Sameness and difference

Use in the book

At 163a–b Critias denies that making and doing are the same, thus resisting an inference based on treating them alike. Socrates permits his vocabulary provided the application is clear. At 165e Critias objects that different knowledges are not uniformly alike in having tangible products. Socrates accepts the difference but asks for a common structure of being knowledge of something other than itself (166a–b2).

Critias locates temperance's uniqueness at precisely that point: the other knowledges know other things, whereas this one knows itself and them (166b–c). At 169e–170a another identity claim is challenged. Critias says knowing oneself and knowing what one knows and does not know are the same; Socrates asks why. Apparent verbal proximity has not established equivalence.

The dialogue thus uses sameness and difference at several levels: meanings of verbs, structure of expertise, identity of the knower and object, and equivalence of definitions. It supplies no separate theory of the Forms Same and Different. The local comparisons are demanding enough without importing one.

Places to read

1. 163a–bMaking and doing denied to be identical
2. 165e–166c2Likeness and difference among knowledges
3. 169e–170bClaimed equivalence of forms of self-knowledge questioned

Translation in this edition

“Other” may indicate another object, another expertise or an alternative account. The edition’s contextual nouns often make these references clear; they should be preserved when quoting a short phrase whose Greek pronoun alone could be ambiguous.

ἄλλος

Attested: ἄλλο (allo). Other or different; distinguishes making from doing and a knowledge from the object it knows. References: 166a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἄλλος. See Same and different.

διαφέρω

Attested: διαφέροντες / διαφέρειν / διαφέρει (diapherontes / diapherein / diapherei). To excel or stand out, in wisdom, beauty or character; to make a difference in identifying a statement’s speaker; and to differ, when Critias distinguishes temperance from other forms of knowledge. References: 153d, 157d, 161c, 166b. Lexical identification: lemma: διαφέρω. See Same and different.

ἕτερος

Attested: ἕτερον / ἑτέρα (heteron / hetera). Other or different; distinguishes a knowledge from its object or one field of knowledge from another. References: 166b, 171a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἕτερος. See Same and different.

ὅμοιος

Attested: ὁμοία / ὁμοίων / ὅμοιος (homoia / homoiōn / homoios). Similar or alike; Critias denies that temperance or the other knowledges should all be treated as alike. References: 165e, 170a. Lexical identification: lemma: ὅμοιος. See Same and different.

ὁμοιότης

Attested: ὁμοιότητά (homoiotēta). Similarity or likeness; Critias accuses Socrates of seeking a similarity to other knowledges where temperance differs from them. References: 166b. Lexical identification: lemma: ὁμοιότης. See Same and different.

ὁμοίως

Attested: ὁμοίως (homoiōs). Equally or alike; asks whether all the omniscient person’s knowledges contribute equally to happiness. References: 174a. Lexical identification: lemma: ὁμοίως. See Same and different.

ταὐτόν

Attested: ταὐτόν / ταὐτὸν (tauton / tauton). The same; crasis of τὸ αὐτό, used in identifying things or questioning whether two accounts coincide. References: 170a. Lexical identification: crasis: τὸ αὐτό; pronoun lemma: αὐτός. See Same and different.

Use in the book

At 230a–b Socrates obtains the companion’s agreement that good and bad food are equally food. He expands the claim to drink and other things, then to decent and base human beings. Neither person is more or less human because of moral character. The point is classificatory: differences in goodness do not, in these examples, produce degrees of membership in the relevant kind.

The same reasoning is applied to decent and base gain at 230c. At that stage the claim has a clear conditional force. If both really are gains, the bad one does not cease to count as gain simply because it is bad. This use of sameness preserves the companion’s preferred distinction rather than refuting it. It allows Socrates to ask what common description makes the two gains.

Before asking that question, however, Socrates concludes that the possessor of decent gain gains no more than the possessor of base gain. Sameness of classification is now made to support sameness in the action or outcome of gaining. That does not follow without an additional restriction: two portions can be equally food while one supplies more food or nourishment, and two profits can equally be profits while differing in size. The qualifiers that made the earlier claim reasonable do not automatically carry across to every use of “more.”

The next question partly repairs the focus by asking “What do you see in both that is the same?” The inquiry can proceed without endorsing equality in amount. A charitable reading treats “gains no more” as meaning “is no more genuinely a case of gaining”; a critical reading hears an equivocation that the later expenditure calculations expose. The Greek and the edition leave that pressure visible. An article should identify the change of respect rather than simply call every occurrence of “equally” mathematical equality.

Places to read

1. 230bκατὰ τὸ σιτίον εἶναι — Sameness is expressly limited to being food.
2. 230b–c2ᾗ τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν — The claim concerns the respect in which something is the same.
3. 230cκέρδος γε ὁμοίως ἐστὶ — Both proposed kinds are equally gain.
4. 230dτί ταὐτὸν ἐν ἀμφοτέροις ὁρῶν — The definition must identify what is common to both.

Translation in this edition

The edition renders ὁμοίως as “equally” throughout the food-and-gain analogy. That consistency exposes the inferential transition; it should not be taken as an editorial guarantee that every occurrence means equality of quantity. The text’s own limiting phrases remain essential to interpreting the repeated word.

Use in the book

The gold and stone comparison introduces sameness in a specified respect (313a–b). Stones may differ in weight or shape, but they do not differ insofar as each is stone. Socrates applies that form to law: each law is equally law, not one more than another. The premise establishes the intended level of definition. It does not yet say that every law commands the same behavior.

The companion's objection concerns a different sameness. If law discovers what is, why do people not always use the same laws about the same things? (315a). His examples compare communities and periods. The recurring phrases “different people different ones” and “different ones at different times” distinguish social distribution from temporal change. The fact that every member of a class is a law does not by itself answer whether their contents conflict.

Socrates' response initially appeals to invariant correct predication: just things are just, greater weights heavier, fine things fine. The next stage introduces knowing subjects, who accept the same things about the same things (316d). Here the two accusative and prepositional expressions have different roles: the same accepted judgments concern the same subject matter. The qualification permits attention to the object known; it is not a claim that medicine, farming, and politics all have identical rules.

At 317b changing rules about the same matters becomes a mark of ignorance. The earlier draughts image suggests that apparent movement may obscure something stable, but does not specify all the conditions under which cases should count as the same. The later distributive examples introduce differentiated recipients: each soil receives the seeds due to it, bodies receive fitting nourishment. Uniform correctness need not mean giving every recipient an undifferentiated ration.

The dialogue's strongest formulation consequently joins stability with fit. A good distributor's practice is right in relation to its objects; genuine knowledge does not alternate arbitrarily on an unchanged matter. Yet the work does not articulate a developed theory of how context changes relevant conditions. Its final question about the soul prevents that absent theory from being assumed already complete.

Places to read

1. 313aδιαφέρει νόμος νόμου κατ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο — Difference is restricted to a specified respect
2. 313bνόμος γὰρ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐστιν ὁμοίως — Each is equally law
3. 313bοὐχ ὁ μὲν μᾶλλον, ὁ δ’ ἧττον — Degrees of being law are excluded in the opening comparison
4. 315aτοῖς αὐτοῖς νόμοις χρώμεθα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν — The objection concerns the same laws about the same things
5. 315bἄλλοτε ἄλλοις; ἄλλοι ἄλλοις — Difference over times and among people
6. 316dταὐτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν νομίζουσιν — The later claim about knowledgeable judgment
7. 317dτὰ ἄξια σπέρματα ἑκάστῃ γῇ διανέμει — Right allocation distinguishes the needs of different soils

Translation in this edition

“Same,” “different,” and “equally” are retained where they carry the argument. Tauta without an accent may resemble the transliteration of ταῦτα, “these things”; the Greek distinguishes ταὐτά, “the same things,” from ταῦτα. The draughts sentence brings both into close proximity.

Always — ἀεί (aei)

ἀεί (aei)

Always. The temporal invariance challenged by the companion and later attributed to knowledgeable judgment. Attested: ἀεὶ (315a). Sameness, difference, and the same subject.

Differ — διαφέρειν (diapherein)

διαφέρειν (diapherein)

Differ. Differ in the specified respect of being law, not necessarily in every feature or command. Attested: διαφέρει (313a). Sameness, difference, and the same subject.

Equally — ὁμοίως (homoiōs)

ὁμοίως (homoiōs)

Equally. Each law is equally law in Socrates' opening comparison. Attested: ὁμοίως (313b). Sameness, difference, and the same subject.

Gold — χρυσός (chrysos)

χρυσός (chrysos)

Gold. One of the material examples showing how instances can share what they are despite other differences. Attested: χρυσός (313a). Sameness, difference, and the same subject.

Less — ἧττον (hētton)

ἧττον (hētton)

Less. The contrary degree likewise excluded from being law in the opening comparison. Attested: ἧττον (313b). Sameness, difference, and the same subject.

More — μᾶλλον (mallon)

μᾶλλον (mallon)

More. Socrates excludes one instance's being more law than another in the respect being defined. Attested: μᾶλλον (313b). Sameness, difference, and the same subject.

The same thing — τὸ αὐτό (to auto)

τὸ αὐτό (to auto)

The same thing. The common character of laws insofar as each is law; not yet sameness of every rule's content. Attested: ταὐτόν (313b). Sameness, difference, and the same subject.

The same things — τὸ αὐτό (to auto)

τὸ αὐτό (to auto)

The same things. What Socrates says the apparently shuffled things remain. Attested: ταὐτά (316c). Sameness, difference, and the same subject.

Stone — λίθος (lithos)

λίθος (lithos)

Stone. The second material example for sameness in the respect under definition. Attested: λίθος (313b). Sameness, difference, and the same subject.

In respect of being law (contextual phrase)

313a: κατὰ τὸ νόμος εἶναι. The preposition with the articular infinitive specifies a respect under which things are compared. Laws need not have identical contents or histories to be alike “in being law.” The gold and stone examples depend on that restriction. Removing it would make Socrates assert an indiscriminate sameness that the words do not require. See Sameness and difference.

Use in the book

The inquiry into loving begins with “does it make no difference?” whether the friend is lover or beloved. Menexenus’ initial “no difference” licenses a test that shows how consequential the direction of affection can be.

At 222b Socrates asks whether the akin differs in any way from the like. Here a genuine difference is required if the new proposal is to avoid an earlier objection. The verb thus frames both an initially neglected distinction and a final distinction that has not yet been secured.

Places to read

1. 222bΕἰ μέν τι τὸ οἰκεῖον τοῦ ὁμοίου διαφέρει — If the akin differs in some way from the like.
2. 212a–b

Use in the book

The Republic excerpt insists that contrary actions cannot belong to the same thing at the same time, through the same part, and toward the same object. The archer’s two hands explain why apparently opposed movements need not violate this rule. Posidonius considers another problem: an individually qualified being remains itself while its material increases or decreases. Identity across change is not identical with absence of every difference.

Places to read

1. I.49.30.2The qualifications of sameness distinguish contrary psychic impulses.
2. I.20.7.3Individual quality persists through material growth and loss.

Translation in this edition

The qualifications attached to “same” are retained. “Other” and “different” follow whether the passage distinguishes another item or a contrasting character.