Κ Kappa

look into it together

κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι

The joint examination that spares the boy from boasting or denying · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordTo look into a question together, in common.
  • In the CharmidesOnce, with its partner phrase following: “we ought to look into it together, whether or not you possess what I am asking about”, and “I am willing to look into it with you” (158d–e).
  • In this edition“Look into it together”; “look into it with you”.
  • A place to read158c–159a.
English renderings
κοινῇ ἂν εἴη σκεπτέον, koinēi an eiē skepteon, “we ought to look into it together”; σκοπεῖν μετὰ σοῦ, skopein meta sou, “to look into it with you”

Meaning

Κοινῇ, the dative of κοινός, “common”, means jointly, in common. Σκέπτεσθαι and σκοπεῖν are the dialogue’s verbs for examining, “to look into” (see σκέπτομαι; σκοπέω); the Key Words say that the English keeps the same phrase “wherever the repetition can be heard” (Key Words, “Look into, and at a loss”). The verbal adjective σκεπτέον, “it must be looked into”, makes the joint examination a necessity of the situation.

Use in the book

The phrase answers the boy’s dilemma. Asked whether he has temperance, Charmides can neither affirm it without boasting nor deny it without calling Critias a liar (158c–d; see αἰσχυντηλός; ἔξαρνος). Socrates offers a third way: “You seem to me to be talking sense, Charmides. And it seems to me … that we ought to look into it together, whether or not you possess what I am asking about, so that you won’t be forced to say what you don’t want to, and I in turn won’t set about my doctoring without looking into things. So if you’d like, I am willing to look into it with you; if not, let’s leave it” (158d–e; see ἀναγκάζω; ἀσκέπτως; εἴτε … εἴτε μή). The joint looking removes force from the boy and haste from Socrates, and it makes the boy’s consent the condition of the inquiry, as handing over his soul was the condition of the charm (157b–c; see θεραπεύω). He accepts: “Why, I’d like nothing better” (158e).

The same joint looking returns when Critias takes the argument over: “I would much rather look into it with you, to see whether what was said is true or not” (162e; see ἀληθής). Socrates states it as his practice when Critias treats him as one who claims to know the answers: “I inquire with you, each time, into whatever is proposed” (165b; see ζητέω); and when Critias accuses him of trying only to refute him, he gives the reason, that it is “a common good” for things to become plain (166c–d; see κοινὸν ἀγαθόν). The ending is shared as well: “we are beaten on every side” (175b; see πανταχῇ ἡττώμεθα), and the boy draws the conclusion that “not even you two are able to discover what it is” (176a).

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the places where the joint looking returns.

  1. 158d–eWe ought to look into it together, whether the boy has temperance; Socrates is willing to look into it with him.
  2. 162eSocrates would rather look into it with Critias.
  3. 165bSocrates inquires with Critias into whatever is proposed.
  4. 166dIt is a common good that each thing should become plain.
  5. 175bThey are beaten on every side.
  6. 176aNot even the two of them can discover what temperance is.

Translation in this edition

“We ought to look into it together” for κοινῇ ἂν εἴη σκεπτέον (158d8), and “I am willing to look into it with you” for ἐθέλω σκοπεῖν μετὰ σοῦ (158e3). At 158d8 Burnet prints ἂν εἴη from a Venice manuscript; B and T have εἴη ἂν εἶναι, from which Stephanus would remove εἶναι and Salvini εἴη.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the Protagoras Socrates gives the reason in Homer’s words. He converses, he tells Protagoras, only to examine what he himself is at a loss about, for Homer is right in the line “when two go together, one notices before the other”: going so, all of us are somehow better provided for every deed, word and thought, while a man alone, if he notices something, goes about at once looking for someone to show it to and to confirm it with (348c–d).

In the Crito the joint look is the condition of persuasion. When Crito agrees that Socrates seems to speak well, but asks what they are to do, Socrates answers: “Let us look into it together, good friend, and if at any point you can speak against what I say, speak against it, and I will be persuaded by you” (48d–e).

Other ancient sources

The line is spoken in the Iliad by Diomedes, one of the foremost Greek fighters at Troy. Volunteering to steal into the Trojan camp by night, he asks for a companion: with another man there will be more comfort and more boldness, for “when two go together, one notices before the other how there may be gain; a man alone, even if he notices, has a shorter mind and a thinner wit”.1 Aristotle quotes the half-line in praise of friendship: friends help the young to avoid error, the old in their care and in what their weakness leaves undone, and those in their prime to fine actions, for “when two go together” they are more able to think and to act.2

Source note

1. Homer, Iliad 10.222–226.

2. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.1, 1155a12–16.