From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordTo look carefully, to consider, to examine. In Attic prose its future σκέψομαι and aorist ἐσκεψάμην serve as the future and aorist of σκοπέω, so that the two make one verb, “to look into”.
- In the CharmidesTen times in the simple verb, from “we ought to look into it together” (158d) to “let us look still better at whether, if it is of that kind, it will benefit us at all” (172d). The compounds and the noun have their own entries.
- In this edition“Look into”, “look”.
- A place to read161b–c and 165b–c.
- English renderings
- σκεπτέον, skepteon, “we ought to look into it”, “we have to look into”; σκέψασθαι, skepsasthai, “look into it”; σκέψαι, skepsai, “look into this”, “look into it”; σκεψάμενος, skepsamenos, “once I have looked into it”; σκέψωμαι, skepsōmai, “(until) I have”; σκεψώμεθα, skepsōmetha, “let us look into it”, “let us look”; σκέψεται, skepsetai, “(won’t) he look into”
Meaning
Σκέπτομαι is the older verb of looking, of the family of σκοπός, a watcher, and of σκέψις, a looking. Its tenses carry distinctions that the present σκοπέω does not: the aorist takes a look as a whole, done or to be done; the verbal adjective σκεπτέον says that it must be done. The family gave English “sceptic”, from σκεπτικός, “given to looking into things”.
Use in the book
The verbal adjective states obligation, twice at the start. Socrates resolves the boy’s dilemma with it: “we ought to look into it together, whether or not you possess what I am asking about” (158d–e; see κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι). And when the boy, asked whom he heard his third answer from, says it makes no difference, Socrates agrees and states a rule: “For in any case what we have to look into is not who said it, but whether what is said is true or not” (161c; see ἀκούω; ἀληθής). The rule governs the rest of the dialogue. An answer is examined on its own terms, whoever owns it; and later, when Critias fears that he is the one being refuted, Socrates repeats it in another form (166d–e; see σκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον).
The aorist imperative hands the look to someone else, and in its first use it is the boy who hands it. Having lost two definitions, Charmides offers a third that is not his own and asks Socrates to do the examining: “But look into this: what do you think of it, as an account of temperance?” (161b; see ἀναμιμνῄσκομαι). Socrates hands the look back in turn when he is at a loss: “Come then, Critias … look into it, and see whether, on these matters, you turn out to be better provided with a way through than I am” (167b; see εὔπορος).
The aorist participle and subjunctive make looking the condition of agreeing. Critias offers to give an account if Socrates will not agree that temperance is knowing oneself, and Socrates refuses to be hurried: “So once I have looked into it I am willing to say whether I agree or not. Just wait until I have” (165c; see ἐπέχω; ὁμολογέω). The sentence is the opposite of the concessions Socrates regrets at the end, made “without even considering” whether what they granted was possible (175c; see ἐπισκέπτομαι; πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν). The hortatory subjunctive opens fresh tests, “Let us look into it from this angle” (170e) and “let us look still better” (172d), and the future asks what an examiner would do: when he has to test what knowledge a doctor has, “won’t he look into what it is of?” (171a; see πεῖραν λαβεῖν; τῷ τινῶν εἶναι).
Places to read
Every passage in which the simple verb occurs; its compounds and the noun are listed under their own entries.
- 158dWe ought to look into it together, whether the boy possesses what Socrates is asking about.
- 158eThe boy: look into it in whatever way you think best.
- 161bThe boy: look into this account of temperance.
- 161cWhat we have to look into is not who said it, but whether what is said is true.
- 165cOnce he has looked into it Socrates will say whether he agrees; Critias must wait until he has.
- 167bSocrates to Critias: look into it, and see whether you are better provided with a way through.
- 170eLet us look into it from this angle: how would the temperate man tell a true doctor?
- 171aTo test what knowledge the doctor has, he will look into what it is of.
- 172dLet us look still better at whether such a knowledge would benefit us.
Translation in this edition
“Look into” throughout, as the Key Words rule for σκοπεῖν and σκέπτεσθαι, with “look” where English wants the shorter verb (172d2). At 158e5 a single “look into it” renders both σκέψασθαι and the imperative σκόπει that follows it (see σκοπέω), and in “Just wait until I have” (165c2) the verb is left to be understood. At 158e5 “best” renders Heindorf’s βέλτιον, where B and T have βελτίω, and Stephanus proposed the future σκέψεσθαι for the aorist; at 172d2 “at all” renders ἄρα τι, a correction in B, where B and T have ἄρτι, “just now”, and “will benefit” is T’s ὀνήσει, where B has the infinitive ὀνήσειν. The two verbs stand as alternatives in the manuscripts at 167b1, where T has the aorist ἐπισκεψώμεθα and B the present ἐπισκοπώμεθα (see ἐπισκέπτομαι).
Elsewhere in Plato
In the Euthyphro the verbal adjective decides between two ways of treating a definition. Euthyphro has said that the holy is what all the gods love. Are we to examine this in its turn, Socrates asks, and see whether it is rightly said? Or are we to leave it alone and take it on trust from ourselves and from others, conceding the point the moment anyone claims it? Or must the speaker’s words be looked into? We must, Euthyphro answers, though he thinks it well said (9e). The Charmides’ rule at 161c is the same choice: not who says it, but what is said, must be looked into.