Common

Use in the book

Socrates cites the saying κοινὰ τά γε φίλων, “friends’ things are common,” to avoid asking which boy is richer. If their claim to friendship is true, their possessions should not make a difference between them.

The neuter plural κοινά is predicative, not an abstract noun meaning community. The proverb is used as a conversational premise rather than investigated as a detailed rule of ownership. It contrasts the competitive comparisons of age, birth, and beauty with friendship’s proposed sharing of material advantages.

Places to read

1. 207cκοινὰ τά γε φίλων λέγεται — friends’ things are said to be common.

Use in the book

The definition attributed to Pythagoras is called common to every kind of motion. The claim concerns the definition’s reach: difference or otherness in matter is proposed as covering the kinds under discussion. The word does not say that every movement has the same direction, speed, or physical mechanism.

Places to read

1. I.19.1.1One proposed definition is said to cover all motion.

Translation in this edition

“Common” suits shared possession; “general” may clarify the scope of a definition. Preserve the class over which the statement ranges.

Use in the book

In the test of two equal first principles, what the pair share cannot explain what distinguishes them. Ficino supposes a common nature plus two proper features, then argues that the resulting composition depends on a unifier. The proper natures also need an origin: if identical unrestricted nature produced each feature in the same way, their claimed difference would disappear.

The same family changes emphasis when God is called no thing’s “private guide” but the common guide. Here the contrast concerns the scope of causation, and a common office is assigned the common effect, being. By contrast, “the proper effect” at II.7.29 means the effect especially corresponding to the first agent. At II.9.8 and II.9.10, proper intelligence and proper object identify what belongs to divine knowing without dependence on something external. These are related claims of belonging, not one technical definition mechanically repeated.

A cause proper to vines need not be a vine's separate personal soul. The principle may reside in the common soul of earth. Conversely, the animals that move independently and live apart from earth have souls of their own. The spheres themselves have common souls, and stars can have proper souls within their spheres. “Common” thus specifies a range of governance rather than numerical identity of every governed soul.

The same vocabulary governs the rejection of God as the proper mover of only one sphere: his causation is common to all, while each differentiated sphere requires an intimately corresponding mover. In the Pythagorean excursion, a particular Phoebus and a particular Jupiter belong to zodiacal positions; they must not be silently substituted for every universal divine name. In the lantern example a general plan cannot produce a particular step without a particular intervening cognition. The opposition moves among ownership, appropriate causation, scale of rule, and scope of thought.

Places to read

1. II.2.2, II.2.3, II.2.4Shared nature and distinctive properties in the two-principle argument
2. II.7.6, II.7.29Common office and the first agent’s proper effect
3. II.9.8, II.9.10The characteristic intelligence and adequate object of divine self-knowledge
4. IV.1.7–923proper causes operate within a common earthly life
5. IV.1.31 and IV.1.35–392345human, elemental, stellar, and other souls have different scopes
6. IV.1.43 and IV.1.59particular divine designations and particular movers have limited assignments
7. IV.2.13–1523a general purpose requires particular cognition for execution

Translation in this edition

“Proper,” “private,” “of their own,” “particular,” “common,” and “universal” are contextual choices. At II.7.6, private means restricted to one recipient, not concealed. At II.2.3, property means a feature contributing to composition, not real estate. The Book IV discussion likewise distinguishes a sphere's common soul from the proper souls of its inhabitants. A single standardized English label would obscure those changes.

absolutus / absolute

absolutus / absolute. Printed forms: absolutae; absolute; absolutum.

Unrestricted or considered without an added qualification. Common nature producing absolutely would not explain divergent properties; being considered absolutely lacks intrinsic limitation. References: II.2.4, II.4.2. See Common and proper.

addere / accedere / advenire

addere / accedere / advenire. Printed forms: accedente; accedunt; addiciuntur; additam; advenit; adveniunt.

To add, approach, or accrue from elsewhere. A distinguishing property added to necessity creates composition; what comes from elsewhere differs from what belongs naturally. References: II.2.4, II.7.14, II.7.20. See Common and proper.

aequalis / aeque

aequalis / aeque. Printed forms: aequalem; aequalia; aeque.

Equal, equally, or equally disposed in a specified respect. Equal first gods are tested; a body’s equal disposition toward being and nonbeing indicates need for determination. References: II.2.1, II.2.4, II.7.8. See Common and proper.

communis

communis. Printed forms: commune; communem; communi; communis.

Common or shared, as opposed to a differentiating or privately restricted feature. A common nature explains agreement; a common guide has the universal office of giving being. References: II.2.2, II.2.3, II.7.6. See Common and proper.

competere / pertinere / spectare

competere / pertinere / spectare. Printed forms: competit; pertineant; spectat.

To belong, pertain, or concern in a specific respect. Dominion belongs to goodness; impossibility of nonbeing concerns eternity; inward perfection is assigned its consequence. References: II.1.5, II.4.3, II.6.19. See Common and proper.

convenire / congruere

convenire / congruere. Printed forms: congruant; congruerent; conveniant; convenit; conveniunt.

To agree or coincide, but also to belong fittingly to a subject. Shared predicates establish agreement; in the preservation argument “belongs to” marks a natural condition. References: II.2.2, II.2.5, II.6.19, II.7.20. See Common and proper.

differre / discrepare

differre / discrepare. Printed forms: differant; differt; differunt; discrepent.

To differ or disagree in nature or property. A distinguishing feature cannot be explained by the common nature precisely as common. References: II.2.1, II.2.2, II.2.4, II.7.12. See Common and proper.

Phoebus particularis / Iupiter particularis

Phoebus particularis / Iupiter particularis. Printed forms: Iupiter particularis; Phoebus particularis.

A particular Phoebus and Jupiter in this cosmic assignment. The qualifiers prevent unmarked substitution of these zodiacal souls for universal divine names in other passages. References: IV.1.43. See Common and proper.

proprius / communis

proprius / communis. Printed forms: communes; communi; propriam; propriis.

Belonging to an individual or appropriately its own; common to a wider whole. Independent animal life is distinguished from the common life of an elemental sphere. References: IV.1.37. See Common and proper.

proprius / proprietas

proprius / proprietas. Printed forms: propria; Propria; propriae; proprietas; proprietate; proprietatem; proprietates.

One’s own, specific, characteristic; a distinguishing property. The feature differentiating an angel from God must have an origin and therefore disclose dependence. References: II.2.3, II.2.4, II.7.14, II.9.8. See Common and proper.

rector proprius

rector proprius. Printed forms: rector proprius.

A governor assigned specifically to one body. God's universal causation excludes confinement to this particular governing role. References: IV.1.59. See Common and proper.