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accept

ἀποδέχομαι

Receiving an account, at once or after looking · Charmides

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Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordἈποδέχεσθαι is to receive from someone, and so to accept what he offers: a payment, a guest, a statement or an argument.
  • In the CharmidesFour times, at three moments. The boy accepts the good doctors’ principle (156c); Critias accepts that medicine produces health, “a fine work for us” (165d); and Socrates will not accept that a knowledge of knowledge is temperance until he has looked into whether it benefits us (169b).
  • In this edition“Accept”, and “I do” for Critias’ one-word answer at 165d.
  • A place to read169a–c.
English renderings
ἀποδέχῃ, apodechēi, “you accept”; ἀποδέχομαι, apodechomai, “I do”, “accept”

Meaning

Ἀποδέχεσθαι (apodechesthai) is δέχεσθαι, “to receive”, with ἀπό, “from”: to take something from someone’s hands. In argument it is the word for receiving a λόγος as sound, a little more than agreeing and a little less than being convinced: one accepts a principle in order to build on it. Its opposite is to send the account back, as one returns a bad coin.

Use in the book

The three moments make a sequence, from acceptance on hearsay to acceptance refused until the inquiry is done.

The boy accepts first, and quickly. Socrates has set out what good doctors say, that the part is treated with the whole, and the boy has agreed that this is what they say and that it is so (see αἰσθάνομαι); then: “And you think it well said, and you accept the principle?” “Absolutely” (156c). The principle is accepted because it is said and seems so, and the acceptance is what Socrates needs: hearing it, he takes heart again (156d; see ἀναθαρρέω). The whole account of the Thracian charm rests on it.

Critias accepts next, and the acceptance commits him to more than he sees. Socrates would answer that medicine produces health, “a fine work for us,” and he adds, “if you accept that.” “I do” (165d; see ἀπεργάζομαι). The small concession brings in the model of a knowledge known by its work, and when Socrates asks what fine work temperance produces, Critias must reject the question he has just let in (165e).

Socrates refuses last. Having left it to “a great man” to decide whether knowledge is among the things that relate to themselves, he says: “I can neither say with confidence whether it is possible … nor, even if it most certainly exists, accept that it is temperance, until I have looked into whether a thing of that kind would benefit us or not” (169a–b; see ἀπιστία; διισχυρίζομαι). Acceptance becomes the end of an inquiry, not its beginning. The dialogue can be read as giving the verb to the three speakers in the order of their caution: the boy who accepts what doctors say, the guardian who accepts what he does not examine, and the inquirer who accepts nothing he has not looked into.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

  1. 156cThe boy agrees that the good doctors’ principle is well said, and accepts it.
  2. 165dSocrates says that medicine produces health, a fine work, if Critias accepts that; Critias does.
  3. 169bSocrates cannot say whether a knowledge of knowledge is possible, nor accept that it is temperance until he has looked into whether it would benefit us.

Translation in this edition

“Accept” at 156c8 and 169b2. At 165d2–3 the English keeps the condition, “if you accept that”, and renders the answer, Ἀποδέχομαι, “I accept”, by the idiomatic “I do”. The λόγος accepted at 156c is “the principle”, one of the senses the Glossary records for the word.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the Phaedo acceptance binds as it binds Critias. Simmias says that arguments which prove from likelihoods are impostors, but that the account of recollection and learning was given through a hypothesis “worthy of acceptance”: that our soul exists before it enters a body just as surely as the being that bears the name “what it is”. “I have accepted this, as I persuade myself, adequately and rightly. So I must not, it seems, accept from myself or from anyone else the claim that the soul is a harmony” (92d–e). Having received one account, he is obliged to send back another. In the Charmides Critias receives a premise without seeing what it excludes; Simmias sees it and lets it decide.