From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordἌτοπος, “out of place”: what has no place in the usual order of things, and so odd, strange, absurd; of a person, unaccountable.
- In the CharmidesSix times. The boy finds it “an odd thing” to speak against oneself (158d); after that the word belongs to the argument: “what a strange thing we are trying to say” (167c), “isn’t it strange, if there really is such a thing?” (168a), “some strange things come to light” (172c, and in the past tense at 172e), and Critias’ retort, “You’re saying some truly strange things, Socrates” (172e).
- In this edition“Odd” once (158d), “strange” everywhere else.
- A place to read172c–173a.
- English renderings
- ἄτοπον, atopon, “odd”, “strange”; ἄτοπ’ ἄττα, atop’ atta, “some strange things”; ἄτοπα, atopa, “strange things”
Meaning
The adjective is formed from τόπος, “place”, with the negative prefix: the ἄτοπον has no place where it belongs. In conduct it is the unseemly, in speech the absurd, in a man the eccentric who fits no type. In argument it names a result that will not sit with what one already knows, the sign that something earlier has gone wrong. The strange is not yet the impossible, and the Charmides keeps the two apart.
Use in the book
The first speaker to use the word is the boy. Asked whether he is temperate, he finds both answers closed: “if I say I’m not temperate … not only is it an odd thing to say such things against oneself, but at the same time I shall be showing up Critias here as a liar” (158d; see ἐπιδείκνυμι). The oddness is social, the unseemliness of running oneself down in company. The Greek, αὐτὸν καθ’ ἑαυτοῦ, “oneself against oneself”, can be read as a first, unwitting turn of the reflexive that will carry the second half of the dialogue.
From then on the word is Socrates’, and it marks the places where the argument stops fitting. Having stated Critias’ knowledge “of nothing else but itself and the other kinds of knowledge”, he says, “Then see what a strange thing we are trying to say, my friend. For if you look at this same thing in other cases, it will seem to you, I think, to be impossible” (167c; see ἀδύνατος). After the sight that sees no colour and the fear that fears nothing dreadful (see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς), he applies the word to knowledge itself: “Then isn’t it strange, if there really is such a thing? For let’s not yet insist that there isn’t; let us go on looking into whether there is” (168a; see διισχυρίζομαι). The strange is a reason to look further, not a verdict, and when he sorts the cases a little later he puts some among the impossible and leaves others “very strongly doubted” (168e; see ἀπιστέω).
The second group comes after the concessions. Granting that knowledge of knowledge is possible, Socrates suspects “our search has been to no useful purpose. I infer this because some strange things come to light about temperance, if it is of this kind” (172c; see τεκμαίρομαι). He withdraws the agreement that it would be a great good for each to do what he knows and hand the rest over to those who know (172d). Critias protests, “You’re saying some truly strange things, Socrates,” and Socrates takes the word back from him: “By the dog … I think so too; and it was with my eye on this very point that I said just now that some strange things were coming to light for me” (172e; see νὴ τὸν κύνα). In Socrates’ mouth the word describes what the argument shows; in Critias’ it describes Socrates. The second use can be read as the one Plato’s other characters make of the word, when they find not the argument but the man out of place.
Places to read
Every passage in which the word occurs.
- 158dThe boy: to say he is not temperate would be an odd thing to say against oneself.
- 167cSocrates: see what a strange thing we are trying to say; in other cases it would seem impossible.
- 168aAfter the parallels: isn’t it strange, if there really is such a knowledge? Let us go on looking.
- 172cSome strange things come to light about temperance, if it is of this kind.
- 172eCritias: you are saying truly strange things; Socrates: so I think too, and that is what I meant by the strange things coming to light.
Translation in this edition
“Odd” at 158d2, where the word is a matter of manners; “strange” at 167c4, 168a10, 172c5, 172e3 and 172e5, so that the reader can follow one word through the second half of the dialogue. Ὡς ἀληθῶς at 172e3 is “truly”. At 172e5 Burnet prints Badham’s conjecture ἄτοπ’ ἄττ’, which makes Socrates repeat exactly the words of 172c5; B and T have ἄτοπά γ’, and Bekker read ἄτοπά τ’ (apparatus, e5).
Elsewhere in Plato
The word is regularly turned on Socrates. In the Theaetetus he reports that people call him the strangest of men, who makes others be at a loss (149a; see ἀπορέω). In the Phaedrus, after he has praised the spot by the river where they sit, Phaedrus tells him that he seems a most unaccountable man, like a stranger being shown the sights, who never sets foot outside the city walls (230c–d). In the Gorgias Callicles breaks off to tell him how strange he is, and a mere speaker to the crowd (494d). Alcibiades in the Symposium makes the word the summit of his praise: Brasidas, the Spartan general, may be likened to Achilles, and Nestor and Antenor, the old counsellors of Homer’s Greeks and Trojans, to Pericles, the Athenian statesman, but such is this man’s strangeness, ἀτοπία, in himself and in his talk, that no one past or present comes near him, unless he is likened to silens and satyrs (221c–d). In the Charmides the strangeness has passed to the argument; Critias’ retort at 172e briefly hands it back to the man.