From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Orientation
At a Glance
- The wordΣκοπεῖν, “to look into”, with τὸν λόγον, “the argument”: to examine what is being said rather than the one who says it.
- In the CharmidesOnce: “And so now too, I say, this is what I am doing: examining the argument for my own sake above all, but perhaps also for the sake of my other friends” (166d); with the charge that follows, “Just pay attention to the argument itself, and look to see what will become of it under refutation” (166e).
- In this edition“Examining the argument”.
- A place to read166b–e.
- English renderings
- τὸν λόγον σκοπεῖν, ton logon skopein, “examining the argument”
Meaning
Λόγος here is the argument in progress, the discussion itself, as the Glossary has it for 166c–e. To examine it is to test what it says and where it leads. The phrase sets the argument apart from the people who carry it on, as something with a course of its own.
Use in the book
Critias, pressed to say what temperance is knowledge of, complains that Socrates is only trying to refute him, and Socrates answers that he refutes him for the reason he would scrutinize himself, for fear of thinking he knows what he does not (166c–d; see διερευνάω; ἐλέγχω; λανθάνω). Then he names the activity: “And so now too, I say, this is what I am doing: examining the argument for my own sake above all, but perhaps also for the sake of my other friends” (166d; see ἐπιτήδειος). The common good he adds, that each thing should become plain as it is, is told elsewhere (166d; see κοινὸν ἀγαθόν). Then the charge: “say goodbye to whether it is Critias or Socrates who is being refuted. Just pay attention to the argument itself, and look to see what will become of it under refutation” (166d–e; see ἔα χαίρειν; ἐκβαίνω; προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν).
The phrase parts the argument from its owners. An argument has its own fate, “what will become of it”, and the man who holds it can watch that fate as a spectator. Critias’ grievance assumed that to refute what he says is to defeat him; Socrates’ phrase denies it, and the denial lets Critias go on: “All right … I’ll do that; you seem to me to be talking sense” (166e). The order of beneficiaries can be read as the phrase’s sharpest point. The examination serves the examiner “above all”, as a guard against his own unnoticed error, and the other man only after; the edition’s note at 166d calls it, on one reading, Socrates’ fullest statement in the dialogue of what his refutations are for (see διερευνάω).
Places to read
The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the accusation and the motive that lead to it and the charge it leads to.
- 166cCritias: Socrates is trying to refute him and letting go of what the argument is about.
- 166c–dSocrates refutes as he would scrutinize himself, for fear of thinking he knows what he does not.
- 166dHe is examining the argument for his own sake above all, and perhaps for his friends’.
- 166d–e2Critias is to say goodbye to who is being refuted and attend to the argument itself.
Translation in this edition
“Examining the argument” renders τὸν λόγον σκοπεῖν (166d3). At 166e2, where Socrates tells Critias to “look to see what will become of it”, Burnet prints Heindorf’s imperative σκόπει; B has the infinitive σκοπεῖν, and T writes σκόπεῖν, with both accents.
Elsewhere in Plato
In the Gorgias Socrates hesitates to refute Gorgias for the reason Critias resents being refuted. He is afraid, he says, that Gorgias will think he speaks out of rivalry, not about the matter, to make it clear, but against Gorgias himself (457e). The kind of man he then says he is, as glad to be refuted as to refute, is told elsewhere (458a–b; see ἐλέγχω), and so is whether he would let Gorgias be if Gorgias were not of that kind (458a; see ἐάω). In the Phaedo, on the day of his death, Socrates warns his friends that he may be arguing out of a wish to win. The uneducated, when they dispute, care nothing for how things stand but only that what they have proposed should seem true to those present; he will differ from them only in this: his eagerness will be, not that what he says should seem true to those present, except as a by-product, but that it should seem so, as far as it can, to himself (91a–b). The advice that follows, to think little of Socrates and much more of the truth, is told elsewhere (91c; see ἀλήθεια).