From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordThe medical art, ἡ ἰατρικὴ τέχνη: the craft that belongs to the ἰατρός, the doctor.
- In the CharmidesThirteen times. Socrates’ pretended “doctoring” (158e); “And medicine … is knowledge of the healthy?” (165c); “he knows the healthy by medicine and not by temperance” (170c); “Then the medical man doesn’t know about medicine either” (170e); and at the end, “will medicine make us any less healthy …?” (174c).
- In this edition“Medicine”; “doctoring” once (158e), as the Glossary records.
- A place to read165c–166a and 170b–171c.
- English renderings
- ἰατρική, iatrikē, “medicine”; ἰατρικῆς, iatrikēs, “(about, without) medicine”; ἰατρικῇ, iatrikēi, “(by) medicine”; ἰατρικήν, iatrikēn, “medicine”, “doctoring”
Meaning
Ἰατρική is an adjective made into a noun, with τέχνη, “craft”, or ἐπιστήμη, “knowledge”, understood: the art of the doctor. For Plato’s Socrates it is a favourite craft to argue with. It has a subject, the body; an object, the healthy and the diseased; and a product, health. Its practitioners can be told apart, and it can be taught. The edition’s Glossary records how the dialogue keeps object and product distinct: “medicine is knowledge of the healthy and produces health” (Glossary, “health”).
Use in the book
The word enters as a joke. Socrates is playing the doctor at Critias’ suggestion (155b), and he proposes to look into the boy’s temperance with him, so that, as he puts it, “I … won’t set about my doctoring without looking into things” (158e; see ἀσκέπτως; κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι). The doctoring is the inquiry.
Then medicine becomes the model. When Critias defines temperance as knowledge of oneself, Socrates asks for its object and its work on medicine’s pattern: “And medicine … is knowledge of the healthy?” “Certainly” (165c), and its work is health (165c–d; see ἐπιστήμη τινός; καλὸν ἔργον). Critias objects that temperance is not like the other kinds of knowledge (165e; see ζήτησις).
In the long examination of 170a–171c medicine becomes the rival. If temperance is knowledge of knowledge alone, the temperate man “knows the healthy by medicine and not by temperance” (170c; see ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινοῦ καὶ νοσώδους). The consequence is drawn with a straight face: since knowledge of knowledge was assigned to temperance alone, the medical man does not know about medicine either, “since medicine is in fact a knowledge” (170e–171a; see ἰατρικός). The edition’s note at 171a explains the joke: the conclusion follows “because medicine has just been classed as a knowledge, and knowledge of knowledge was given to temperance alone”. Medicine is defined by its object, and whoever would look into it must look into it there (171a–b; see ᾗ ἰατρικός), so that no one could follow what a doctor says and does “without medicine” (171b; see ἐπακολουθέω).
At the end medicine is the standard. If the knowledge of good and bad is taken away, Socrates asks, “will medicine make us any less healthy …?” “No less” (174c; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ); and temperance, set over the crafts, would not make us healthy in medicine’s place (174e; see δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας). The last three uses can be read as a measure of the definitions: medicine goes on doing its work through all of them, and the temperance of knowledge of knowledge is shown to do none.
Places to read
Every passage in which the noun occurs.
- 158eSocrates will not set about his doctoring without looking into things.
- 165cMedicine is knowledge of the healthy; what use is it and what does it produce?
- 170b–c2The knowledge of the healthy is medicine; the healthy is known by medicine, not by temperance.
- 170e–171a2One will not discuss medicine with the doctor; the medical man does not know about medicine, since medicine is a knowledge.
- 171a–bMedicine is defined by being knowledge of the healthy and the diseased, and must be looked into there; no one can follow a doctor without medicine.
- 174cWithout the knowledge of good and bad, medicine will still make us healthy.
- 174eWould temperance make us healthy, and not medicine?
Translation in this edition
“Medicine” throughout, and “doctoring” for ἐπὶ τὴν ἰατρικήν at 158e2, of Socrates’ pretence, as the Glossary records. At 170e12 “the medical man” renders ὁ ἰατρικός (see ἰατρικός).
Elsewhere in Plato
In the Gorgias medicine is the art that flattery imitates. Socrates tells Gorgias and Polus that cookery has slipped in under medicine and pretends to know the best foods for the body, so that before children the doctor would die of hunger (464d–e; see ἀληθινός); cookery he will not call a craft, only experience, since it can give no reasoned account of the things it serves up, of what they are by nature (465a; see ἄλογος). Later Socrates makes justice the medicine of the soul. As money-making frees us from poverty and medicine from disease, so the penalty frees us from licentiousness and injustice; being treated is not pleasant but beneficial; and the penalty “makes men temperate and more just, and becomes a medicine of wickedness” (478a–d).
Other ancient sources
The Hippocratic treatise On Ancient Medicine, of the late fifth century BC, argues for medicine’s claim to be a craft from the differences between its practitioners. Its craftsmen, the writer says, are some poor and some far superior, which could not be so if there were no medicine at all; all would be equally inexperienced and without knowledge of it, and chance would govern everything for the sick.1 The test the Charmides cannot perform, telling the good doctor from the bad, can be read as the treatise’s proof that there is something to know.
Aristotle uses medicine to separate experience from craft. To judge that a certain remedy helped Callias, sick with this disease, and Socrates, and many others one by one, Callias and Socrates standing for any patients, belongs to experience; to judge that it helps all of one kind, marked off as a class, when they are sick with this disease, the phlegmatic, say, or the bilious when they burn with fever, belongs to craft.2
Source note
1. Hippocrates, On Ancient Medicine 1.
2. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.1, 981a5–12.