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absurd

ἄλογος

The absurd, which the concessions came to · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordἌλογος is without λόγος: without account or reason, absurd; also without speech.
  • In the CharmidesOnce in Burnet’s text. Nothing, Socrates says, could appear “more absurd” than their concession that the temperate man knows, of what he does not know, that he does not know it (175c). The manuscripts B and W also have the word at 158c, where T has “not easy”.
  • In this edition“Absurd”.
  • A place to read175b–c.
English renderings
ἀλογώτερον, alogōteron, “more absurd”

Meaning

Ἄλογος (alogos) joins the negative prefix to λόγος (logos), which is speech, account, reason and argument at once. What is ἄλογον cannot be given an account of: it is unreasonable, absurd. The same word is used of beasts, which lack speech, and of magnitudes that have no common measure. Socrates’ idiom at 175c, οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐχὶ ἀλογώτερον, is literally “more absurd than anything whatever”.

Use in the book

Socrates counts the concessions “that did not follow in the argument”, each made, as he says twice, “though the argument did not allow it”: that there is knowledge of knowledge, and that by it one knows the works of the other kinds of knowledge, “so that, if you please, our temperate man might turn out to know, of what he knows, that he knows it, and of what he does not know, that he does not know it. This we conceded with the utmost magnificence, without even considering that it is impossible to know, in some way or other, what one does not know at all; for our agreement says that he knows them, knows that he does not know them. And yet, I think, nothing could appear more absurd than this” (175b–c; see ἁμῶς γέ πως; μεγαλοπρεπῶς; ὁμολογία).

The word is chosen with λόγος in view. What they conceded was what the λόγος did not allow, and the result is ἄλογον, without λόγος. The absurdity is a contradiction: to know of something that one does not know it, one must in some way know it; but it is something one does not know “at all” (μηδαμῶς).

The absurdity belongs to the formula as Critias’ definition made it, a knowledge by which the temperate man would know the very objects of the knowledges he lacks (175b). Socrates’ own aim, not to “think I know something when I don’t” (166d; see λανθάνω), claims less and does not run into it. The dialogue’s last word on the formula can be read as marking the limit of Critias’ version, not of the Socratic disclaimer (see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν).

At 158c the manuscripts divide. When Socrates asks Charmides whether he is temperate, the boy says, in T, that it was “not easy” (οὐ ῥᾴδιον) either to agree or to deny; in B and W, that it was “unreasonable” (ἄλογον). On the reading of B and W the boy would call the question itself absurd; on T’s, he finds it hard, which fits his blush.

Places to read

The one passage in which the word occurs in Burnet’s text, and the manuscripts’ reading at 158c.

  1. 158cB and W read ἄλογον, “unreasonable”, where Burnet prints T’s “not easy”: either to agree or to deny that he is temperate.
  2. 175b–c2Nothing could be more absurd than the conceded claim that the temperate man knows, of what he does not know, that he does not know it.

Translation in this edition

Ἀλογώτερον (175c) is “more absurd”; “absurd” renders no other word in the edition’s English, and ἄτοπος, “strange” or “odd”, is kept apart (see ἄτοπος). At 158c7 Burnet prints οὐ ῥᾴδιον from T and a variant in W, against ἄλογον in B and W, and the English follows: “it was not easy, in the circumstances, either to agree or to deny”.

Elsewhere in Plato

The Theaetetus meets the same absurdity in the puzzle of false judgement. Socrates and Theaetetus agree that about each thing one either knows it or does not, and that it is impossible for one who knows a thing not to know it, or for one who does not know it to know it (188a–b); to take what one knows for what one does not know would be “a monstrosity” (188c). In the Gorgias the word marks the line between craft and knack: Socrates will not call cookery a craft, because it has no account of the nature of what it applies, and “I do not call a craft anything that is without an account” (465a).