Like and unlike

Use in the book

At 214c–d, bad people are described as unlike even themselves, unstable rather than consistently similar. At 215d the rival explanation makes the most dissimilar things friendly because of complementary needs. Unlike does not automatically mean opposite: the argument strengthens dissimilarity into opposition at 215e, and then tests the stronger thesis. The summary of rejected candidates includes the unlike at 222e.

Places to read

1. 214dαὐτὸ αὑτῷ ἀνόμοιον — unlike itself.
2. 214c–d
3. 215d–216b2
4. 222e

Use in the book

At 214a–b a poetic saying and writings about nature support the proposition that like is a friend to like. The first test concerns bad persons: their harmful conduct and instability undermine the general claim. A charitable reinterpretation limits genuine likeness and friendship to the good (214c–d).

The next objection explicitly asks about likeness insofar as it is likeness. What benefit can one similar thing give another that the other cannot give itself? The subsequent difficulty about good persons rests on their supposed sufficiency rather than merely on resemblance (214e–215c2). These qualifications are essential: the argument does not simply announce that friends must have nothing in common.

The word returns at 222b–d when the akin must be distinguished from the like. ὁμοιότης, “likeness”, makes the respect under consideration explicit at 222b. Comparative language such as ὥσπερ, “just as”, and ἔοικε, “it seems/resembles”, is not automatically an occurrence of this lexical family.

Places to read

1. 214eκαθ’ ὅσον ὅμοιος — insofar as [he or it is] like.
2. 214a–215c23
3. 215d–216b2
4. 222b–e

Use in the book

B 22 deliberately includes two kinds of affinity. Sun, earth, heaven, and sea are friendly with their own parts, including those dispersed in mortal things. Things better suited to blending are also made alike by Aphrodite and held dear by one another. Similarity is therefore not always a fixed prerequisite untouched by mixture: the joining power can itself produce likeness or compatibility.

The opposite case involves things far apart in birth, mixture, and moulded form, which are hostile and unfamiliar with joining under Strife's promptings. Those several measures of difference matter. The fragment does not reduce affinity to a single resemblance of colour or temperature.

B 37's growth of earth by earth and aither by aither, and B 62's fire seeking like fire, show how gathering by kind participates in cosmic differentiation. B 90 extends similar meeting to sweet, bitter, sour, and hot. Its brief pairing does not disclose every surrounding mechanism.

The perceptual formula in B 109 is a related application, but has a different immediate question: how the knower recognises what is outside. The present article concerns combining and separating; the epistemological use deserves its own treatment rather than being assumed to solve every problem of mixture.

Places to read

1. B 22Affinity of a kind with its own parts is placed beside compatibility for mixture through Aphrodite.
2. B 37Earth and aither increase their own kinds.
3. B 62.1–6Separating fire seeks its like and raises emerging forms.
4. B 90Matching taste and heat qualities meet in a short sequence.
5. B 109The corresponding recognition formula is a distinct perceptual use of likeness.

Translation in this edition

“Made alike by Aphrodite” in B 22 is important: it should not be paraphrased as a rule that Love joins only things already identical. The supplied words in the hostile clause mark a textual intervention which the smooth English might otherwise conceal.