Π Pi

do, act

πράττω

To do, to act, to fare: the verb of the boy’s first and third definitions, of the doctor’s treatment, of the life run by knowledge, and of the last resort to force · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordTo do, to carry out, to manage; with an adverb, to fare, so that εὖ πράττειν is both to act well and to do well in life.
  • In the CharmidesForty-eight times. It is the verb of Charmides’ first and third definitions, “doing everything in an orderly way and quietly” (159b) and “doing one’s own business” (161b); of the doctor who, “having acted beneficially or harmfully, does not know himself—how he has acted” (164b–c); of the life without error, in which no one would try to do what he did not know (171e); and of the last exchange: “When you set about doing anything, and use force, no man alive will be able to oppose you” (176d).
  • In this edition“Do”, “doing”; “act”, “acted” (164b–c, 173d); “done”, “are done” (171b), “be done” (173b); “do well” for εὖ πράττειν.
  • A place to read161d–164c and 171d–173d.
English renderings
πράττειν, prattein, “doing”, “do”, “to do”, “acting”; πράττων, prattōn, “the man who does”; πράττει, prattei, “does”, “acts”; πράττῃ, prattēi, “(the work he) is doing”; πράξας, praxas, “having acted”; ἔπραξεν, epraxen, “he has acted”, “he acted”; ἐπράττετε, eprattete, “you were (not) doing”; πράττοντες, prattontes, “(by) acting”, “those who do”; πράττοντας, prattontas, “those who do”; πράττοντα, prattonta, “the man who does (his own business)”; πράξειν, praxein, “(what they) would do”; πραττομένοις, prattomenois, “done”; πραττόμενα, prattomena, “the things done”; πράττεται, prattetai, “are done”; πράττοιεν, prattoien, “did”; πράττοιμεν, prattoimen, “we would do (well)”; πράττοιτο, prattoito, “be done”; πράττοι, prattoi, “would act”

Meaning

Πράττω, the Attic form of πράσσω, is to pass through to an end, and so to accomplish: to do a thing, to transact business, to manage affairs; intransitively, with an adverb, to fare. The Greek verb is wider than English “do”. It is the word for a statesman’s dealings and a man’s private affairs, and its noun πράγματα, “matters”, “business”, covers what both deal with. Set beside ποιεῖν, “make”, it leans towards the act rather than the product, and Critias turns that leaning into a doctrine (see ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν). The double sense of doing and faring is the hinge of the dialogue’s second half, as the edition’s Key Words say of εὖ πράττειν: it “means both to act well and to fare well, to prosper, as English ‘do well’ also can”.

Use in the book

The verb carries two of the three definitions that the boy offers and loses. His first makes temperance “doing everything in an orderly way and quietly” (159b; see κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ), and Socrates answers by comparing actions, quick and quiet (160b–c; see τὸ ἡσυχῇ πράττειν). His third is “doing one’s own business” (161b; see τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν), and Socrates refutes it by widening the verb until it covers anything done at all, writing and reading, healing, building and weaving (161d–e; see ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν; πολυπραγμονέω). The edition’s note at 161e names the move: “Socrates takes ‘doing’ to mean making or performing anything at all.” Critias narrows the verb again, from Hesiod, and makes doing the making of good things (163b–e; see ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν; πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν).

The doctor’s case gives the verb its own argument (164a–c; see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτόν; τὰ δέοντα). In a few lines it passes from doing a thing, healing, to acting in a manner: a doctor need not know when his treatment is beneficial, nor each craftsman when he is going to profit from “the work he is doing”, and so the doctor, “having acted beneficially or harmfully, does not know himself—how he has acted”, and yet, having acted beneficially, “he acted temperately”, by Critias’ account (164b–c). The doctor’s deed has two descriptions, what he does and how it turns out for the patient, and he can know the first without the second. The gap between them is the whole difficulty of Critias’ definition.

The same gap opens again in the life without error. If the temperate man knew what he knew and what he did not, Socrates says, “neither would we ourselves try to do what we did not know … Nor would we allow the others we ruled to do anything except what they would do correctly”, and so those so disposed would “do finely and well” and be happy (171d–172a; see εὖ πράττειν; ὀρθῶς; πρᾶξις). The verb begins the sentence as acting and ends it as faring. Socrates later withdraws the agreement that it would be a great good “if each of us did what we knew” (172d; see πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν), and in the dream he grants everything except the last step: everything would “be done according to the kinds of knowledge”, and “the human race would act and live knowledgeably, I grant … But that by acting knowledgeably we would do well and be happy, this, my dear Critias, we cannot yet learn” (173a–d; see ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν; κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας). The dream’s question is whether doing in the first sense ever yields doing in the second.

The last use takes the verb out of the argument. Charmides and his guardian have resolved that Socrates will charm the boy whether he will or not, and Socrates yields to the boy: “When you set about doing anything, and use force, no man alive will be able to oppose you” (176d; see βιάζομαι; ἐναντιόομαι). What the two did with force some twenty-five years later is told elsewhere (176c; see βιάζομαι). The verb that the argument could not tie to knowledge can be read as ending, in the hands of the boy and his guardian, as doing backed by force.

Places to read

The passages in which the verb occurs outside its set phrases, which have their own entries: κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ (159b), τὸ ἡσυχῇ πράττειν (160c), τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν with ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν and οἱ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντες (161b–163c, the verb’s other uses there included), and εὖ πράττειν (172a, 173d, 174b).

  1. 163eThe man who does bad things is not temperate, but the one who does good things.
  2. 164bThe doctor who makes someone healthy does what he ought; and the man who does what he ought is temperate.
  3. 164b–cA doctor need not know when his treatment is beneficial, nor a craftsman when he will profit from the work he is doing; having acted beneficially, the doctor may not know how he has acted.
  4. 171bThe examiner looks into whether the things said are said truly and whether the things done are done rightly.
  5. 171eWe would not try to do what we did not know, nor allow others to do anything except what they would do correctly.
  6. 172dSocrates doubts that it would be a great good if each of us did what we knew.
  7. 173a–bIf temperance ruled, everything would be done according to the kinds of knowledge.
  8. 173dThe human race would act and live knowledgeably; that by acting knowledgeably we would do well is not yet shown.
  9. 176dWhen Charmides sets about doing anything and uses force, no man alive will be able to oppose him.

Translation in this edition

The Key Words record that the three verbs of 161b–164c are kept apart, “‘make’ for poiein, ‘do’ for prattein, ‘work’ for ergazesthai”, and of “doing one’s own business” that “the English keeps the verb ‘do’ wherever the argument depends on it”. With the adverbs of 164b–c and 173d it is “act”: “having acted beneficially”, “he acted temperately” (164b11–c5), “would act and live knowledgeably”, “by acting knowledgeably” (173d1, 173d4); the passive is “done”, “the things done” and “are done” (171b7–9) and “be done” (173b1). Εὖ πράττειν is “do well” (172a2–3, 173d4, 173d7, 174b12). At 164b9 Burnet prints οὗ with T and W, where B has τοῦ, and πράττῃ with B and W, where T has πράξῃ; at 173b1 πάντ’ ἂν is his own correction, for ἄν in B and T and πάντα in Stobaeus; at 173d4 ἂν πράττοντες is T’s reading, where B has τὰ πράττοντες.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the Protagoras the same double verb is read in a poem. Simonides had written that every man is good who has fared well, πράξας εὖ, and bad if he has fared badly, and Socrates gives the line his own sense. What faring well at letters makes a man good at letters? Plainly, learning them. What well-doing makes a good doctor? Learning how to treat the sick. A bad doctor must first have been a doctor, and a good one; those who know nothing of medicine could never fare badly into being doctors at all. So a good man may become bad, through time, toil, illness or some other mischance, “for this is the one bad doing, to be robbed of knowledge” (344e–345b). Socrates’ reading makes faring well a matter of knowing, and can be read as the very step that the Charmides’ dream withholds and cannot show.