From the book
Meditations
Marcus Aurelius · Diotimos Editions · 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordἈνάγκη is necessity, what cannot be otherwise, and the constraint that makes it so. Τύχη, from τυγχάνειν, "to hit upon, to happen", is fortune, what falls to a man; εἰκῇ is "at random". The Stoics called fortune a cause hidden from human reasoning.
- In the MeditationsThe works of fortune "are not apart from nature" (2.3), though fortune is "hard to read" (2.17.1). Marcus moves luck inward: he is lucky because, though this has happened to him, he goes on free from distress (4.49.1). Necessity is common, but "to the rational living being alone it is given to follow willingly what happens, while bare following is necessary for all" (10.28); and if all is at random, "do not you too act at random" (9.28).
- In this editionἈνάγκη is "necessity" and, with an infinitive, "it is necessary", "must" or "bound to"; ἀναγκαῖος is "necessary" and ἀναγκάζειν "compel"; τύχη is always "fortune", ἐπιτυχία "chance", ἀτύχημα and εὐτύχημα "misfortune" and "good fortune"; εἰκῇ is "at random" and εἰκαιότης "aimlessness".
- A place to read10.28, where Marcus tells himself to form an impression of "our bondage", and that the rational living being alone can follow willingly.
Meaning
Ἀνάγκη (anankē) is necessity, and also the force that constrains; ἀναγκαῖος (anankaios) is what is necessary or needful, and ἀναγκάζειν (anankazein) is to compel. Τύχη (tychē) belongs with τυγχάνειν (tynchanein), "to hit upon, to happen": it is what befalls a man, good or bad. The handbook of the philosophers' opinions on nature that has come down among the works of Plutarch of Chaeronea, the Platonist philosopher and biographer of the late first and early second centuries, reports that Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, the philosopher of the fifth century BC, and the Stoics called fortune "a cause unclear to human reasoning", for some things come about by necessity, some by fate, some by choice, some by fortune and some of themselves.1 Fortune, so defined, is still a cause, only one not seen. Εἰκῇ (eikēi) is "at random", without plan, and εἰκαιότης (eikaiotēs) aimlessness.
Marcus' necessity is that of nature (2.3, 7.18, 10.7.1), of a man's principles (6.41, 8.14), and of the task in hand (4.24).
Use in the book
Necessity is first nature's. "And there is necessity too, and what is advantageous to the whole universe, of which you are a part" (2.3; see Nature). The parts of the whole must perish, "but let this be said as signifying 'to be altered'" (10.7.1; see Dissolution), and Marcus' own changing is "similarly necessary to the nature of the whole" (7.18; see Change). The bad falls under it: "These things are bound by nature to happen so, from such people, of necessity; and he who does not want this wants the fig tree to have no juice" (4.6); the shameless man is one of those "who must be in the universe" (9.42.1; see Fault and ignorance).
Within a man the necessity is that of his principles. Of whoever he meets Marcus is to remember "that he is compelled to act so" (8.14; see Principles and reminders), and in offenders he is to consider "what compulsions of principles they have laid down" (11.18.1; see Anger). The rule binds him too: whatever outside his choice he sets up as good or bad, "it is necessary, on falling into such a bad thing or failing to get such a good, that you blame the gods and hate men too" (6.41; see Good, bad and indifference). The compulsion stops short of the choice. "Or are you compelled, because you are made without talent, to grumble …? No, by the gods" (5.5); "there is no one who will compel me to transgress against him", his god and daimon (5.10.2; see Daimon). Circumstances may compel him "to be, as it were, thoroughly troubled", but he is to return quickly into himself (6.11; see Tranquillity).
The answer to necessity is willingness. After picturing the discontented man as a sacrificed piglet, kicking and squealing (10.28; see Pain and pleasure), Marcus writes: "Form an impression of our bondage, and that to the rational living being alone it is given to follow willingly what happens, while bare following is necessary for all" (10.28). Following is common to all; willing is the gift of reason. The disposition worth effort "welcomes all that happens as necessary, as familiar, as flowing from such a beginning and spring" (4.33), and if all is "a necessity not to be transgressed", the first of the three possibilities of 12.14, Marcus asks, "why do you resist?" (12.14; see Providence and atoms).
Fortune is not outside the order. "The works of fortune are not apart from nature, or from the spinning together and interweaving of the things that providence governs" (2.3; see Nature); of each thing one must say that it came from God, or "by the fall of the lot and the spinning together wound along with it and such coincidence and fortune", or from a kinsman (3.11.3; see Good, bad and indifference). Yet fortune is "hard to read" (2.17.1; see Soul), and what it brings passes: of those who reached their peak in fame or "fortunes of any kind" Marcus asks where all those things are now, and answers, "Smoke and ash and a legend, or not even a legend" (12.27). What happens from outside "is either by chance or by providence; and one must neither blame chance nor bring a charge against providence" (12.24; see Providence and atoms).
Good and bad fortune Marcus moves into the man. "Unlucky am I, because this has happened to me. No: lucky am I, because though this has happened to me I go on free from distress" (4.49.1; see Tranquillity). Such a thing could have happened to anyone, but not everyone would have gone on free from distress; and he asks, "Do you call anything at all a man's misfortune which is not a failure of man's nature?" (4.49.1). The principle follows: "not that this is a misfortune, but that to bear it nobly is good fortune" (4.49.2; see Courage and endurance). Of the so-called "mischances" none harms law, and so none harms city or citizen (10.33.4; see Citizenship). A neighbour's vice is not bad for Marcus, since God did not decide so, "so that my being unlucky should not be in another's power" (8.56; see Ruling centre). Whoever has seen the citadel of the understanding and does not flee to it "is unlucky" (8.48; see Inner retreat and citadel).
Randomness he refuses in himself. "Let no act be done at random" (4.2); "For one must do nothing at random" (8.17); and, whichever member of the disjunction holds, "if God, all is well; if at random, do not you too act at random" (9.28; see Providence and atoms). The soul does violence to itself when it "does whatever it does at random and without attention" (2.16; see Impulse).
Marcus does not settle how much of the world is necessity and how much chance. He grants both their reach over events, the body and the bad man's acts, and keeps three things out of their reach: whether he follows willingly, how he bears what comes, and whether he acts at random. This can be read as his use of the school's teaching: necessity and fortune name what happens to a man; good fortune names what he does with it.
Places to read
Every chapter in which ἀνάγκη, ἀναγκαῖος, ἀναγκάζειν, καταναγκάζειν, ἐπάναγκες, ἔνδεσις, τύχη, ἐπιτυχία, σύντευξις, one of the words of luck (εὐτυχής, ἀτυχής, ἀτυχεῖν, εὐτύχημα, ἀτύχημα, εὐκλήρημα, ἀκλήρημα), εἰκῇ, εἰκαῖος or εἰκαιότης occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided. The places of τυγχάνειν, among them its uses for chance, "any chance" and "if it so happens", are given in the sub-entry; the names Eutyches and Eutychion (10.31) are left out.
- 1.9.2GreekFrom Sextus of Chaeronea, Plutarch's nephew, Marcus learned to find and order, with a firm grasp and by method, the principles necessary for life (see Principles and reminders).
- 1.12GreekFrom Alexander the Platonist, usually identified, as the edition's note says, with Alexander of Seleucia, Marcus' secretary for Greek letters, Marcus learned not to plead business often, or without necessity, as an excuse from the duties that arise from relations with others (see Duty and fitting action).
- 1.16.2GreekAntoninus Pius, Marcus' adoptive father, left his friends free not to dine with him every time nor go with him on his journeys as a matter of course.
- 1.16.3GreekAntoninus kept constant guard over what the empire needed, and was sparing of its funds.
- 1.16.4GreekAntoninus used the things that make for ease of living, which fortune supplied in plenty, without vanity and without apology.
- 1.17.9GreekAmong the gifts of the gods, Marcus did not fall in with a sophist nor sit down to writing treatises; all these things, in a quoted line, need the help of gods and of fortune (see Philosophy).
- 2.3GreekThe works of fortune are not apart from nature or from the interweaving of the things that providence governs, and there is necessity too, and what is advantageous to the whole (see Nature).
- 2.5GreekMarcus will give himself leisure if he does each act as the last of his life, without any aimlessness (see Present action).
- 2.8GreekThose who do not keep track of the movements of their own soul are bound to be unhappy (see Attention and self-examination).
- 2.10GreekTheophrastus, successor of Aristotle, the philosopher of the fourth century BC, judges the man who does wrong in rage more like one who has been wronged first and by distress compelled to rage (see Desire and aversion).
- 2.13GreekThe service of the daimon within is to keep it pure of passion, aimlessness and discontent with what comes from gods and men (see Daimon).
- 2.16GreekThe soul does violence to itself when it lets an act or impulse of its own go at no target, but does whatever it does at random (see Impulse).
- 2.17.1GreekIn human life fortune is hard to read (see Soul).
- 2.17.2GreekPhilosophy lies in keeping the daimon within inviolate, doing nothing at random (see Daimon).
- 3.4.2GreekIn the sequence of impressions one must avoid what is random and pointless.
- 3.4.3GreekThe best man forms impressions of what another is saying or doing not often, nor without some great necessity for the common good (see Impression).
- 3.7GreekMarcus is never to honour as advantageous anything that will some day force him to break faith or abandon self-respect.
- 3.11.3GreekOf each thing one must say whether it has come from God, or by the fall of the lot and such coincidence and fortune, or from a fellow man (see Good, bad and indifference).
- 4.2GreekNo act is to be done at random, nor otherwise than according to a doctrine that completes the art.
- 4.6GreekWhat such people do is bound by nature to happen of necessity, and he who does not want it wants the fig tree to have no juice.
- 4.9GreekThe nature of the advantageous has been compelled to do this.
- 4.24GreekAgainst the "Do little" of Democritus, the atomist philosopher of the fifth century BC, Marcus asks whether it is not better to do what is necessary, and is to ask at each thing whether it is one of the things that are not necessary (see Tranquillity).
- 4.32.2GreekIt is necessary to remember that the attention given to each action has its own worth and proportion.
- 4.33GreekWhat deserves effort is a just understanding, social actions, truthful speech and a disposition that welcomes all that happens as necessary.
- 4.45GreekThe sequence of things is not an enumeration holding only what is compelled, but a reasoned connection (see Cosmos and order).
- 4.49.1GreekMarcus is lucky, not unlucky, because though this has happened to him he goes on free from distress, and he asks whether anything is a man's misfortune that is not a failure of man's nature (see Tranquillity).
- 4.49.2GreekAt everything that leads towards distress Marcus is to use the principle that this is not a misfortune, but that to bear it nobly is good fortune (see Courage and endurance).
- 5.5GreekMarcus asks whether he is compelled, because he is made without talent, to grumble and flatter, and answers no.
- 5.10.2GreekNo one will compel Marcus to transgress against his god and daimon (see Daimon).
- 5.12GreekThe many receive the comic poet's line about wealth and the windfalls that bring luxury or fame as aptly said (see Good, bad and indifference).
- 5.28GreekMarcus asks whether he is angry with the man whose armpits stink; such a smell must come from such things, and if the man listens, Marcus will cure him, and there is no need for anger (see Mind and reason).
- 6.10GreekIf all is a jumble, Marcus asks why he should crave to linger in such a random compound and confusion (see Providence and atoms).
- 6.11GreekWhen Marcus has been compelled by circumstances to be, as it were, thoroughly troubled, he is to return quickly into himself and not go out of the rhythm beyond what is necessary (see Tranquillity).
- 6.16.4GreekUnless Marcus stops honouring many other things, he will be neither free nor self-sufficient, for it is necessary to envy, to be jealous and to plot (see Contentment and self-sufficiency).
- 6.41GreekWhoever sets up things outside choice as good or bad must, on failing to get them, blame the gods and hate men (see Good, bad and indifference).
- 7.18GreekMarcus' own changing is similarly necessary to the nature of the whole (see Change).
- 7.51GreekIn tragic lines, the wind that blows from the gods one must bear, in toils without lament.
- 7.63GreekIt is most necessary to remember the saying that every soul is deprived of truth unwillingly (see Soul).
- 7.66GreekSocrates, the Athenian philosopher, is to be judged by whether, among other things, he was neither indignant at random at vice nor a slave to anyone's ignorance (see Body and flesh).
- 8.14GreekWhoever Marcus meets, he is to ask what principles the man has about good and bad, and to remember that he is compelled to act so (see Principles and reminders).
- 8.17GreekOne must blame no one, for one must do nothing at random (see Providence and atoms).
- 8.31GreekAfter all the efforts to leave a successor, it is necessary that someone be last of his family (see Death).
- 8.48GreekHe who has seen that the understanding free from passions is a citadel and does not flee to it is unlucky (see Inner retreat and citadel).
- 8.56GreekGod did not decide that a neighbour's vice should be bad for Marcus, so that his being unlucky should not be in another's power (see Ruling centre).
- 9.1.2GreekHe who pursues pleasures as good is impious, for he must often blame the common nature as allotting contrary to worth (see Justice).
- 9.28GreekIf God, all is well; if at random, Marcus is not to act at random too (see Providence and atoms).
- 9.42.1GreekThe shameless man is one of those shameless people who must be in the universe (see Fault and ignorance).
- 10.6.1GreekThe nature of the universe is not compelled even by any cause from outside to generate anything harmful to itself (see Whole and part).
- 10.6.2GreekWhen these things are brought to their end, it is necessary that life flow smoothly, as a citizen's does (see Citizenship).
- 10.7.1GreekFor the parts of the whole it is necessary to perish, that is, to be altered; Marcus asks whether nature made her parts of necessity prone to fall into the bad, and finds it unconvincing (see Dissolution).
- 10.28GreekMarcus is to form an impression of our bondage, and that the rational living being alone can follow willingly what happens, while bare following is necessary for all.
- 10.33.4GreekNone of the so-called mischances harms law, and so none harms city or citizen (see Citizenship).
- 11.18.1GreekMarcus is to consider above all what compulsions of principles men have laid down (see Anger).
- 11.18.3GreekIf the shameful is not the only bad thing, Marcus too must necessarily do much wrong (see Anger).
- 11.19GreekOver the first of four turnings of the ruling centre Marcus is to say, "This imagining is not necessary" (see Impression).
- 12.14GreekEither a necessity of fate and an order not to be transgressed, or a providence that can be propitiated, or a confusion of aimlessness without a leader; if the first, Marcus asks why he resists (see Providence and atoms).
- 12.16GreekHe who does not want the base man to do wrong is like one who does not want the fig tree to carry juice, or all other things that are necessary (see Fault and ignorance).
- 12.20GreekThe first rule is to act neither at random nor without reference, the second to refer everything to the social end (see Attention and self-examination).
- 12.24GreekIn what he does, Marcus is to ask whether it is neither at random nor otherwise than Justice herself would have acted; what happens from outside is either by chance or by providence, and neither is to be blamed (see Providence and atoms).
- 12.27GreekOf those who reached their peak in fame, disasters, enmities or fortunes of any kind, Marcus asks where all those things are now: smoke and ash and a legend (see Simplicity and sincerity).
Translation in this edition
Ἀνάγκη is "necessity" (1.12, 3.4.3, 12.14 twice) and "of necessity" (4.6, 10.7.1); with an infinitive it is "it is necessary" (6.16.4 twice, 6.41, 8.31, 10.6.2, 10.7.1), "must" (5.28, 9.1.2, 9.42.1, and "one must" in the tragic lines of 7.51), "are bound to" (2.8) and "must necessarily" (11.18.3); the plural is "compulsions" (11.18.1). Ἀναγκαῖος is "necessary" (1.9.2, 4.24, 7.18, 10.7.1, 10.28, 11.19, 12.16), "it is necessary" (4.32.2), "as necessary" (4.33), "beyond what is necessary" (6.11), "unnecessary" with the negative (4.24), and in the superlative "most necessary" (7.63); with the article it is "necessity" (2.3), and τῶν ἀναγκαίων τῇ ἀρχῇ (tōn anankaiōn tēi archēi) is "what the empire needed" (1.16.3). Ἀναγκάζειν is "compel" (2.10, 4.9, 5.5, 5.10.2, 6.11, 8.14, 10.6.1) and "force" (3.7); καταναγκάζειν is "what is compelled" (4.45), and ἐπάναγκες "as a matter of course" (1.16.2). "Bound by nature" at 4.6 renders πέφυκε (pephyke), and "it will be necessary" at 8.25 renders δεήσει (deēsei). "Bondage" is ἔνδεσις (10.28), and "willingly" there ἑκουσίως (hekousiōs; see Fault and ignorance). Τύχη is "fortune" at all six places, "fortunes" in the plural (12.27). "Chance" renders ἐπιτυχία (12.24 twice) and the participle of τυγχάνειν in "any chance nature" (5.8.4) and "any chance thing" (11.38); "no further chance" at 2.6 renders καιρός (kairos), and "takes no chances" at 1.8.1 ἀκύβευτον (akybeuton), "not given to dicing". Σύντευξις is "coincidence" (3.11.3). Εὐτυχής is "lucky" (4.49.1) and ἀτυχής "unlucky" (4.49.1, 8.48), ἀτυχεῖν "my being unlucky" (8.56); εὐτύχημα and ἀτύχημα are "good fortune" and "misfortune" (4.49.1, 4.49.2), as the Glossary records, and ἀπότευγμα (apoteugma) beside them "a failure" (4.49.1). Εὐκλήρημα is "windfalls" (5.12) and ἀκλήρημα "mischances" (10.33.4); "disasters" at 12.27 renders συμφοραί (symphorai). Εἰκῇ is "at random" at all its places but 3.4.2, where τὸ εἰκῇ (to eikēi) is "what is random"; εἰκαῖος is "random" (6.10) and εἰκαιότης "aimlessness" (2.5, 2.13, 12.14).
Greek forms and English renderings
What must be and what falls out · Meditations
ἀνάγκη, anankē, "necessity", "it is necessary", "must", "bound to", "compulsions"; ἀναγκαῖος, anankaios, "necessary", "necessity", "unnecessary", "needed"; ἀναγκάζειν, anankazein, "compel", "force"; καταναγκάζειν, katanankazein, "compel"; ἐπάναγκες, epanankes, "as a matter of course"; ἔνδεσις, endesis, "bondage"; τύχη, tychē, "fortune"; ἐπιτυχία, epitychia, "chance"; σύντευξις, synteuxis, "coincidence"; τυγχάνειν, tynchanein, "chance", "happen", "attain"; εὐτυχής, eutychēs, "lucky"; ἀτυχής, atychēs, "unlucky"; ἀτυχεῖν, atychein, "being unlucky"; εὐτύχημα, eutychēma, "good fortune"; ἀτύχημα, atychēma, "misfortune"; εὐκλήρημα, euklērēma, "windfall"; ἀκλήρημα, aklērēma, "mischance"; εἰκῇ, eikēi, "at random", "random"; εἰκαῖος, eikaios, "random"; εἰκαιότης, eikaiotēs, "aimlessness"
Epictetus and the Stoics
Cicero, the Roman orator and philosopher of the first century BC, reports in On Fate how Chrysippus, the school's third head, tried to keep both fate and what is in our power. Of the older philosophers, some held that everything comes about by fate in such a way that fate brings the force of necessity, Democritus, Heraclitus of Ephesus, Empedocles of Acragas and Aristotle among them; others, that the movements of the mind are voluntary and free of fate. Chrysippus wished, like an honorary arbiter, to strike the middle, but leaned to those who would free the mind from necessity. He divided causes into the perfect and principal and the helping and proximate, and said that when all things are said to come about by fate through antecedent causes, the second kind is meant. Assent cannot come about unless it is moved by an impression; but Chrysippus goes back to his cylinder and his top, which cannot begin to move unless they are pushed, and once pushed move on by their own nature. As the man who pushed the cylinder gave it the beginning of its motion but not its aptness to roll, so the impression will stamp its likeness on the mind, but assent will be in our power, and, once struck from outside, will move for the rest by its own force and nature.2 Marcus' "he is compelled to act so" (8.14) and his "there is no one who will compel me" (5.10.2) can be read beside the cylinder: the push comes from outside; how a man moves under it comes from his principles. The school's image for following was a dog. The Refutation of All Heresies, a Christian work of the early third century ascribed to Hippolytus of Rome, whose first book sets out the opinions of the Greek philosophers, says that Zeno of Citium, the founder of the school, and Chrysippus affirmed that all things are by fate, with this example: if a dog is tied to a cart, then if it wants to follow, it is both pulled and follows, doing what is in its own power along with necessity; if it does not want to follow, it will be compelled all the same; so too with men, who, even if they do not want to follow, will in any case be compelled to go into what is destined.3 Marcus' "bare following is necessary for all", and the willing following given to the rational living being alone (10.28), can be read as the two dogs. The prayer of Cleanthes, Zeno's successor at the head of the school, to be led by Zeus and Doom, and the Latin version of Seneca, the Roman Stoic of the first century, belong to the same teaching (see Fate and allotment). Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, makes the willing an oath: as soldiers swear to put Caesar's safety before everything, so men, honoured by God with so much, should swear never to disobey him, nor to charge or fault any of his gifts, nor to do or undergo against their will anything that must be.4
ἀκλήρημα
Attested: ἀκληρημάτων (aklērēmatōn; 10.33.4). A mishap; the word is formed on κλῆρος (klēros), "lot". "And of these so-called mischances none harms law" (10.33.4; see Citizenship). Lemma: ἀκλήρημα.
ἀναγκάζω
Attested: ἠναγκασμένῳ (ēnankasmenōi; 2.10), ἀναγκάσει (anankasei; 3.7), ἠνάγκασται (ēnankastai; 4.9), ἀναγκάζῃ (anankazēi; 5.5), ἀναγκάσων (anankasōn; 5.10.2), ἀναγκασθῇς (anankasthēis; 6.11), ἀναγκάζεται (anankazetai; 8.14), ἀναγκάζεσθαι (anankazesthai; 10.6.1). To compel, to force. "I shall remember that he is compelled to act so" (8.14); "for there is no one who will compel me to transgress against him" (5.10.2); "When you have been compelled by circumstances to be, as it were, thoroughly troubled, return quickly into yourself" (6.11); the nature of the universe "is not compelled even by any cause from outside to generate anything harmful to itself" (10.6.1). At 8.14 A, the Vatican manuscript, has the command "remember" for "I shall remember". Lemma: ἀναγκάζω.
ἀναγκαῖος
Attested: ἀναγκαίων (anankaiōn; 1.9.2, 1.16.3, 4.24), ἀναγκαῖον (anankaion; 2.3, 4.32.2, 4.33, 7.18, 10.7.1, 10.28, 11.19), τἀναγκαῖα (tanankaia; 4.24), ἀναγκαῖα (anankaia; 4.24, 6.11, 12.16), ἀναγκαίας (anankaias; 4.24), ἀναγκαιότατον (anankaiotaton, superlative; 7.63). Necessary, needful; with the article, necessity. "And there is necessity too" (2.3); "Is it not better to do what is necessary, and whatever the reason of a living being civic by nature requires, and as it requires?" (4.24); "while bare following is necessary for all" (10.28); "This imagining is not necessary" (11.19). Lemma: ἀναγκαῖος.
ἀνάγκη
Attested: ἀνάγκης (anankēs; 1.12, 3.4.3, 4.6, 10.7.1), ἀνάγκη (anankē; 2.8, 5.28, 6.16.4 twice, 6.41, 7.51, 8.31, 9.1.2, 9.42.1, 10.6.2, 10.7.1, 11.18.3, 12.14 twice), ἀνάγκας (anankas; 11.18.1). Necessity, constraint; with an infinitive, it is necessary. "These things are bound by nature to happen so, from such people, of necessity" (4.6); "this man too is one of those shameless people who must be in the universe" (9.42.1); "If, then, a necessity not to be transgressed, why do you resist?" (12.14); in the plural, "what compulsions of principles they have laid down" (11.18.1). At 7.51 the word stands in two lines of an unknown tragedy, as the edition's note says. At 12.14 P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, has εἱμαρμένη (heimarmenē), "fated", for εἱμαρμένης (heimarmenēs), "of fate", and omits the "and" that follows. Lemma: ἀνάγκη.
ἀτυχέω
Attested: ἀτυχεῖν (atychein; 8.56). To be unlucky, to fare ill. A neighbour's vice is not bad for Marcus, which God did not decide, "so that my being unlucky should not be in another's power" (8.56; see Ruling centre). Lemma: ἀτυχέω.
ἀτύχημα
Attested: ἀτύχημα (atychēma; 4.49.1 twice, 4.49.2). A misfortune. "Why then is that a misfortune rather than this good fortune? Do you call anything at all a man's misfortune which is not a failure of man's nature?" (4.49.1); "not that this is a misfortune, but that to bear it nobly is good fortune" (4.49.2). Lemma: ἀτύχημα.
ἀτυχής
Attested: ἀτυχής (atychēs; 4.49.1, 8.48). Unlucky, unfortunate. "Unlucky am I, because this has happened to me" (4.49.1); "he who has seen it and does not flee to it is unlucky" (8.48). At 8.48 Herbert Richards, whose notes on Marcus Aurelius appeared in the Classical Review in 1905, proposed to exchange "ignorant" and "unlucky", as J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, reports. Lemma: ἀτυχής.
εἰκαῖος
Attested: εἰκαίῳ (eikaiōi; 6.10). Random, haphazard. If all is a jumble, "why do I even crave to linger in such a random compound and confusion?" (6.10; see Providence and atoms). Lemma: εἰκαῖος.
εἰκαιότης
Attested: εἰκαιότητος (eikaiotētos; 2.5, 2.13, 12.14). Randomness, aimlessness. Marcus will give himself leisure if he does each act as the last of his life, "free of all aimlessness" (2.5); the service of the daimon is to keep it "pure of passion, aimlessness and discontent" (2.13); the third member of 12.14 is "a confusion of aimlessness without a leader". Lemma: εἰκαιότης.
εἰκῇ
Attested: εἰκῇ (eikēi; 2.16, 2.17.2, 3.4.2, 4.2, 7.66, 8.17, 9.28 twice, 12.20, 12.24). At random, without plan or aim. "Let no act be done at random" (4.2); "For one must do nothing at random" (8.17); "if God, all is well; if at random, do not you too act at random" (9.28); Socrates is to be judged by whether he was "neither indignant at random at vice nor indeed a slave to anyone's ignorance" (7.66). With the article it is "what is random" (3.4.2). Lemma: εἰκῇ.
ἔνδεσις
Attested: ἔνδεσιν (endesin; 10.28). A binding in, bondage. "Form an impression of our bondage, and that to the rational living being alone it is given to follow willingly what happens" (10.28). Leopold ends the preceding sentence at "in silence", so that "our bondage" depends on the chapter's opening "Form the impression", and the English supplies the verb; he reports ἔνδοσιν (endosin), "giving in", in two manuscripts. Both points are in the edition's note. Lemma: ἔνδεσις.
ἐπάναγκος
Attested: ἐπάναγκες (epanankes, the neuter used as an adverb; 1.16.2). Compulsory; as an adverb, of necessity. Antoninus left his friends free "not to dine with him every time nor go with him on his journeys as a matter of course" (1.16.2). Lemma: ἐπάναγκος.
ἐπιτυχία
Attested: ἐπιτυχίαν (epitychian; 12.24), ἐπιτυχίᾳ (epitychiāi; 12.24). A hitting upon, chance. What happens from outside "is either by chance or by providence; and one must neither blame chance nor bring a charge against providence" (12.24; see Providence and atoms). Lemma: ἐπιτυχία.
εὐκλήρημα
Attested: εὐκληρημάτων (euklērēmatōn; 5.12). A piece of good fortune, a windfall. The many receive "the line about wealth and the windfalls that bring luxury or fame" as aptly said (5.12; see Good, bad and indifference). Lemma: εὐκλήρημα.
εὐτύχημα
Attested: εὐτύχημα (eutychēma; 4.49.1, 4.49.2). A piece of good fortune. "Why then is that a misfortune rather than this good fortune?" (4.49.1); "to bear it nobly is good fortune" (4.49.2; see Courage and endurance). Lemma: εὐτύχημα.
εὐτυχής
Attested: εὐτυχής (eutychēs; 4.49.1). Lucky, fortunate. "No: lucky am I, because though this has happened to me I go on free from distress" (4.49.1). Lemma: εὐτυχής.
καταναγκάζω
Attested: κατηναγκασμένον (katēnankasmenon; 4.45). To compel, constrain; the perfect participle, what has been made necessary. The sequence of things is not "like some enumeration, holding disconnectedly [and] only what is compelled, but a reasoned connection" (4.45; see Cosmos and order). The bracket marks the "and" that Leopold deletes, after Johann Matthias Schultz, who edited the Meditations in 1802. Lemma: καταναγκάζω.
σύντευξις
Attested: σύντευξιν (synteuxin; 3.11.3). A meeting, a coincidence, from συντυγχάνειν (syntynchanein), "to meet with". Of each thing one must say that it has come "by the fall of the lot and the spinning together wound along with it and such coincidence and fortune" (3.11.3; see Good, bad and indifference). Lemma: σύντευξις.
τυγχάνω
Attested: τύχῃ (tychēi; 1.13), τυγχάνοντας (tynchanontas; 1.14.2), ἔτυχε (etyche; 1.17.1, 11.18.4), τυχεῖν (tychein; 1.17.4, 7.53, 7.73), τυχοῦσα (tychousa; 5.8.4), τυχοῦσιν (tychousin; 5.10.1), τυγχάνεις (tynchaneis; 6.50, 11.7), τυχόν (tychon; 10.36), τυγχάνει (tynchanei; 11.1.1), ἔτυχεν (etychen; 11.24), τυχόντος (tychontos; 11.38). To hit upon, to attain; to happen to be; and, in the participle, any chance one. Of chance: "for not even any chance nature brings anything that is not appropriate to what is governed by it" (5.8.4); philosophers "not ordinary ones" (5.10.1); "if it so happens" (11.18.4) and "had things fallen out so" (1.17.1); the contest, Epictetus said, "is not about any chance thing, but about being mad or not" (11.38), a saying the edition's note identifies. Of attaining: the rational soul "attains its own end wherever the term of life comes upon it" (11.1.1). Of happening to be: "this in which you now happen to be" (11.7). At 5.8.4 A and the books of excerpts omit τυχοῦσα. Lemma: τυγχάνω.
τύχη
Attested: τύχη (tychē; 1.16.4, 2.17.1), τύχης (tychēs; 1.17.9, 2.3), τύχην (tychēn; 3.11.3), τύχαις (tychais; 12.27). What befalls; fortune. "The works of fortune are not apart from nature" (2.3); "the soul a whirl, fortune hard to read" (2.17.1); Antoninus used what "fortune supplied in plenty" (1.16.4); all these gifts, among them his escape from sophists, "need the help of gods and of fortune", in a line Leopold marks as a quotation from an unknown source (1.17.9). Lemma: τύχη.
Source note
1. [Plutarch], On the Opinions of the Philosophers 1.29, 885c–d.
2. Cicero, On Fate 39–43.
3. Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies 1.21.1–2.
4. Epictetus, Discourses 1.14.15–16.