Μ Mu

learn, understand

μανθάνω

Learn and understand: how Socrates came by his charm, and the benefit left to the knowledge of knowledge · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordTo learn, to come to know; and, of what is said, to understand.
  • In the CharmidesTwelve times: “I learned it out there on campaign from one of the Thracian doctors of Zalmoxis” (156d); “I learned that from Hesiod” (163b); “again I don’t understand how it is the same thing” (170a); “this, my dear Critias, we cannot yet learn” (173d); “if I took great pains to learn a charm for a thing worth nothing” (175e).
  • In this edition“Learn”, and “understand” where the object is something said.
  • A place to read172b–173d.
English renderings
ἔμαθον, emathon, “I learned”; μανθάνειν, manthanein, “learning”; ἐμάνθανον, emanthanon, “I understood”, “(took great pains) to learn”; μανθάνω, manthanō, “I (don’t) understand”; μανθάνῃ, manthanēi, “(whatever else) he learns”, “(each thing) he learns”; μαθήσεται, mathēsetai, “(will) learn”; μάθῃ, mathēi, “(has) learned”; μαθεῖν, mathein, “(cannot yet) learn”

Meaning

Μανθάνειν covers two things that English keeps apart: acquiring a knowledge one did not have, and understanding something said by means of a knowledge one has. A Greek who says μανθάνω in conversation usually means “I follow you”; a teacher’s pupils μανθάνουσι because they are learning. The Euthydemus makes a sophistical game of the double sense, and the Charmides uses both without comment.

Use in the book

The verb first names how authority is acquired. Socrates “learned” his charm from a Thracian doctor (156d; see Ζάλμοξις; Θρᾷξ), Critias “learned” his distinction from Hesiod (163b; see Ἡσίοδος), one a foreign healer at the opening of the cure, the other a poet where Critias takes over the argument. At the end Socrates returns to his own: he is still more aggrieved on account of the charm he learned from the Thracian, if he took great pains to learn a charm for a thing worth nothing (175e; see ἀγανακτέω; σπουδή). The inquiry has been, among other things, a test of whether what he learned was worth learning, and he refuses its apparent verdict: “Well, I don’t at all think it is so; rather, I am a poor inquirer” (175e; see ζητητής).

In conversation the verb means understanding, and its two uses can be read as measuring the two halves of Critias’ performance. When Critias distinguishes making from doing, Socrates says, “almost as soon as you began I understood what you meant” (163d; see Πρόδικος): the distinctions are easy to follow because they are only distinctions of words. When Critias claims that knowing oneself is the same as knowing what one knows and does not know, Socrates says, “I’m afraid I’m my same old self: again I don’t understand how it is the same thing” (170a; see κινδυνεύω). What he does not understand is the point on which the definition fails.

The verb is also the benefit left to the knowledge of knowledge. Learning easily was finer than learning with difficulty, and learning easily was learning quickly (159e; see δυσμαθία; εὐμαθία). Later Socrates proposes that the good temperance has may be that “whoever has it will learn more easily whatever else he learns”, seeing the knowledge as well as each thing learned, and will examine others better about what he has learned (172b; see ἐναργής; ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην; προσκαθοράω). In the dream the verb marks the limit of what they have found: that acting knowledgeably would make us do well and be happy, “this, my dear Critias, we cannot yet learn” (173d; see ἐπιστημόνως). The noun of the verb names what the knowledge of knowledge was knowledge of none of (168a; see μάθημα).

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

  1. 156dSocrates learned the charm from one of the Thracian doctors of Zalmoxis.
  2. 159eLearning easily is learning quickly.
  3. 163bCritias learned his distinction from Hesiod.
  4. 163dSocrates understood what Critias meant as soon as he began.
  5. 170aSocrates does not understand how it is the same thing, to know what one knows and to know what one does not know.
  6. 172bWhoever has knowledge of knowledge will learn more easily whatever else he learns.
  7. 173dThat acting knowledgeably makes us happy they cannot yet learn.
  8. 175eSocrates is aggrieved for the charm he learned from the Thracian, if he took great pains to learn a charm for a thing worth nothing.

Translation in this edition

“Learn” wherever the verb means acquiring (156d4, 159e3, 163b4, 172b3–7, 173d5, 175e3, 175e5); “understand” at 163d2 and 170a3, where the object is what someone has said. “Learning easily” renders εὐμαθία (159e1–3; see εὐμαθία).

Elsewhere in Plato

In the Euthydemus Socrates explains the trick of the two sophists who have just made young Clinias say first that the wise learn and then that the ignorant learn. As Prodicus says, he tells the boy, one must first learn about the correctness of names: people use “learning” both when someone who has no knowledge of a thing afterwards acquires it, and when someone who already has the knowledge uses it to examine the same thing being done or said, though they then call it understanding, συνιέναι, rather than learning, but sometimes learning too; and the sophists have shown him that the same name is applied to men in opposite states, the one who knows and the one who does not (277e–278a).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle lists the same double sense among the fallacies that arise from a word with more than one meaning: “those who know learn, since what is dictated is learned by the literate”; for “learning” is used both of understanding while using knowledge and of acquiring knowledge.1

Source note

1. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations 4, 165b32–34.