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and of nothing else

ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός

The restriction that leaves temperance without benefit · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The word“Of nothing else”: a genitive of object that confines a knowledge to what has just been named.
  • In the CharmidesSocrates’ reminder at 174e: “didn’t we solemnly declare long ago that it is knowledge only of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge, and of nothing else?” It blocks Critias’ last attempt to set temperance over the knowledge of the good.
  • In this edition“And of nothing else”.
  • A place to read174d–175a.
English renderings
ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός, allou de oudenos, “and of nothing else”; οὐκ ἄλλου τινός … ἢ ἑαυτῆς, ouk allou tinos … ē heautēs, “of nothing else but itself”

Meaning

Ἄλλου (allou), “of another”, with οὐδενός (oudenos), “of none”, and δέ marking the contrast with the μόνον, “only”, before it: temperance is of knowledge only, and of nothing besides. The restriction is Critias’ own. He gave it at 166c, “All the others are knowledge of something else, not of themselves, but this alone is knowledge both of the other kinds of knowledge and of itself”, and Socrates stated it at 167b–c as “one single knowledge which is knowledge of nothing else but itself and the other kinds of knowledge”.

Use in the book

The restriction made temperance unique, and it made the parallels of 167c–168a strange: a sight that sees no colour, a love that loves nothing beautiful (see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς). At the end it decides the outcome. Critias has named the knowledge of good and bad as the one that makes us happy (174b), and tries to bring it under temperance, which, he says, presides over the other kinds of knowledge and so would rule over this one too, and benefit us (174d–e; see ἐπιστατέω).

Socrates answers with the restriction: “Would it also make us healthy … and not medicine? And would it do the other things belonging to the crafts, and not each of those crafts its own work? Or didn’t we solemnly declare long ago that it is knowledge only of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge, and of nothing else? Isn’t that so?” “It seems so” (174e; see διαμαρτύρομαι; τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον). Then temperance will not be “the craftsman of health”, since health belongs to another craft; nor of benefit, since that work too was given to another craft; “How then will temperance be beneficial, when it is the craftsman of no benefit?” (174e–175a; see οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός).

The phrase is the hinge of the last refutation. Critias’ definition is caught between two demands: to be unlike every other knowledge, which the restriction secures, and to benefit us, which needs an object, the good. To rule over the other kinds of knowledge is not to have their objects. The restriction he accepted to make temperance unique is what makes it useless.

Places to read

The passages in which the restriction is stated and used.

  1. 166cCritias: all the other kinds of knowledge are of something else, not of themselves; temperance alone is of itself and the others.
  2. 167b–c2Socrates states it: one single knowledge which is of nothing else but itself and the other kinds of knowledge.
  3. 168aSocrates restates it: knowledge of no subject of learning, but of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge.
  4. 174d–175a2Critias would set temperance over the knowledge of the good; Socrates recalls that it is knowledge only of knowledge and of nothing else; so it is the craftsman neither of health nor of benefit.

Translation in this edition

Ἐπιστήμης μόνον … καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης ἐπιστήμη, ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός (174e) is “knowledge only of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge, and of nothing else”. Διεμαρτυρόμεθα, “we called to witness, declared solemnly”, is “solemnly declare”, and the edition keeps its weight: the restriction was a formal undertaking.

Elsewhere in Plato

The principle behind “each of those crafts its own work” is set out in the Ion. Socrates asks the rhapsode Ion whether a certain work has not been given by the god to each craft to know, so that what we know by the pilot’s art we shall not know by medicine, and so for all the crafts (537c–d). In the Euthydemus Socrates and Clinias look for the kingly art that would rule over all the others and make men happy, and find themselves going round in a circle, unable to say what it produces (291b–292e), as the edition’s note at 174c observes. Critias’ “presides over” asks for that kingly art; his definition has already denied it any object of its own.