True opinion and the unproved bridge

Use in the book

At 314e Socrates has ruled out base resolutions because law has been admitted to be fine and good. He nevertheless says that law appears to him to be some kind of opinion. He concludes conditionally that if law is opinion, it is the decent kind. The companion assents. Socrates then asks what decent opinion is: is it not the true kind? The companion again assents. A further question identifies true opinion as discovery of what is, and the discovery formula for law follows.

These steps must be separated. The argument that a base resolution is not law does not prove that law is opinion. Nor does the exclusion of base opinion, without additional assumptions, establish the precise relation between an opinion's truth and its beneficial civic function. The companion's affirmative answers supply the bridge. The dialogue makes the agreement visible; a lexicon should make its argumentative cost visible too.

The discovery formula does not immediately identify law with expert knowledge. The first noun is doxa, and its truth is what matters in this stretch. Later the crafts introduce epistēmones and those who know how, people whose agreement is attributed to knowledge (316c–317d23). The text does not provide a separate account of how true opinion becomes knowledge, or a formal distinction between a correct guess and an understanding of reasons. Importing such an account from another dialogue would go beyond this work's expressed argument.

Truth returns in the historical application. Minos is said to have discovered the truth concerning civic administration, and the persistence of his laws is used as evidence. The companion calls the explanation reasonable, and Socrates asks what follows if he is speaking truly (321b). That condition matters: plausibility of an account and truth of its premises remain distinguishable even in the passage praising a model lawgiver.

The ending presents no contradiction in calling law true-directed while admitting ignorance about the soul. It shows that the accepted formula is not yet the sought content. One can agree that genuine law should be a true discovery and still be unable to say what the lawgiver distributes to make the soul better.

Places to read

1. 314eεἴπερ δόξα νόμος ἐστί — The conditional status of law as opinion
2. 314eΔόξα δὲ χρηστὴ τίς ἐστιν; οὐχ ἡ ἀληθής; — The bridge from decent to true opinion is put as a question
3. 315aἡ ἀληθὴς δόξα τοῦ ὄντος ἐστὶν ἐξεύρεσις — True opinion is identified with discovery of what is
4. 317bἈληθῆ λέγεις — The companion's ordinary response, “What you say is true”
5. 321bτοῦ ὄντος περὶ πόλεως οἰκήσεως ἐξευρόντος εὖ τὴν ἀλήθειαν — Truth in the claim about Minos' civic achievement
6. 321bεἰ ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω — Socrates' explicit condition on the closing inference about old laws

Translation in this edition

The transition from “decent” to “true” stays visible rather than being smoothed into two occurrences of “correct.” The source's introduction itself identifies this as an exposed step and notes the continuing condition “if law is opinion.” The article explains that vulnerability without deciding that the whole argument is either conclusive or worthless.

Appears — καταφαίνεσθαι (kataphainesthai)

καταφαίνεσθαι (kataphainesthai)

Appears. Socrates' own qualified acceptance that law is some kind of opinion. Attested: καταφαίνεται (314e). True opinion and the unproved bridge.

If law is opinion — εἴπερ δόξα νόμος ἐστί (eiper doxa nomos esti)

εἴπερ δόξα νόμος ἐστί (eiper doxa nomos esti)

If law is opinion. The explicit condition retained in the step from excluding base opinion to identifying decent opinion. Attested: εἴπερ δόξα νόμος ἐστί (314e). True opinion and the unproved bridge.

Quite clear — κατάδηλος (katadēlos)

κατάδηλος (katadēlos)

Quite clear. The claimed clarity that law, if opinion, must be the decent kind after base opinion is excluded. Attested: κατάδηλον (314e). True opinion and the unproved bridge.

True — ἀληθής (alēthēs)

ἀληθής (alēthēs)

True. The proposed identifying quality of decent opinion, accepted by the companion rather than separately demonstrated. Attested: ἀληθής (314e). True opinion and the unproved bridge.

True opinion — ἀληθὴς δόξα (alēthēs doxa)

ἀληθὴς δόξα (alēthēs doxa)

True opinion. An opinion identified with discovery of what is in the step leading to the account of law. Attested: ἀληθὴς δόξα (315a). True opinion and the unproved bridge.

If law is opinion (contextual phrase)

314e: εἴπερ δόξα νόμος ἐστί. The conditional qualifies the claim that law must be the decent opinion. Socrates has said that law also appears to him to be some kind of opinion, but the inference is still framed “if law is opinion.” The argument first excludes the base kind; it does not derive the whole identification simply from law's being good. See True opinion.