From the book
Meditations
Marcus Aurelius · Diotimos Editions · 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordἘνέργεια, from ἔργον (ergon), "work", is being at work, activity; πρᾶξις, from πράσσειν, "to do", is an action, a thing done. Τὸ παρόν, "what is at hand", is the present.
- In the MeditationsThe good and the bad of a rational being lie "not in being acted upon but in activity" (9.16), and of its own acts the understanding is concerned only with the present (6.32). Marcus will give himself leisure "if you do each act as the last of your life" (2.5); dying too "is one of the actions of life" (6.2); and what he prays for he can have now, if he leaves the past behind, entrusts the future to providence and directs the present alone towards holiness and justice (12.1.1).
- In this editionἘνέργεια is always "activity", and πρᾶξις "action", twice "act" and once "deeds"; ἐνεργεῖν and πράσσειν are "do" or "act"; τὸ παρόν is "the present", once "the work in hand" (3.12).
- A place to read6.2, where Marcus counts dying among the actions of life and asks only "to settle the present well".
Meaning
Ἐνέργεια (energeia), from ἐν (en), "in", and ἔργον (ergon), "work", is being at work, a power used and not merely had; the verb ἐνεργεῖν (energein) is to be at work, to act, and ἐνέργημα (energēma) an act done. Πρᾶξις (praxis) is the noun of πράσσειν (prassein), "to do", "to bring about": an action. Marcus sets ἐνέργεια against πεῖσις (peisis), "being acted upon" (6.51, 9.16; see Pain and pleasure), and uses his two words of acting almost as one: in "do each act" at 2.5 the verb is ἐνεργῇς (energēis) and the noun πρᾶξιν (praxin). Τὸ παρόν (to paron), "what is at hand", is the present (see Time and eternity), and at 3.12 the edition renders it "the work in hand". Τέλος (telos), the end, is what every act is to be referred to (2.16, 9.23, 12.20).
Use in the book
A man's good lies in what he does. "The lover of fame forms the opinion that his own good is another's activity; the lover of pleasure, his own being acted upon; the man who has a mind, his own action" (6.51). Of the three, only the last places his good in what he does himself. Reluctant to get up at first light, Marcus asks whether he has come to be "for feeling pleasure, and in a word, you, for being acted upon, or for activity" (5.1.1), where J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, has the "you" of P. Fournier, who edited Auguste Couat's French translation of the Meditations (1904), for the manuscripts' "not"; and the good and the bad of the rational living being lie "not in being acted upon but in activity" (9.16; see Virtue and excellence). Another's activity is another's affair: "He has his own disposition, his own activity. I have now what the common nature wants me to have now, and I do what my nature wants me to do now" (5.25).
Activity can be read as happening only now: the understanding's own acts are in its power, and of these it is concerned only with the present, since its future and past acts already make no difference (6.32; see Time and eternity). Marcus' rule for acting is a rule for the hour: "Every hour, set your mind firmly, as a Roman and a male, on doing what is in hand with exact and unaffected dignity, affection, freedom and justness, and on giving yourself leisure from all other impressions. And you will give yourself it if you do each act as the last of your life, free of all aimlessness, of passionate turning away from the dictate of reason, of pretence, of self-love, and of discontent with what has been apportioned to you" (2.5). The leisure is from other impressions, and it comes from the act itself, done as if it were the last. Leopold prints the correction of H. I. Polak, whose notes on the text appeared in Hermes in 1886, so that it is Marcus who is "free" of aimlessness and the rest; in the manuscripts the word agrees with the act.
Death is no exception. "Let it make no difference to you whether you do what is seemly cold or warm, drowsy or with enough sleep, ill spoken of or well spoken of, dying or doing something else; for this too, by which we die, is one of the actions of life; it is enough, then, here too to settle the present well" (6.2). Cold, sleep, repute and dying are circumstances of an act, not its measure, and the rule for dying is the rule for every hour.
The present also holds what he prays for. "All those things which you pray to reach by a roundabout way you can have now, if you do not begrudge yourself" (12.1.1). The condition follows: to leave the past behind, entrust the future to providence, and direct the present alone towards holiness, so that he loves what is allotted, and towards justice, so that he says what is true and does what accords with law and with worth (12.1.1; see Justice). If, near the exit, he leaves all else behind, honours only his ruling centre and the divine in him and fears never having begun to live according to nature, he will cease, the chapter ends, "hanging on this and that" (12.1.2; see Death).
A life is made of such acts. "One must compose life action by action, and be content if each, so far as possible, provides its own" (8.32; see Obstacle and reservation), and life is "the system made up of all actions" (12.23; see Change). Each act is whole: the rational soul attains its end wherever life is cut short, "not as in a dance or in acting and the like, where the whole action is left incomplete if something cuts it short" (11.1.1; see Soul). The rest Marcus allows himself lies in the passage from act to act: "Take delight and rest in one thing: passing from one social action to another social action, with remembrance of God" (6.7). So too in Book XII: "What remains but to enjoy life, joining one good thing to another, so as to leave not even the briefest interval?" (12.29).
Each present act has its measure. "At each action question yourself: how does this stand with me? Shall I regret it?", and nothing more is wanted "if the present work is that of an intelligent and social living being, under the same law as God" (8.2). At 9.6 what is "Enough" is all present: opinion, action and disposition. Every action is to "help to complete a civic life", and one without reference to the social end "tears life apart" (9.23; see Kinship and cooperation).
At 7.68 the understanding's "ready use of what is put before it" says to what presents itself that the present is "always material for rational and civic virtue, and in sum for the art of man or God" (see Tranquillity). Marcus' argument can be read as joining two claims, that a man's good lies in his activity and that activity is always now: so the whole of his good is within reach at every hour, and the thought of death, which takes away every future, sharpens the present act instead of emptying it (2.5, 6.2).
Places to read
The passages where activity and action, and acting in the present, are discussed or carry the argument, in the order of the book; every place of ἐνέργεια, ἐνεργεῖν, πρᾶξις, πράσσειν and the other words treated here is given in the sub-entries. Τὸ παρόν has its sub-entry under πάρειμι (pareimi; see Time and eternity).
- 2.5GreekEvery hour Marcus is to set his mind on doing what is in hand with dignity, affection, freedom and justness, and he will give himself leisure from all other impressions if he does each act as the last of his life.
- 2.16GreekThe soul does violence to itself when it lets any act or impulse go at no target and does whatever it does at random, when even the smallest things ought to be done with reference to the end.
- 3.12GreekIf Marcus does the work in hand following right reason, keeps his daimon pure and is content with present activity according to nature and with heroic truth, he will live well (see Daimon).
- 3.14GreekMarcus is not going to read his little notebooks, the deeds of the ancient Romans and Greeks or the extracts he was laying aside for old age; he is to hurry to the end and come to his own help, if he cares for himself at all, while it is open to him.
- 4.2GreekNo act is to be done at random, nor otherwise than according to a doctrine that completes the art.
- 4.24GreekAgainst the saying of Democritus, the atomist philosopher of the fifth century BC, "Do little", Marcus asks whether it is not better to do what is necessary and what the reason of a living being civic by nature requires; unnecessary actions are to be taken away with unnecessary impressions (see Tranquillity).
- 4.51GreekThe short road is the one according to nature, so as to say and do everything in the soundest way, and it frees one from toils and from all management and pretentiousness.
- 5.1.1GreekReluctant to get up, Marcus is to have ready the thought that he is rising to do the work of a man, and asks whether he has come to be for feeling pleasure or for activity.
- 5.25GreekAnother who does wrong has his own disposition and his own activity; Marcus has now what the common nature wants him to have now, and does what his own nature wants him to do now.
- 6.2GreekIt is to make no difference to Marcus whether he does what is seemly cold or warm, drowsy or rested, ill or well spoken of, dying or doing something else, for dying too is one of the actions of life, and it is enough here too to settle the present well.
- 6.7GreekMarcus is to take delight and rest in one thing: passing from one social action to another, with remembrance of God.
- 6.32GreekThe understanding's own acts are in its power, and of these it is concerned only with the present, for its future and past acts already make no difference (see Time and eternity).
- 6.51GreekThe lover of fame takes his own good to be another's activity, the lover of pleasure his own being acted upon, the man who has a mind his own action.
- 7.54GreekIt is always in Marcus' power to be piously well pleased with the present conjuncture, to behave justly towards the men present, and to work with art upon the present impression.
- 7.68GreekUse says to what presents itself that the present is always material for rational and civic virtue (see Tranquillity).
- 7.69GreekThe perfection of character is to pass each day as the last (see Simplicity and sincerity).
- 8.2GreekAt each action Marcus is to ask himself how it stands with him and whether he will regret it; soon he will be dead, and nothing more is wanted if the present work is that of an intelligent and social living being.
- 8.12GreekWhen roused from sleep with reluctance, Marcus is to remind himself that rendering social actions accords with his constitution, while sleep is common to the irrational living beings.
- 8.32GreekLife is to be composed action by action, each providing its own so far as possible; and when something active is prevented, another action at once takes its place, by being well pleased with the hindrance and passing over fair-mindedly to what is given (see Obstacle and reservation).
- 9.6GreekEnough: the present opinion firmly grasping, the present action social, the present disposition well pleased with what happens.
- 9.16GreekThe bad and the good of the rational living being, like its virtue and vice, lie not in being acted upon but in activity (see Virtue and excellence).
- 9.23GreekEvery action is to help to complete a civic life, and an action without reference to the social end tears life apart (see Kinship and cooperation).
- 9.41GreekMarcus is to be intent only on what is being done now and on the instrument through which he does it (see Philosophy).
- 10.11GreekThe man who has put off the body is content with two things, acting justly in what is now being done and loving what is now allotted to him (see Contentment and self-sufficiency).
- 10.33.1GreekWhatever in the material at hand can be done or said in the soundest way it is open to Marcus to do or say, and everything one can enact according to one's own nature is to be held an enjoyment (see Obstacle and reservation).
- 11.1.1GreekThe rational soul attains its end wherever life is cut short, not as in a dance or in acting, where the whole action is left incomplete (see Soul).
- 12.1.1GreekMarcus can have now all that he prays to reach by a roundabout way, if he does not begrudge himself: if he leaves the past behind, entrusts the future to providence and directs the present alone towards holiness and justice.
- 12.1.2GreekIf near the exit Marcus leaves all else behind, honours only his ruling centre and the divine in him, and fears never having begun to live according to nature, he will cease hanging on this and that (see Death).
- 12.23GreekA single activity that ceases in due time suffers nothing bad, and neither does life, the system made up of all actions (see Change).
- 12.29GreekThe preservation of life is to see each thing through and through and with the whole soul to do what is just and say what is true; Marcus asks what remains but to enjoy life, joining one good thing to another without leaving the briefest interval.
Translation in this edition
Ἐνέργεια is "activity" at all twenty of its occurrences, "activities" in the plural (5.23, 6.59, 9.3.1), and "activity" renders no other word but the verb at 10.9. Ἐνεργεῖν is "do" (2.5, 2.16, 3.7 twice, 3.12, 3.16.2, 4.2, 8.47 four times, 9.31, 9.42.4) and "act" (3.5, 5.6.2, 8.45, 12.24), and by sense "carry out" (7.7), "bring about" (6.55, 10.11), "enact" (10.33.1), "is in activity" (10.9) and, for the participle, "the doer" (8.47). Ἐνέργημα is "act" (4.2, 6.32 three times) and "workings" (9.3.1), and ἐνεργητικός "the man of action" (1.7.1) and "active" (8.32). Πρᾶξις is "action" at forty-three of its forty-six occurrences, "act" at 2.5 and 2.16 and "deeds" at 3.14. "Action" renders also κατόρθωσις (katorthōsis) in "right actions" (5.14; see Virtue and excellence), ἐνεργητικός in "the man of action" (1.7.1), δικαιοπράγημα (dikaiopragēma) in "just actions" (11.20.2; see Justice) and, at 9.31, the infinitive of πράσσειν. Πράσσειν is "do", and "act" at six places (3.6.1, 5.9, 5.34, 6.21, 6.50, 7.44); εὖ (eu) and καλῶς (kalōs) πράττειν (prattein) are "do well" (3.13, 4.24, 7.36), οὐ κακῶς πράττει (ou kakōs prattei) "did without ill intent" (1.15.2), the articular infinitive τὸ κοινωνικῶς πρᾶξαι (to koinōnikōs praxai) "the social action itself" (9.31), and Democritus' Ionic πρῆσσε (prēsse) "Do little" (4.24). At 8.32 "acting justly" supplies a verb that Leopold's text lacks, as Samuel Friedrich Nathanael Morus, the eighteenth-century German scholar who edited the Meditations at Leipzig, proposed. Πρακτέος is "what must be done" (3.15), "what is to be done" and "is to do" (7.55); πρακτικός is "the practical side" (10.9) and, with φιλοσόφως (philosophōs), "act as philosophers" (9.29). Τέλος is "end" at all thirteen of its occurrences, kept apart from "target", σκοπός (skopos; see Impulse), and from "outcome", ἀποτέλεσμα (apotelesma; 6.42; see Kinship and cooperation). Τὸ παρόν is "the present", and at 3.12 "the work in hand"; ἀντιπράσσειν (antiprassein) is "work against" (2.1). "Dawdling" at 4.51 is στραγγεία (strangeia), the correction of Stephanus and of G. H. Rendall, the English translator of the Meditations, which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts' στρατεία (strateia), "soldiering".
Greek forms and English renderings
Doing what is in hand, now · Meditations
ἐνέργεια, energeia, "activity"; ἐνεργεῖν, energein, "do", "act", "carry out", "bring about", "enact", "be in activity", "the doer"; ἐνέργημα, energēma, "act", "workings"; ἐνεργητικός, energētikos, "the man of action", "active"; πρᾶξις, praxis, "action", "act", "deeds"; πράσσειν, prassein, "do", "act"; πρακτέος, prakteos, "what must be done", "what is to be done", "is to do"; πρακτικός, praktikos, "the practical side", "act"; τέλος, telos, "end"; τὸ παρόν, to paron, "the present", "the work in hand"
Epictetus and the Stoics
Diogenes Laertius, whose Lives of the Philosophers, of the third century AD, sets out the Stoics' teaching in its seventh book, reports that they called duty an activity, ἐνέργημα, proper to constitutions that accord with nature (see Duty and fitting action).1 Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, held his hearers to their activity and not its results. He asks to be shown a single man who cares how he does something and turns his attention "not to getting something but to his own activity", and asks who, walking, attends to the activity itself, or, deliberating, to the deliberation and not to what it may win; why, then, he asks, do we wonder that we are practised in our materials but in our activities mean, unseemly, worthless, cowardly, slack and failures through and through?2 Nor will he let the hour be put off. In the Handbook he asks how long his hearer will wait before thinking himself worthy of the best things: he is no longer a youth, and if he now fixes one day after another for attending to himself, he will live and die a layman without noticing it; whenever anything toilsome or pleasant, glorious or inglorious, comes before him, let him remember that "now is the contest, and the Olympic games are already here", that it is no longer possible to put it off, and that progress is lost or kept "by one day and one thing".3 Seneca, the Roman Stoic and adviser of Nero, states a rule that can be read beside 2.5 and 7.69: "every day must be so ordered as if it closed the column and completed and filled out life". His aim is that one day should count for him as a whole life; he does not seize the day as his last, but regards it as one that might be. Life's worst fault, he writes, is that it is never complete and some part of it is always put off; whoever sets the last touch on his life each day has no need of time, for a man hangs on the future when his present comes to nothing; and he bids Lucilius, the friend to whom the letters are written, count each day a separate life.4 Marcus' man who will cease "hanging on this and that" (12.1.2) can be read beside him.
Other ancient sources
Aristotle, the philosopher of the fourth century BC, argued in the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics that if the work of man is "an activity of soul according to reason, or not without reason", the human good is "activity of the soul in keeping with virtue", and in a complete life besides, "for a single swallow does not bring the spring, nor does a single day; no more does one day, or a little time, make a man blessed and happy".5 Marcus' rational soul, by contrast, "attains its own end wherever the term of life comes upon it" (11.1.1; see Soul), and of using things with greatness of mind and men socially "even three hours like that are enough" (6.23; see Time and eternity). Where Aristotle needs a whole life, Marcus' act can be read as complete at every point, and this as the ground of 2.5 and 6.2.
ἐνέργεια
Attested: ἐνέργειαν (energeian; 3.4.3, 5.1.1, 5.25, 6.51), ἐνεργείᾳ (energeiāi; 3.12, 8.22, 9.16 twice), ἐνεργείας (energeias; 4.10, 5.20, 7.53, 8.7, 9.21), ἐνέργεια (energeia; 5.20, 5.35, 8.16, 12.23), ἐνέργειαι (energeiai; 5.23), ἐνεργειῶν (energeiōn; 6.59, 9.3.1). Being at work, activity, as against being acted upon. "Have you come to be … for being acted upon, or for activity?" (5.1.1); "content with present activity according to nature" (3.12); "it is your activity, brought to its end according to your impulse and judgement" (8.16); "Cessation of activity, a stop of impulse, of opinion, and as it were a death: nothing bad" (9.21). At 5.1.1 "you" before "for being acted upon" is the correction of Fournier, which Leopold prints; A, the Vatican manuscript, and D, the Darmstadt manuscript, have "not for being acted upon", and P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, "not for doing". Lemma: ἐνέργεια.
ἐνεργέω
Attested: ἐνεργῇς (energēis; 2.5, 3.12), ἐνεργῇ (energēi; 2.16), ἐνέργει (energei; 3.5), ἐνεργεῖσθαι (energeisthai; 3.7, 8.47, 10.9), ἐνεργήσων (energēsōn; 3.7), ἐνεργοῦντα (energounta; 3.16.2, 9.42.4), ἐνεργείσθω (energeisthō; 4.2), ἐνεργεῖ (energei; 5.6.2), ἐνεργοίην (energoiēn; 6.55), ἐνεργεῖν (energein; 7.7, 10.33.1), ἐνεργοίη (energoiē; 8.45), ἐνεργεῖς (energeis; 8.47 twice), ἐνεργουμένου (energoumenou; 8.47), ἐνεργῶν (energōn; 8.47), ἐνεργουμένοις (energoumenois; 9.31), ἐνεργούμενα (energoumena; 10.11), ἐνήργησεν (enērgēsen; 12.24). To be at work, to act, to do; in the passive, to be done. "Do not act unwillingly, or unsocially" (3.5); "it is set before you to carry out what falls to you" (7.7); "why do you not rather do it than be distressed?" (8.47); "everything is an enjoyment which it is open to one to enact according to one's own nature" (10.33.1). At 6.55 the first person ἐνεργοίην, "I myself might bring about", is the correction of Herbert Richards, whose notes on Marcus Aurelius appeared in the Classical Review in 1905, which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts' ἐνεργοίη. Lemma: ἐνεργέω.
ἐνέργημα
Attested: ἐνέργημα (energēma; 4.2), ἐνεργήματα (energēmata; 6.32 three times, 9.3.1). An act done, a working. "Let no act be done at random" (4.2); "to the understanding, the things that make no difference are those that are not its own acts" (6.32); of the body, "the other natural workings that the seasons of life bring" (9.3.1). Lemma: ἐνέργημα.
ἐνεργητικός
Attested: ἐνεργητικόν (energētikon; 1.7.1, 8.32). Active, given to action. From Rusticus, the Stoic, Marcus learned not to parade himself "as the man of discipline or the man of action" (1.7.1); "but something else active, perhaps, will be prevented" (8.32). Lemma: ἐνεργητικός.
πρακτέος
Attested: πρακτέα (praktea; 3.15), πρακτέων (prakteōn; 7.55), πρακτέον (prakteon; 7.55). That must be done. Men do not know how many things are meant by "seeing what must be done" (3.15); nature guides Marcus "through what is to be done by you. And each is to do what follows from the constitution" (7.55). Lemma: πρακτέος.
πρακτικός
Attested: πρακτικά (praktika; 9.29), πρακτικόν (praktikon; 10.9). Of action, practical. Marcus scorns the "civic little men who, as he thinks, act as philosophers" (9.29; see Philosophy); "one must see and do everything so that at once the practical side is accomplished, and at once the observing side is in activity" (10.9), where πρακτικόν is the correction of Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century, which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts' περιστατικόν (peristatikon). Lemma: πρακτικός.
πρᾶξις
Attested: πρᾶξιν (praxin; 2.5, 2.16, 4.32.2, 6.7, 6.51, 8.2, 8.32, 12.23), πράξεων (praxeōn; 2.7, 6.2, 6.30.3, 10.6.2, 12.8, 12.23), πράξεις (praxeis; 3.14, 4.24 twice, 4.33, 5.1.3, 5.14, 5.36, 6.30.1, 8.1, 8.12, 11.18.3, 11.21, 12.35), πράξει (praxei; 4.25, 5.34), πράξεσιν (praxesin; 5.1.2, 8.51), πράξεως (praxeōs; 6.7, 9.42.4, 11.9 three times, 11.18.3), πρᾶξις (praxis; 7.11, 7.58, 7.74, 8.32, 9.6, 9.23 twice, 9.31, 11.1.1). An action, a thing done. "the man who has a mind, his own action" (6.51); "passing from one social action to another social action" (6.7); "At each action question yourself" (8.2); life is "the system made up of all actions" (12.23). At 9.6 A and D lack "opinion, firmly grasping, and the present", so that they read only the present action and the present disposition; at 9.23 D lacks the second πρᾶξίς σου (praxis sou), "action of yours". Lemma: πρᾶξις.
πράσσω
Attested: πράττοι (prattoi; 1.15.2), πράττει (prattei; 1.15.2, 7.44), πράσσων (prassōn; 1.16.6, 8.34, 11.13), πραχθῆναι (prachthēnai; 1.16.7, 1.17.3, 10.12, 10.33.1), πραχθεῖσιν (prachtheisin; 1.16.7), ἔπραξα (epraxa; 1.17.1), πράξειν (praxein; 1.17.5), πρᾶξαι (praxai; 1.17.7, 2.10, 4.12, 9.31, 10.33.1), πράσσειν (prassein; 2.5, 2.9, 4.24 three times, 4.51, 5.9, 5.10.2, 5.25, 5.34, 10.9), πράσσει (prassei; 3.4.1, 3.4.3, 4.40, 8.53, 9.42.3), πράσσοντα (prassonta; 3.6.1), πράξεις (praxeis; 3.13, 6.23), ἔπραξεν (epraxen; 4.18), πρῆσσε (prēsse; 4.24), πράσσομεν (prassomen; 4.24, 6.44.2), πεπρᾶχθαι (peprachthai; 5.3), πράξῃ (praxēi; 5.6.1, 9.42.4), πράσσω (prassō; 5.25, 6.21, 7.5, 8.23 twice), πράττων (prattōn; 6.2), πρασσομένων (prassomenōn; 6.30.2), πράσσωμεν (prassōmen; 6.44.2), πρᾶττε (pratte; 6.50), πράττειν (prattein; 7.36), πράττῃ (prattēi; 7.44), πράσσεις (prasseis; 7.58, 9.41), πρᾶξον (praxon; 8.5), πρασσομένῳ (prassomenōi; 9.41), ἔπραξας (epraxas; 9.42.4), πράξω (praxō; 10.6.2, 10.35), πράξας (praxas; 10.8.3, 12.23), πράξει (praxei; 10.11), πρασσόμενον (prassomenon; 10.11), πρασσομένου (prassomenou; 10.37), πράσσῃς (prassēis; 12.1.1), πράξῃς (praxēis; 12.17). To do, to act, to bring about. "I do what my nature wants me to do now" (5.25); "Be intent only on what is being done now and on the instrument through which you do it" (9.41); "If it is not a duty, do not do it" (12.17), where A has πράξεις. Lemma: πράσσω.
τέλος
Attested: τέλος (telos; 2.16 twice, 3.14, 3.16.2, 5.14, 5.15, 5.16 twice, 5.32, 9.23, 12.20), τέλους (telous; 5.15, 11.1.1). End, that for which a thing is made and to which its acts are referred. "the end of rational living beings is to follow the reason and law of the most venerable city and commonwealth" (2.16; see Citizenship); "towards which it is carried, in that lies its end" (5.16); "to make the leading back to nothing other than the social end" (12.20); the rational soul "attains its own end wherever the term of life comes upon it" (11.1.1; see Soul). Lemma: τέλος.
Source note
1. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 7.108.
2. Epictetus, Discourses 2.16.15–18.
3. Epictetus, Handbook 51.1–2.
4. Seneca, Letters to Lucilius 12.8, 61.1 and 101.8–10.
5. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.7, 1098a7–8 and 1098a16–20.