From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordWhat is said: a word, a report, an account, a reason or principle, an argument, and the discussion in which arguments are given.
- In the CharmidesTwenty-four times, from the boy’s “You’re talked about a good deal among people my age” (156a) to Socrates’ “unable to inquire into anything whatever by argument” (176a); at the centre, “Just pay attention to the argument itself, and look to see what will become of it under refutation” (166e); near the end, “we have conceded many things that did not follow in the argument” (175b).
- In this editionThe Glossary: “argument, λόγος (logos), where it means the discussion itself: 160b–d, 162e, 166c–e, 169d, 173e, 175b–c, 176a. Elsewhere ‘account’ (158d, 164c, 165b), ‘principle’ (156c, 161e) and ‘words’ (157a, ‘beautiful words’).”
- A place to read175b–c.
- English renderings
- λόγος, logos, “(you’re) talked about”, “account”, “the argument”; λόγου, logou, “principle”, “argument”; λόγῳ, logōi, “argument”; λόγον, logon, “principle”, “says”, “answer for”, “the argument”, “what you meant”, “account”; λόγους, logous, “words”; λόγων, logōn, “words”
Meaning
Λόγος is the noun of λέγω, “say”, and no English word covers it. It is what is said about someone, his reputation; the account a man gives, of himself or of a matter; the reckoning that lies behind a practice, its principle or ratio; the argument that moves from premises to a conclusion; and, by an easy step, the discussion in which such arguments are put forward and tested. Greek uses one word where English needs five, and the dialogue moves through all of them.
Use in the book
The early uses are of what people say. The boy knows Socrates because he is much talked about, οὐ … ὀλίγος λόγος (156a); the boy is temperate “as Critias here says” and “by his account” (158b, 158d); the doctor acts temperately “by your account” (164c). Then the word becomes a principle: the doctors put the whole body on a regimen “On this principle”, and the boy says he accepts “the principle” (156c; see ἀποδέχομαι); the imagined law would have each man make everything “on the same principle” (161e). At 157a λόγοι are the beautiful words of the charm (see λόγοι καλοί), and at 163d Socrates tells Critias, “almost as soon as you began I understood what you meant”, ἐμάνθανον τὸν λόγον (see μανθάνω).
From 160b the word is the argument, and the argument is given a life of its own. Its conclusions hold “on this argument at any rate” (160b), and its premises were laid down “in our argument” (160d; see ὑποτίθημι). Critias takes it over from the boy (162e; see παραδέχομαι). When he complains that Socrates is “letting go of what the argument is about” (166c), Socrates answers that he is examining the argument for his own sake above all (166d; see σκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον), and tells Critias to forget which of them is being refuted: “Just pay attention to the argument itself, and look to see what will become of it under refutation” (166e; see ἐκβαίνω). The argument has a course of its own; Socrates grants a premise “to keep our argument moving” (169d; see πρόειμι), and later finds that “we are no longer holding to the argument” that the man who lives knowledgeably is happy (173e; see ἐμμένω).
At the end the argument speaks against those who conducted it. “And yet we have conceded many things that did not follow in the argument. For we conceded that there is knowledge of knowledge, though the argument did not allow it or say that there was; and we conceded, again, that by this knowledge one knows the works of the other kinds of knowledge too, though the argument did not allow this either” (175b–c; see ἐάω; πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν; φάσκω). The λόγος is the third party in a conversation of two: it allows and refuses, says and does not say, and the speakers have overridden it. The failure Socrates blames is theirs, not the argument’s, and the last use of the word shows what he thinks he has proved about himself: if the boy has temperance, he should regard Socrates as a babbler, “unable to inquire into anything whatever by argument” (176a; see λῆρος). The charm made of λόγοι and the argument that refused its consent are the same word, and the dialogue can be read as asking whether the first can work without the second.
Places to read
Every passage in which the noun occurs.
- 156aSocrates is much talked about among the boy’s age-group.
- 156cThe doctors treat the whole on this principle; the boy accepts the principle.
- 157aThe charms are beautiful words; from such words temperance comes to be.
- 158bThe boy is well endowed for temperance, as Critias says.
- 158dMany think the boy temperate, by Critias’ account.
- 160bOn this argument the temperate life would not be quiet.
- 160dIn the argument temperance was laid down as one of the fine things.
- 161eA law would order each man to make everything on the same principle.
- 162cThe boy wants Critias, not himself, to answer for the definition.
- 162eCritias agrees and takes the argument over.
- 163dSocrates understood what Critias meant almost as soon as he began.
- 164cThe doctor acted temperately, by Critias’ account.
- 165bCritias is willing to give an account of knowing oneself.
- 166cCritias: Socrates is letting go of what the argument is about.
- 166dSocrates examines the argument for his own sake above all.
- 166ePay attention to the argument itself and see what becomes of it under refutation.
- 169dSocrates grants a premise to keep the argument moving.
- 173eThey are no longer holding to the argument that the knowledgeable man is happy.
- 175b–c2They conceded many things that did not follow in the argument, though the argument did not allow them.
- 176aSocrates should be regarded as a babbler, unable to inquire by argument.
Translation in this edition
The English follows the Glossary’s division: “talked about” (156a6), “principle” (156c3, 156c8, 161e13), “words” (157a4–5), “says” (158b3), “account” (158d4, 164c2, 165b3), “argument” (160b8, 160d1, 162e3, 166c5, 166d3, 166e2, 169d2, 173e6, 175b5, 175b7, 175c1, 176a3), “answer for the definition” for ὑπέχειν λόγον (162c7; see ὑπέχειν λόγον) and “what you meant” (163d2). Its opposite, ἄλογος, gives “more absurd”, ἀλογώτερον, at 175c (see ἄλογος).
Elsewhere in Plato
The argument as a third party is a Platonic habit. At the end of the Protagoras Socrates says that the outcome of their arguments seems, like a human being, to accuse and mock them, and if it found a voice it would say, “You are absurd, Socrates and Protagoras”, since each has ended by arguing the other’s case (361a–c). In the Crito he describes himself as the kind of man who, not for the first time now but always, obeys nothing of his own except the λόγος that seems best to him when he reasons (46b). In the Republic, when Adeimantus guesses that he is considering whether to admit tragedy and comedy into the city, he answers that perhaps it is that and perhaps more, for he does not yet know, “but wherever the argument, like a wind, carries us, there we must go” (394d). In the Phaedo, after his friends have lost faith in the arguments for the soul’s immortality (88c–89e; see ἀπιστία), he warns them that it would be a pitiable fate if, when there is an argument that is true and sound and can be grasped, a man who has met arguments that seem now true and now false were to blame not himself and his own lack of skill but in the end, in his distress, gladly push the blame off onto the arguments, and spend the rest of his life hating and abusing them, deprived of the truth and knowledge of the things that are (90c–d). The Charmides ends on the right side of that warning: at 175b–c the blame falls on the speakers.
Other ancient sources
Aristotle makes λόγος the mark of the human being. Nature does nothing in vain, he says, and man alone of animals has λόγος; voice is a sign of pain and pleasure, and so other animals have it too, but λόγος is there to make plain what is beneficial and what harmful, and so what is just and what unjust; for this is proper to men as against the other animals, that they alone perceive good and bad, just and unjust, and the rest, and it is sharing in these that makes a household and a city.1 The knowledge the Charmides looks for at the end, of good and bad, can be read as standing where Aristotle puts the work of speech.
Source note
1. Aristotle, Politics 1.2, 1253a9–18.