσθαι, the one place of προσίεσθαι (prosiesthai), "admit" (10.2), and the words of pleasing and courting favour, ἀρεστός, ἀρέσκεια (areskeia), ἀρεσκεύεσθαι and ἀρεσκευτικός (areskeutikos), are given in the sub-entries.

  1. 1.8.2GreekAmong the lessons of Apollonius, the Stoic, is not being short-tempered in explanation.
  2. 2.2GreekMarcus, an old man, is no longer to let his ruling centre resent what is fated in the present.
  3. 2.16GreekThe soul does violence to itself first when it becomes an abscess on the universe, for to resent anything that happens is to stand apart from nature.
  4. 2.17.2GreekPhilosophy lies, among other things, in receiving what happens and is allotted as coming from where the daimon itself came.
  5. 3.4.3GreekThe good man welcomes with his whole soul all that happens and is allotted to him, and is persuaded that what is spun for him is good.
  6. 3.4.4GreekThe good man sets no store by praise from those who do not live in agreement with nature, who are not even pleased with themselves.
  7. 3.16.2GreekIt is peculiar to the good man to love and welcome what happens to him and is spun for him.
  8. 4.3.1GreekThe brief and elementary things within are to send Marcus back from his retreat not resenting the things to which he returns.
  9. 4.3.2GreekMarcus asks himself whether he resents the vice of men or what is allotted from the whole, and is to meet the first with the verdict on rational beings and the second with the disjunction, providence or atoms.
  10. 4.25GreekMarcus is to try how the life of the good man goes for him, pleased with what is allotted from the whole and content with his own just action and kindly disposition.
  11. 4.33GreekAll things fade into legend; what one must spend effort on is a just understanding, social actions, truthful speech and a disposition that welcomes all that happens as necessary, as familiar, as flowing from such a beginning and spring.
  12. 5.8.3GreekWhat nature prescribes is to be received as the prescriptions of Asclepius are, which, rough as many of them are, are welcomed in the hope of health.
  13. 5.8.4GreekMarcus is to welcome everything that comes about, even if it seems rather harsh, because it leads to the health of the universe.
  14. 5.27GreekHe lives with the gods who continually shows them his own soul pleased with what is allotted and doing what the daimon wills.
  15. 6.26GreekEvery duty is to be brought to its end without being disturbed or resenting in return those who resent.
  16. 6.44.1GreekIf the gods took no counsel about Marcus individually, they took it about the common affairs, and what follows from these he ought to welcome and cherish.
  17. 6.49GreekMarcus asks whether he resents weighing so many pounds and not three hundred, and applies the same to the number of his years.
  18. 6.59GreekMarcus considers what sort of people men want to please, for what gains and by what activities.
  19. 7.64GreekMany things that are the same as pain, such as drowsiness, heat and loss of appetite, escape notice while they are resented.
  20. 7.66GreekSocrates is to be judged by whether he could be content to be just and holy, neither receiving anything allotted from the whole as something strange nor enduring it as unbearable.
  21. 7.70GreekThe immortal gods do not resent bearing with so many base people for so long, but even care for them.
  22. 8.7GreekA rational nature journeys well when, among other things, it welcomes all that the common nature allots it, being a part of it as the leaf is of the plant.
  23. 8.12GreekWhen Marcus is roused from sleep with reluctance, he is to remind himself that social actions accord with his constitution.
  24. 8.23GreekWhen something happens to Marcus, he receives it, referring it to the gods and to the spring of all things.
  25. 8.43GreekWhat gladdens Marcus is to have the ruling centre sound, turning away from no man, looking on everything with kindly eyes, and receiving and using each according to worth.
  26. 8.46GreekIf what happens to each thing is what it is used to and is by nature, Marcus asks why he would resent it; for the common nature brought him nothing unbearable.
  27. 8.53GreekMarcus asks whether he wants to please a man who does not please himself.
  28. 9.28GreekIf the understanding of the whole has an impulse towards each thing, Marcus is to accept the object of its impulse.
  29. 10.3GreekWhether what happens is such as Marcus is by nature able to bear or not, he is not to resent it.
  30. 10.6.2GreekWhen Marcus is so disposed to the whole and to his kin, life must flow smoothly, as the life of a citizen would who goes forward through actions profitable to the citizens and welcomes whatever the city allots.
  31. 10.7.2GreekIf someone, even leaving nature aside, explains change by things being so by nature, it is ridiculous at once to say that the parts of the whole are by nature such as to change and at once to be astonished at it or resent it as something contrary to nature.
  32. 10.8.1GreekThe name "consenting" was to signify for Marcus the willing acceptance of what is allotted by the common nature.
  33. 10.36GreekNo one is so fortunate that some standing by his deathbed will not welcome what is happening; Marcus is not on this account to go away less kindly to them.
  34. 11.9GreekMarcus is to keep his mildness towards those who try to prevent him or are otherwise resentful.
  35. 11.13GreekA man must be seen by the gods disposed to be indignant at nothing and to complain of nothing, stretched towards the coming about of what is of common advantage.
  36. 11.18.2GreekThe third head against anger is that if men do rightly one must not be resentful, and if not, they do wrong unwillingly and in ignorance.
  37. 11.20.2GreekWhenever the ruling centre resents anything that happens, it leaves its own place.
  38. 12.11GreekMan has the authority to do nothing but what God will praise and to receive all that God deals out to him.

Translation in this edition

Δυσχεραίνειν is "resent" at fourteen of its sixteen occurrences: "resent" (2.2, 2.16, 4.3.2 twice, 6.49, 7.70, 8.46, 10.3 twice, 10.7.2), "resents" (11.20.2), "resenting" (4.3.1), "those who resent" (6.26) and, in the passive, "while they are resented" (7.64); it is "be resentful" in "are otherwise resentful" (11.9) and "one must not be resentful" (11.18.2). Its compound ἀντιδυσχεραίνειν is "resenting in return" (6.26), δυσχεραντικός is "short-tempered" (1.8.2) and δυσχερῶς "with reluctance" (8.12); "resent" and "resentful" render no other word. At 4.3.2 both futures, "will you resent?", are corrections that Leopold prints, the first of Coraes and the second of Johann Matthias Schultz, who edited the Meditations in 1802; P has the present. Ἀσπάζεσθαι is "welcome" at all nine of its places, and "welcome" renders no other word. Ἀρέσκεσθαι is "be pleased" (3.4.4, 4.25, 5.27) and the active ἀρέσκειν "please" (6.59, 8.53 three times); ἀρεστός is "pleasing" (6.16.5), ἀρέσκεια "the wish to please" (5.18), ἀρεσκεύεσθαι "curry favour" (5.5) and "court one another's favour" (11.14), and ἀρεσκευτικός, with the article, "eagerness to please" (1.16.3). "Pleased" renders no other word but the εὐαρεστεῖν (euarestein) family, "be well pleased" (see Contentment and self-sufficiency). Δέχεσθαι is "receive" at all twelve of its places. "Receive" also renders παραδέχεσθαι (paradechesthai; 5.12, 6.42), λαμβάνειν (lambanein) and its compounds where a thing is got or taken (1.8.2, 4.46, 8.35, 9.1.2, 9.42.4, 10.6.1, 11.18.5), εὖ πάσχειν (eu paschein), "has received good" (7.73), and ψύχωσις (psychōsis), "receives a soul" and "receiving a soul" (12.24). Ἀποδέχεσθαι is "accept" (9.28) and ἀπόδεξις "acceptance" (10.8.1), the only places of either English word. The other compounds of δέχεσθαι keep their own English: ἐκδέχεσθαι (ekdechesthai) "await" (9.3.1), παρεκδέχεσθαι (parekdechesthai) "take wrongly" (5.6.2), ἐπιδέχεσθαι (epidechesthai) "admits of" (12.14), διαδέχεσθαι (diadechesthai) "took over from" (4.19) and "succeed to" (10.34), and the impersonal ἐνδέχεται (endechetai), "it is … possible" (7.67). Προσίεσθαι is "admit" at its one place (10.2). The neighbouring words have their sub-entries elsewhere: δυσαρεστεῖν, "be discontented", and δυσαρέστησις (dysarestēsis), "discontent", the second of which the Glossary lists beside δυσχεραίνειν under "resent" (see Contentment and self-sufficiency); στέργειν (stergein), "cherish", which stands beside "welcome" at 6.44.1 (see Contentment and self-sufficiency); ἀγανακτεῖν, "be indignant", and χαλεπαίνειν (chalepainein), "be exasperated" (see Anger); and μέμφεσθαι (memphesthai), "blame" (see Fault and ignorance).

Greek forms and English renderings

Taking ill and taking gladly what happens · Meditations

δυσχεραίνειν, dyscherainein, "resent", "be resentful"; ἀντιδυσχεραίνειν, antidyscherainein, "resenting in return"; δυσχεραντικός, dyscherantikos, "short-tempered"; δυσχερῶς, dyscherōs, "with reluctance"; ἀσπάζεσθαι, aspazesthai, "welcome"; ἀρέσκεσθαι, areskesthai, "be pleased"; ἀρέσκειν, areskein, "please"; ἀρεστός, arestos, "pleasing"; ἀρέσκεια, areskeia, "the wish to please"; ἀρεσκεύεσθαι, areskeuesthai, "curry favour", "court … favour"; ἀρεσκευτικός, areskeutikos, "eagerness to please"; δέχεσθαι, dechesthai, "receive"; ἀποδέχεσθαι, apodechesthai, "accept"; ἀπόδεξις, apodexis, "acceptance"; προσίεσθαι, prosiesthai, "admit"

Epictetus and the Stoics

Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, has the thought, but Marcus' two words only in other senses. In the Discourses ἀσπάζεσθαι is mostly the word of greeting, as when a man sent to pay his respects to someone answers that he will, but not abjectly;2 δυσχεραίνειν stands once in the Handbook, of showing displeasure at foul talk by silence, a blush and a frown;3 and for taking ill what happens Epictetus says δυσαρεστεῖν (dysarestein), "be discontented", and ἀγανακτεῖν (aganaktein), "be indignant". The discourse that bears the title "On being well pleased", περὶ εὐαρεστήσεως (peri euarestēseōs), sets out the doctrine. The good and excellent man has placed his own mind under the governor of the whole, as good citizens place theirs under the law of the city. Education is learning to want each thing in the way it comes to be, and things come to be as their ordainer arranged them; one must come to education not to alter the conditions of our life, which is neither granted us nor better, but so that, with things about us standing as they stand and as they were made, we may keep our own mind fitted to what happens. Alone, a man should call it peace and freedom, and among many not a mob but a festival, "and so take everything in with good pleasure", εὐαρέστως δέχεσθαι (euarestōs dechesthai); those who will not accept are punished by being what they are.4 Marcus' citizen who welcomes whatever the city allots (10.6.2) can be read beside Epictetus' good citizens, and his good man "fitted without constraint to his own lot" (3.16.2; see Fate and allotment) beside the mind fitted to what happens. Seneca, the Roman Stoic of the first century, gives the equipment against fortune in commands: a man is to be indignant at nothing that happens to him, and to know that the very things by which he seems to be hurt are among those that complete the course and the duties of the world; "let whatever has pleased God please man".5 He asks Lucilius, his correspondent, whether he is still indignant and complaining, and does not understand that there is nothing bad in such things but this one, that he is indignant and complains; such things, he says, are decreed, not chance, and he himself does not obey God but assents to him, following him willingly, not of necessity: "nothing that befalls me shall I ever receive sadly, nothing with a sour look".6 Seneca's placeat, "let it please", and his excipiam, "I shall receive", can be read as Marcus' ἀρέσκεσθαι and δέχεσθαι in Latin.

ἀντιδυσχεραίνω

Attested: ἀντιδυσχεραίνοντα (antidyscherainonta; 6.26). To resent in return. Every duty is to be brought to its end "without being disturbed or resenting in return those who resent" (6.26; see Duty and fitting action). Lemma: ἀντιδυσχεραίνω.

ἀπόδεξις

Attested: ἀπόδεξιν (apodexin; 10.8.1). Acceptance, approval. The name "consenting" was to signify "the willing acceptance of what is allotted by the common nature" (10.8.1; see Wisdom and discernment). Lemma: ἀπόδεξις.

ἀποδέχομαι

Attested: ἀποδέχου (apodechou; 9.28). To accept, to take as one's own. "And either the understanding of the whole has an impulse towards each thing; and if this is so, accept the object of its impulse" (9.28; see Impulse). Lemma: ἀποδέχομαι.

ἀρέσκεια

Attested: ἀρέσκειαν (areskeian; 5.18). The wish to please, obsequiousness. "It is a terrible thing, then, that ignorance and the wish to please should be stronger than wisdom" (5.18; see Courage and endurance). Lemma: ἀρέσκεια.

ἀρεσκεύομαι

Attested: ἀρεσκεύεσθαι (areskeuesthai; 5.5), ἀρεσκεύονται (areskeuontai; 11.14). To make oneself agreeable, to court favour. Marcus asks whether, for want of talent, he is compelled "to grumble, to be stingy, to flatter, to blame the poor body, to curry favour" (5.5); "Despising one another they court one another's favour" (11.14). Lemma: ἀρεσκεύομαι.

ἀρεσκευτικός

Attested: ἀρεσκευτικόν (areskeutikon; 1.16.3). Given to courting favour; with the article, eagerness to please. In Antoninus Pius, his adoptive father, "towards men no courting of the people, no eagerness to please, no playing to the crowd" (1.16.3; see Court and office). Lemma: ἀρεσκευτικός.

ἀρέσκω

Attested: ἀρέσκονται (areskontai; 3.4.4), ἀρεσκομένου (areskomenou; 4.25), ἀρεσκομένην (areskomenēn; 5.27), ἀρέσκειν (areskein; 6.59, 8.53), ἀρέσκει (areskei; 8.53 twice). To please; in the middle, with the dative, to be pleased with. The good man is "pleased with what is allotted from the whole" (4.25), and he lives with the gods who "continually shows them his own soul pleased with what is allotted" (5.27; see Daimon); those whose praise he discounts "are not even pleased with themselves" (3.4.4), a clause that D, the Darmstadt manuscript, omits; "Do you want to please a man who does not please himself?" (8.53). Lemma: ἀρέσκω.

ἀρεστός

Attested: ἀρεστόν (areston; 6.16.5). Pleasing, acceptable. "But respect and honour for your own understanding will make you pleasing to yourself" (6.16.5; see Self-respect and shame). Lemma: ἀρεστός.

ἀσπάζομαι

Attested: ἀσπαζόμενον (aspazomenon; 3.4.3), ἀσπάζεσθαι (aspazesthai; 3.16.2, 6.44.1), ἀσπαζομένη (aspazomenē; 4.33, 8.7), ἀσπαζόμεθα (aspazometha; 5.8.3), ἀσπάζου (aspazou; 5.8.4), ἀσπαζομένου (aspazomenou; 10.6.2), ἀσπαζόμενοι (aspazomenoi; 10.36). To greet, to embrace; to welcome gladly. The good man is "welcoming with his whole soul all that happens and is allotted to him" (3.4.3); "a disposition that welcomes all that happens as necessary, as familiar, as flowing from such a beginning and spring" (4.33); "but we welcome them in the hope of health" (5.8.3); "welcome everything that comes about, even if it seems rather harsh" (5.8.4). At 10.36 the bystanders at a deathbed are those "who welcome the bad thing that is happening", where Leopold notes in his apparatus that the text would be better without κακόν (kakon), "bad". Lemma: ἀσπάζομαι.

δέχομαι

Attested: δέχηται (dechētai; 2.15), δεχόμενον (dechomenon; 2.17.2, 8.43, 8.57), δέχεται (dechetai; 4.21.2), δεχώμεθα (dechōmetha; 5.8.3), δέξεται (dexetai; 5.12), ἐδέχετο (edecheto; 6.30.3), δεχόμενος (dechomenos; 7.66), δέχομαι (dechomai; 8.23), δέχῃ (dechēi; 11.13), δέχεσθαι (dechesthai; 12.11). To take what is offered, to receive. Of what happens: "receiving what happens and is allotted as coming from there" (2.17.2); "Let us receive these things, then" (5.8.3), where A, the Vatican manuscript, has the indicative δεχόμεθα (dechometha), "we receive"; "I receive it, referring it to the gods" (8.23), words that A omits; "receiving and using each according to worth" (8.43); "to receive all that God deals out to him" (12.11). At 11.13 "and receiving" is Coraes' καὶ δέχῃ (kai dechēi), which Leopold prints; P has οὐ δέχῃ (ou dechēi), "not receiving", and "are doing" before it is the correction of Meric Casaubon, the seventeenth-century English scholar, ποιεῖς (poieis), for P's ποιεῖ (poiei). Elsewhere it is used of a saying received (2.15, 5.12), of the space that receives the bodies consumed as food (4.21.2), of the slanders Antoninus did not receive (6.30.3) and of the solid that receives the sun's ray (8.57). Lemma: δέχομαι.

δυσχεραίνω

Attested: δυσχερᾶναι (dyscheranai; 2.2), δυσχεραίνειν (dyscherainein; 2.16, 10.7.2, 11.18.2), δυσχεραίνοντα (dyscherainonta; 4.3.1), δυσχερανεῖς (dyscheraneis; 4.3.2 twice), δυσχεραίνουσιν (dyscherainousin; 6.26, 7.70), δυσχεραίνεις (dyscheraineis; 6.49), δυσχεραινόμενα (dyscherainomena; 7.64), δυσχεραίνοις (dyscherainois; 8.46), δυσχέραινε (dyscheraine; 10.3 twice), δυσχεραίνοντας (dyscherainontas; 11.9), δυσχεραίνῃ (dyscherainēi; 11.20.2). To find hard to bear, to take ill, to resent. "For to resent anything that happens is to stand apart from nature" (2.16); "For what will you resent? The vice of men? … But will you also resent what is allotted from the whole?" (4.3.2), where both futures are corrections that Leopold prints, the first of Coraes and the second of Schultz, and P has the present δυσχεραίνεις, "do you resent?"; "why would you resent it?" (8.46); "do not resent it" (10.3, twice); "whenever the ruling centre resents anything that happens, then too it leaves its own place" (11.20.2). Lemma: δυσχεραίνω.

δυσχεραντικός

Attested: δυσχεραντικόν (dyscherantikon; 1.8.2). Given to taking things ill, short-tempered. Among the lessons of Apollonius, "and in explanation not short-tempered" (1.8.2). Lemma: δυσχεραντικός.

δυσχερής

Attested: δυσχερῶς (dyscherōs; 8.12). Hard to handle, troublesome; the adverb, with difficulty, reluctantly. "When you are roused from sleep with reluctance, remind yourself that it accords with your constitution and with human nature to render social actions" (8.12; see Human work). Lemma: δυσχερής.

προσίημι

Attested: προσίεσο (prosieso; 10.2). In the middle, to let come to oneself, to admit. Of what one's nature as governed by nature alone seeks: "then do it and admit it, if your nature as a living being is not going to be put in a worse condition" (10.2; see Nature). Lemma: προσίημι.

Source note

1. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 7.116.

2. Epictetus, Discourses 2.6.6; the noun ἀσπασμοί (aspasmoi), "greetings", at 4.4.37.

3. Epictetus, Handbook 33.16.

4. Epictetus, Discourses 1.12 (title), 1.12.7, 1.12.15, 1.12.17 and 1.12.21–22; δυσαρεστεῖν and ἀγανακτεῖν stand together at 1.12.25.

5. Seneca, Letters to Lucilius 74.20.

6. Seneca, Letters to Lucilius 96.1–2.