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look into

σκοπέω

To look into: Socrates’ constant word for what the partners do, from his first offer to the boy to his reproach to himself at 175a · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordTo watch, look at, consider; to look into, examine. In Attic it supplies the present and imperfect of the verb whose future and aorist are σκέψομαι and ἐσκεψάμην (see σκέπτομαι).
  • In the CharmidesTwenty times, from Socrates’ offer to the boy, “I am willing to look into it with you” (158e), to his reproach to himself for “looking into temperance to no useful purpose” (175a). The compound ἐπισκοπέω has its own entry.
  • In this edition“Look into” throughout, with “look”, “look at”, “see” and “examining” where the English needs them.
  • A place to read158d–e, 165b–c, 171a–b and 175a.
English renderings
σκοπεῖν, skopein, “look into (it)”, “examining”; σκόπει, skopei, “look into”, “look to see”, “see whether”; σκοποίμην, skopoimēn, “(I would much rather) look into it”; σκοπῶμεν, skopōmen, “let’s (not) look (yet)”, “let us go on looking into”; σκοπῶ, skopō, “I am looking”, “looking into”; σκοπῇς, skopēis, “(if) you look at”; σκοπούμενος, skopoumenos, “(the man who) looks into it”, “examining”; σκοποῖμεν, skopoimen, “we were (not) looking into it”

Meaning

A σκοπός is a watcher, and also the mark one aims at; σκοπεῖν is to fix one’s eyes on something in order to judge it. It is a looking with attention and purpose, unlike ὁρᾶν, “to see”; and, unlike ζητεῖν, “to seek”, it supposes that the thing is already before one and needs to be examined. The edition’s Key Words call it Socrates’ constant word: “Socrates’ constant word for what he and his partners are doing is skopein or skeptesthai, ‘to look into’, and it is rendered with the same English phrase wherever the repetition can be heard (158d–e, 161b–c, 167b, 169b, 175a).”

Use in the book

The verb enters as an offer. The boy cannot say whether he has temperance, and Socrates proposes a joint inquiry: “if you’d like, I am willing to look into it with you; if not, let’s leave it”; and the boy answers, “look into it in whatever way you think best” (158e; see κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι; σκέψις). The looking is consented to before it begins, as the boy’s soul had to be handed over before the charm (157b–c; see πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα).

The object of the looking then shifts from the boy to what is said. Charmides himself uses the verb to hand on his third answer: “So look into whether you think the man who said it was right” (161b; see σκέπτομαι). Critias, taking the argument over, is offered the same partnership: “I would much rather look into it with you, to see whether what was said is true or not” (162e; see παραδέχομαι). And when Critias tries to turn the question back on Socrates’ own opinion, Socrates refuses: “Let’s not look yet at what I think, but at what you are saying now” (163e; see ἐάω). The verb fixes what is under examination, and Socrates guards it.

Its shortest use is its plainest. Critias, offering an account of knowing oneself, says, “Look into it, then.” “I am looking,” Socrates answers (165c). The present tense is the inquiry in progress, and the next sentence begins it: “If temperance is knowing something, then clearly it would be a kind of knowledge” (165c; see ἐπιστήμη τινός). From there the verb carries the long examination of a knowledge of knowledge. It turns on the argument itself, “examining the argument for my own sake above all” (166d; see σκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον); it keeps the question open through the parallels, “if you look at this same thing in other cases” (167c), “see whether you think there is any sense which is a sense of senses” (167d; see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς), and “let’s not yet insist that there isn’t; let us go on looking into whether there is” (168a; see διισχυρίζομαι).

In the test of the doctor the verb is given a rule. Socrates lays it down, and Critias agrees, that “whoever wants to look into medicine must look into it in the things in which it is found”, not outside them; so “the man who looks into it correctly will examine the doctor, in so far as he is a doctor, in what is healthy and diseased”, examining whether what he says is true and what he does is rightly done (171a–b; see ἐπισκέπτομαι; ᾗ ἰατρικός). Looking into a knowledge means looking into its field. The rule defeats Critias’ temperance, which has no field of its own, and it can be read as the dialogue’s account of what its own looking has been doing: examining each definition where it claims to apply.

The last uses turn the verb on itself. Socrates looks back on his own words: “I said just now that some strange things were coming to light for me, and that I was afraid we were not looking into it correctly” (172e; see ἄτοπος); “one must look into what comes to light and not let it go by at random, if one cares for oneself even a little” (173a; see εἰκῇ; παρίημι). And when the argument has made temperance the craftsman of no benefit, he judges the whole inquiry: “So you see, Critias, that my fear long ago was reasonable, and I was right to blame myself for looking into temperance to no useful purpose?” (175a; see αἰτιάομαι; οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός). The verdict is itself a looking into the looking, and Socrates does not let it stand. Before the page is out he refuses the result, saying he is “a poor inquirer” and that temperance is a great good (175e; see ζητητής). The dialogue’s constant verb ends by examining its own use and finding the examiner, not the virtue, at fault.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs; the compound ἐπισκοπέω (167a) is listed under its own entry.

  1. 158eSocrates is willing to look into it with the boy; the boy: look into it in whatever way you think best.
  2. 161bThe boy: look into whether the man who said it was right.
  3. 162eSocrates would much rather look into it with Critias.
  4. 163eLet us not look yet at what Socrates thinks, but at what Critias says.
  5. 165cCritias: look into it, then. Socrates: I am looking.
  6. 166dSocrates is examining the argument for his own sake above all.
  7. 166eCritias is to look to see what will become of the argument under refutation.
  8. 167bCritias: we must look into it.
  9. 167cIf you look at the same thing in other cases, it will seem impossible.
  10. 167dSee whether there is a sense of senses and of itself.
  11. 168aLet us not insist that there is no such knowledge, but go on looking into whether there is.
  12. 171a–bWhoever wants to look into medicine must look into it in its own field; the man who looks into it correctly examines the doctor there.
  13. 172eSocrates was afraid they were not looking into it correctly.
  14. 173aOne must look into what comes to light and not let it go by at random.
  15. 175aSocrates was right to blame himself for looking into temperance to no useful purpose.

Translation in this edition

“Look into” renders the verb wherever the repetition can be heard, as the Key Words say; “look” at 163e6 and 165c4, “look at” at 167c5, “see whether” at 167d7, “look to see” at 166e2, and “examining” for σκοπεῖν with τὸν λόγον (166d3) and for σκοπούμενος at 171b8. At 166e2 the imperative is Heindorf’s conjecture (see σκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον); at 168a11 a later hand in T has the compound ἐπισκοπῶμεν for ἔτι σκοπῶμεν.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the Phaedo Socrates tells how the object of his looking changed. When he had worn himself out looking at the things that are, he was afraid of suffering what befalls those who watch the sun in eclipse, some of them have their eyes destroyed, unless they observe its image in water or the like. So he was afraid that he would blind his soul altogether by looking at things with his eyes and trying to lay hold of them by each sense in turn, and he decided to flee for shelter to λόγοι, accounts, and to examine in them the truth of the things that are. He will not grant that a man who looks at things in accounts is looking at them in images any more than one who looks at them in what is done; and from then on he set out each time from whatever account he judged strongest (99d–100a). The Charmides’ looking can be read as of this second kind from beginning to end: it looks at temperance in what is said about it.