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craftsman of health

δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας

Whether a knowledge of knowledge can produce health · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordA craftsman named by what he produces, with the product in the genitive: the maker of health.
  • In the CharmidesOnce: “Then it will not be the craftsman of health?” “Certainly not” (174e). The question denies to temperance the work of medicine, and the next lines deny it benefit (175a).
  • In this edition“The craftsman of health”.
  • A place to read174d–175a, with 157a and 165c–d.
English renderings
ὑγιείας … δημιουργός, hygieias … dēmiourgos, “the craftsman of health”

Meaning

The edition keeps two words apart: health, ὑγίεια, is the product of medicine, and the healthy, τὸ ὑγιεινόν, its object; “medicine is knowledge of the healthy and produces health”, as the Glossary puts it. The “craftsman of health” is the one who makes the product. The phrase asks whether temperance can be that craftsman, and the dialogue answers it from both ends.

Use in the book

Health is the dialogue’s first good. The Thracian taught that temperance comes to be in souls through beautiful words, “and once it has come to be and is present, it is easy then to provide health for the head and for the rest of the body too” (157a–b; see σωφροσύνη καὶ ὑγίεια). Temperance in the soul is the condition of health in the body. When Critias defines temperance as knowledge of oneself, Socrates takes medicine as the model of a knowledge that produces: asked what use it is and what it produces, he would say, “No small benefit: it produces health, a fine work for us” (165c–d; see ἀπεργάζομαι; καλὸν ἔργον). Temperance, he says, ought to answer the same question.

The phrase comes at the end of Critias’ last attempt. He has named the knowledge of good and bad as the one that makes us happy, and proposes to set temperance over it: temperance “presides over the other kinds of knowledge too”, and ruling over the knowledge of the good, it would benefit us (174d–e; see ἐπιστατέω). Socrates replies that to rule the crafts is not to do their work. Temperance was declared knowledge only of knowledge and of its lack (see ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός); “Then it will not be the craftsman of health?” “Certainly not.” “For health belonged to another craft, didn’t it?” “To another” (174e–175a; see τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον). Benefit too belongs to another craft, and temperance is “the craftsman of no benefit” (175a; see οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός).

The two ends of the dialogue can be read as speaking of two temperances. The charm’s temperance, a good state of the soul, makes health easy; Critias’ temperance, a knowledge whose only object is knowledge, can make nothing, health least of all. The question of 165c, what temperance produces, has had its answer.

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, and the passages on the making of health that it answers.

  1. 157a–bOnce temperance is present in the soul, it is easy to provide health for the head and the body.
  2. 165c–dAsked what medicine produces, Socrates would say health, a fine work.
  3. 174eTemperance, knowledge only of knowledge, will not be the craftsman of health.
  4. 175aHealth belongs to another craft, and benefit too; temperance is the craftsman of no benefit.

Translation in this edition

Οὐκ ἄρα ὑγιείας ἔσται δημιουργός; (174e9) is “Then it will not be the craftsman of health?”, keeping the question; the Greek puts “health” first, against “medicine” in the lines before. The Glossary lists the phrase with “of no benefit” under “craftsman”.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the Gorgias Socrates imagines the craftsmen of the goods praised in a drinking song, health first, then beauty, then honest wealth, coming to dispute Gorgias’ claim that his art concerns the greatest good. The doctor would say first, “Socrates, Gorgias is deceiving you”, for it is his own art that concerns the greatest good, and its work is health, than which nothing is a greater good (451e–452b). In the first book of the Republic Socrates argues against Thrasymachus that each art differs from the others by having a different power, and provides its own benefit, not a common one: medicine health, piloting safety at sea (346a). The Charmides asks what benefit a temperance that is no particular art could provide. The Euthydemus puts the same question to the kingly art (291e–292a), and the search goes round in a circle (291b–c, 292d–e; see ἀπεργάζομαι).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle’s master art can be read as what Critias proposed, given an end. Where a number of arts are subordinate to a single power, he writes, the ends of the directing arts are more to be chosen than those beneath them, since the lower are pursued for the sake of the higher; and the good, it seems, belongs to the art with the most authority, the one that most directs the rest, which is plainly politics, since it settles what kinds of knowledge a city must have, which of them each group must learn, and how far.1 His master art rules the others for the sake of an end of its own, the human good; Critias’ presiding temperance can be read as an architectonic art without one.

Source note

1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.1, 1094a9–16, and 1.2, 1094a26–b7.