Value and utility

Both, rather, and first: the missing inference

ἀμφότεροι (amphoteroi); μᾶλλον (mallon); πρότερον (proteron)

Amphoteroi means both members of a pair; the accusative amphoterous answers whom the lover would bring in.

From the book

The Lovers

Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordAmphoteroi means both members of a pair; the accusative amphoterous answers whom the lover would bring in.
  • In The LoversThe small exchange is the logical hinge of the practical objection.
  • In this editionThe edition keeps the emphatic repetition “both rather and first,” despite its slightly unusual English.
  • A place to readἈμφοτέρους ἔγωγ’ ἄν — The first reply is “Both.”

Meaning

Amphoteroi means both members of a pair; the accusative amphoterous answers whom the lover would bring in. Mallon means more or rather, expressing comparative preference. Proteron means earlier or first relative to the other choice. At 136d Socrates combines preference and priority: which person rather and first? None of these words means “the other is completely useless.”

Use in the book

The small exchange is the logical hinge of the practical objection. Socrates asks whether, in seeking health, the lover would summon the runner-up or the doctor. “Both” is the initial answer. It resists the exclusive choice built into the question and leaves room for two different contributions. Socrates rules out that response as an answer to his next question and demands priority. The lover accepts the doctor “both rather and first.”

This supplies a clear ranking without settling the whole distribution of usefulness. One can prefer and consult a doctor first while retaining some possible use for another knowledgeable person. The text neither explains what that secondary use would be nor disproves it. The storm example repeats the preference structure: one would rather trust the pilot than the philosopher.

Socrates then proposes that in everything else too, whenever a craftsman exists, the philosopher is not useful. The interlocutor answers that it appears so. That assent is part of the dialogue’s evidence, but it should not be mistaken for an independently demonstrated entailment. The passage moves from lower priority to no use. A reader can identify the gap without replacing the actual accepted conclusion with the stronger defense the lover might have made.

There is a related shift in quantification. The examples concern a competent person available for a particular practical choice. The claim that there are always craftsmen generalizes this into permanent redundancy for the philosopher. To make the deduction strict, one would need additional assumptions about access, exclusivity of useful roles and the range of tasks. Those assumptions are not separately argued.

The refutation still has force against the lover’s grand claim that philosophers are “most useful.” He owes an account of a task in which breadth provides a distinctive benefit. His answer “Both” gestures toward a possible account but stops short of giving it. The closing argument changes the proposed philosophical responsibility rather than completing a theory of generalist assistance.

Places to read

  1. 136dἈμφοτέρους ἔγωγ’ ἄν — The first reply is “Both.”
  2. 136dἀλλ’ ὁπότερον μᾶλλόν τε καὶ πρότερον — Socrates replaces joint assistance with comparative priority.
  3. 136dτὸν ἰατρὸν καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ πρότερον — The conceded priority belongs to the doctor.

Translation in this edition

The edition keeps the emphatic repetition “both rather and first,” despite its slightly unusual English. That precision is philosophically useful: smoothing the answer into “only the doctor” would erase the inference problem by changing what the interlocutor actually conceded.